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Abstract
Given the current juncture in history, humanity is faced with the herculean task of adapting to a
tumultuous present and a gimmer future. Should climate projections be accurate, there is little
time to waste. This work makes the claim that we are not only in a political gridlock but also in
an academic one. Researching climate philosophy from its inception, the concluding view is that
no major progress, outside of a standardized descriptive analysis, has been achieved. Thus, the
work evaluates an array of climate philosophers e.g. Stephen Gardiner, James Garvey, Peter
Singer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, etc., with specific emphasis on the economic philosopher
John Broome, suggesting that their recommendations and assessments fall short of being
totalizing in scope and therefore of producing viable theories that, if practically sought after, can
achieve social sustainability. To fix the problem of a lack of social and strategic trajectory, I
offer up Erich Fromm's humanistic philosophy as a suggestive model. In doing so, the argument
is made that this can aid in reorienting our external/empirical obsession by shifting our focus
toward our ‘interiority—our internal worlds and psyches—, since a necessary condition in
achieving sustainability is changing our mindset. By focusing on the human psyche, its structure
and needs, can our behavior finally shift in a way that compliments scientific recommendations
and ecological demands. Hence, Fromm lends the climate philosophy discussion an ontological
framework from which to better direct and more readily navigate toward less socially precarious
and more ethical inclined waters.
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Introduction
Reader beware: the argument made in this dissertation is neither bold nor original but is
instead something that, given the current historical juncture of humanity, simply needs to be
said.1 What is special about this particular juncture is that it is the first genuine situation that
requires the participation and inclusion of every nation in the world, industrial or otherwise. We
are presented with the opportunity to create the first ever cosmopolitan aim. Given all collected
data, the failure to do so would be to invite a cataclysm so great and pervasive that life as we
have come to know it, over the past 12,000 years or so, would no longer reflect the stability that
allowed our species to thrive to the extent that it has. Many point to a currently on-going
American Disenlightenment 2 as a bulwark that acts as a global counter-current and successfully
stymies any effort to move forward. But, I am of the opinion that given the data presented by
scientists, the entire international community appears to be in a state of “perplexed numbness”
induced by contact with a very peculiar “torpedo fish.” 3 That torpedo fish? Climate change.
While currently only four countries: Costa Rica, Norway, New Zealand, and Iceland, 4 have
managed to achieve carbon neutrality, the rest of the world remains in a stage of teenage
rebellion. Whereas some countries are considering adulthood and others are doubling down on

1

I ask the reader lend me some measure of poetic license for what is not an insignificant portion of the introduction
and forgives my brief aberration of academic tone for it twas not me, twere my fingers.
2
Cf. Martin Schönfeld, “American Disenlightenment: climate change made in USA” 2015, Environmental Ethics
for Canadians, 2nd Ed., ed. B. Williston, Oxford University Press.
3
Plato, Complete Works, “Meno,” ed. John H. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.), 879.
4
"UNEP Announces Climate Neutral Network | News | SDG Knowledge Hub | IISD". International Institute for
Sustainable Development. 2008-02-21. Retrieved 2019-11-09.
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continued narcissistic and reckless behavior, both are snugly nestled in maladaptive economies
built on unsustainable growth and modes of existence.
Despite the fact that the scientific community has managed to speak with a univocal
voice on an international level regarding humanity’s circumstance, almost every other institution
cannot seem to achieve any momentum due to a lack of consensus and a night sky deprived of a
political Polaris. What we see is a continued failure of public policy, a breakdown in national and
international politics, a preferential treatment toward outmoded economic models that assist the
ultra-wealthy while continuing to disenfranchise and marginalize the great majority, and
education systems steeped in globally synchronized 20th century ‘factory models.’ Confusion,
apathy, skepticism, anger, and frustration are some emotional composites coloring the canvas of
the modern milieu. Some idolize and attempt to recall a one time “great” 1950’s pre-civil rights
culture, while others patiently wait for a single savior to arrive and bring salvation to their
doorstep. Others yet, believe that the world is coming to an end; if not that, then it’s most
definitely flat, secretly controlled by NASA along with a few powerful members of an elite class
who are part of a pedophile ring overseen by the Clintons.
Our gaze, in a panicked fixation, is ill-fixed, looking to a mythological past, to ill-suited
strongmen of unassailable narcissism, to esoteric YouTube conspiracies and prophecies, to an
idolatry and fetishization of ‘free markets,’ all of which, promising answers and security, are put
into a blender and ejected in a lidless spew of mass hysteria, social tantrums, and popularized
non-cooperation. The truth is that there is no savior and no era in the past that we can recreate to
make everything go back to the way it was, and, most importantly, that there is no singular
answer. Humpty Dumpty cannot be put back together again despite the petulant protest and
irrational convictions of the fervently mad. And though we cannot reverse the hands of time and
2

crawl back into the womb from which consciousness was evolutionarily torn from, Paradise is
not lost. Hope is not lost.
Nietzsche wrote that “All sciences are now under the obligation to prepare the ground for
the future task of the philosopher, which is to solve the problem of value, to determine the true
hierarchy of values.”5 To the future then belongs the philosopher, who is not only poised to solve
the problem of the criterion and the hierarchy of values but construct new modes of interaction,
models of social engagement, and means for smoother person to person emotive enunciation. To
the future belongs those who know how to dream while awake. The answer will not come from a
single source but from the active participation of all people in a concentrated creative pulse of a
biophilic Will-to-life. The future belongs to each and every participant that helps to bring about a
systolic green and diastolic blue; colors of health melded together by humanity’s greatest
evolutionary achievement: solidarity. The alternative is to be confronted by a necrophilic brown;
a mass death. Evolve or perish is the motto and call to action of the Anthropocene.
The behavior of the individual becomes paramount, and the job of an ethicist, more
pertinent now than ever before. Social maturity can only be achieved by the accumulation of
individual awareness and a mass overcoming that passes beyond the mere (coincidental)
community and transforms into a willful collective of individual members. Contemporary
ethicists, while strongly advocating for change, are often still bound by the old ways. Their
analysis of current events and future roadblocks, while perspicacious, bitingly incisive, and
necessarily insightful, is confined mainly to investigation but undoubtedly, they leave any

5

Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kauffman (New York: Random House Inc.,
1967), 58.
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forward motion firmly within the hands of social whimsy. This is a salient feature of climate
ethics in that, though they all agree that climate change is real—that it is harmful to the flora and
fauna of the planet, that it is ‘evil’ since it puts not only our way of life in jeopardy but our entire
existence in peril, etc.— there has not been a satisfying answer as to what the grounding of
climate ethics is comprised of.
So what if it all falls apart?! Would the planet and all creatures that reside within it not
stand to benefit from our demise? It seems that the quicker we scorch the planet the quicker
‘environmental justice’ can finally be achieved and planetary flourishing can begin anew with
one less parasitic species whose hunger is insatiable and whose thirst is unquenchable. Let us
consume until we implode. Perhaps then we might finally behave ethically. Cheers!
If this modest proposal sounds ludicrous, which I presume to be the case to any who are
not nihilists or mad, then the remaining motivation for sustainability seems to be purely for
survival. At best, given the current discussion in climate ethics, it falls into the realm of
aesthetics—and perhaps that is our only genuine answer. Life in total, like a sunset after a storm,
is beautiful. A summum bonum in and of itself. These are the two answers that I have managed to
pilfer and assemble while doing my research for this dissertation. Both fail to satisfy.
Life for the sake of life is not poignant enough of to assert and assume fastidious
directionality. After all, ethicists are not only concerned with distinction i.e. whether behavior of
some sort or another is acceptable or not, but they are also concerned with the ought; the, ‘what
is?’ versus the ‘what should be?’ The problem with telling someone that they should behave in
one fashion as opposed to another is that it is always met with that prickly question, ‘why?’ This
is the question climate ethicists have yet to come to consensus with since to do so would mean to
go beyond the simplistic complexity of their empirical analysis. They would have to, in part,
4

return to their primordial roots of the gleeful shaman and blind soothsayer dancing wildly about
the fire. And, by searching inward with one hand placed upon the belly, stretching the other out
toward sky—in attempt to reach far beyond the vision of the eye and deep into the beyond of the
future—the internal and external would be pulled together and conjoined with an impassioned
stomp of the foot; unified and singular become the uniquely peculiar and the knee-clattering
sublime. With the forceful exhale, the oracle offers hope. Direction. Medicine. A way to be.
With contemporary ethicists, answers to the ‘why’ are merely implied in their analysis of
a global carbon tax, mass migration, the climate’s effect on poverty, etc., and one must
academically mine the work of the collective community in order to extract some semblance of a
response blasé. I find that to begin to answer the question of why, one (must) quickly become(s)
entangled in the problem of ‘the good life.’ A banished question in our modern times, replaced
instead with the imperturbable promise of its labyrinthine pursuit; a putrid golem that dares you
to enter the maze and forces you to earn your joy. Furthermore, I do not know if such a question
can truly be answered without being ontologically tethered. If I am to survive, how shall I live
and why shall I live thusly?
For myself, Erich Fromm, one of Frankfurt School’s forgotten philosophers, can yet
provide the thread end of the Thesean spool; an ethical starting point that guides our journey in a
flutter of whispers that gently command, “Because you are bound by the laws of your being.”
Thus, providing a first step in the nebulous journey toward greener virtues. With Fromm comes a
renewal of a culturally normative humanism. Prima facie, this initially appears counter intuitive.
It can be argued that the root of the problem stems from our narcissism, our ego, our endlessly
self-centered behavior. If that is true, how can focusing more on ourselves be the solution?
Fromm presents us with an obvious solution—we have not paid attention to ourselves but rather
5

have become infatuated, mesmerized, and possessed by our own creations—to our detriment.
Exemplifying this with love, Fromm writes,

The noun "love," which is only an abstraction for the activity of loving, becomes
separated from the man. The loving man becomes the man of love. Love becomes a
goddess, an idol into which the man projects his loving; in this process of alienation he
ceases to experience love, but is in touch only with his capacity to love by his submission
to the goddess Love. He has ceased to be an active person who feels; instead he has
become an alienated worshiper of an idol, and he is lost when out of touch with his idol. 6

The problem of climate change is not solely an empirical problem limited to the external
but rather, is symptomatic of a divestiture of our self-empowerment—ever patiently waiting for
an idol to save us (or remind us) of our ineluctable doom. In a system that actively thwarts selfawareness—an attunement to the working of the internal elements restricted to the laws of
psychological mechanisms—comes the creation of a mass pathology as its hellish replacement.
While scientists, economists, and politicians work together to solve the problem of economic
externalities and planetary externals such as the ecological overshoot, planetary boundaries, mass
extinction, pollution, deforestation, over fishing, soil erosion, acidification of the oceans, etc.,
empirical questions astutely mutate and force us to ask, what attention do we pay to our inner
lives, to our interiority? What will become of our inner world? Is it possible to bring about the
appropriate culture shift in mindset? And, what is the role of the ethicist in such affairs?

6

Erich Fromm, To Have or to Be? (New York: Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 1976), 18.
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We might argue about what virtues are necessary to bring about change. We might even
come to an answer with respect to which values are the correct ones. But none of that would
matter without putting in place a social framework that can provide its members the appropriate
tools to achieve individual agency and collective motivation. For Fromm, the psychological
maturation of the individual coincides with psychic health. By psychic, he does not mean our
relation to the supernatural or paranormal, but to our psyche; the innermost kernel of mind that
meets an objective standard before it explodes into the phenomenologically subjective.
Fromm posits that just as our bodies have a standard of health with respect to pathogens,
our mental state is similar in terms of pathologies. Therefore, should we attempt to treat Earth as
a patient and restore it to a state of planetary health—a homeostatic point where life thrives in
abundance—then it follows that human beings, being subsystems entangled within an
overarching super-system, should adhere to the same principles of health. The first major
provision that Fromm provides is a principle of objective (and therefore universal) health,
beginning with the mind and working its way out. Normative humanism bound by natural law
offers a balm for exceedingly sensitive creatures so that we may begin to take proper care of
ourselves, not only limited to body but also extending to spirit—a holistic and totalized health,
something that should be extended toward all areas life and institutions alike.
Below, I offer a brief outline of the dissertation and a synopsis of the arguments
contained within. The thesis statement of this dissertation is a simple one: something is missing
from the climate discussion among climate ethicists—termed externalists in the work due to their
extensive focus on empirical data analyzed in the consequentialist tradition. Furthermore, despite
their necessary analysis of ethical debacles amidst a downpour of scientific projections, they fail
to offer a sufficient motivation for unified mobilization. However, this is an implication of an
7

earlier failure to provide a prerequisite unifying ethical foundation that promotes a conjoined
principle of internal health for individuals and societies. A unifying ethical theory lends an
axiomatic requisite necessary to ground a theory and engender a focused behavior by way of
culture. In the case of the externalists, as discussed above and will be shown below, while highly
effective in analysis, are often disconnected with respect to an adequate theory that leads to
apposite actionability. Below I argue that the key component that is missing from the dialogue is
a due consideration of our internalities—the objective laws and boundaries of our interiority and
its psychic health. Fromm offers such an ethical (and therefore directive) unifying principle that
provides such a framework in the form of his existential dichotomies; specific traits found
universally in the substrata of the human psyche.
In acknowledging this commonality, the discussion of sustainability can then be
considered through the lens of a normative humanism—the promotion of a society that is best
suited to the creation of a mentally healthy being and lifestyle, and vice versa. From the vantage
of systems theory, the societal shift needed to achieve lasting sustainability cannot be completed
without being comprehensive/all encompassing. Essentially, ad hoc adjustments to our current
institutions to provide such drastic changes would be insufficient, and thus short-lived and prone
to regression. I argue that the change must be purposeful and holistic in nature, not only
rethinking and adapting all institutions from the ground up, but consciously considering the
necessary mindset to achieve such a feat. Fromm provides a recalibration of the ethical
conversation along with the necessary tools to begin a discussion of health pertaining to the
individual, the society, the relationship and duty an individual has to a society, the relationship
and duty the society has to the individual, and by and large the relationship the individual has
with nature through society.
8

I would like to point out that I do not find a substantive failure in the work of the climate
ethicists but I contend that their analysis is being applied in an improper theoretical juncture,
effectively putting the cart before the horse. Therefore, I do not focus on the minutia of their
work but rather aim to draw connections in the lack of an underlying cohesiveness in their
philosophical mulling which result in practical consequences—this is revealed in my exposition
and historical account of John Broome, an economist turned philosopher and an analytic
exemplar. Attempting to find the most efficient ways of combatting climate change by first doing
an extensive (and interminable) cost-benefit analysis before taking action proved to be
inadequate when translated to international actionability—to be shown in the IPCC report.
Again, it is not that such analysis is necessarily incapable of generating answers when given a
specific set of criteria, but that it is utterly ineffective when it does not have the appropriate
values to act as a guide. The externalists fail to agree upon which values are crucial for
transitioning and upholding a sustainable mindset, along with a viable defense of such a choice.
Fromm’s philosophy grants such measures by contributing a suitable human ontology that can
serve as a necessary supplement to the climate conversation.
The dissertation is divided up into two parts: Part I: The Current Climate Conversation:
Work and Analysis of Contemporary Ethicists; Part II: Fromm and Humanism.
Overall, Part I, The Current Climate Conversation: Work and Analysis of Contemporary
Ethicists, is an exposition of the current dialogue in climate ethics. I present a survey of the most
relevant ethicists, their analysis, and conclusions. My intention is to show the type of analysis
that is done and to suggest that it is in need of a supplementary perspective—as they themselves
note. In Chapter 1: Preliminaries, I argue that in order to effectively combat climate change,
partial changes to the system such as merely changing government policy, economics,
9

technology, is not sufficient to achieve effective mitigation or preservation. While some scholars
consider partial changes to be sufficient, the most fundamental shift yet to take place is in culture
and mindset. To combat a problem of this magnitude, any changes made must be holistic. In
other words, it cannot be partial or limited to a few sectors but must involve the entirety of the
system. Using the “iceberg model,” I suggest that while all institutions need to be revolutionized,
social outlook and individual participation are vital—far more than merely waiting for
governments to establish coercive efforts. Section I: Cape Town, uses the example of the
2017/18 drought in Cape Town, South Africa to make the practical point. In addition to the
government taking extreme measures, the most important part in overcoming the drought was
active citizen engagement and a shift in values. Section II: A Lack in Step Two: Actionability
and section III: Gardiner’s Analysis, examines the analysis and conclusions (Step One) of
leading scholars in order to reveal how their proposed solutions (Step Two) are ineffective since
they lack a unifying principle; often affirming that something is missing. Chapter 2: Critical
Conversations, presents two conversations within the general literature. Section I: The OUP,
surveys the discussions in a climate ethics essential reader in order to provide a panoptic view of
the current status of climate ethics, while section II: Ethics x Time, observes the literature over
time, progress made, and the role that ethics played in section III: A Consequence of HyperAnalysis.
Part II, Fromm and Humanism, focuses on the works of Erich Fromm and the possibility
of applying the ideas contained within to the current discussion of climate ethics. Chapter 4,
Fromm Here to There, investigates those areas of Fromm’s understanding that are most pertinent
to the needs of the climate ethics discussion. Section I connects the intellectual tradition Fromm
comes from with the approach Fromm takes with regards to his theories. Section II, Fromm’s
10

Ontology: Here, begins a partial exposition of Fromm’s work with his general human ontology.
This is the key missing element that Broome, and the other externalists looked at in part I, need
in order to make headway. Section II, Frommian Dichotomies: Albuquerque, extends this
analysis with a focused consideration of dichotomies in Fromm’s human psychology. Section IV,
Manifest Destiny: There, is then left with the task of bridging the gap between these theories of
internal life and the external expression of them.
This provides the foundational prerequisites necessary for chapter 5, Humane Humanism, which
offers an application of Frommian thought to some of the issues, discussed earlier in part I, in the
climate ethics discussion. Section 1, Humanistic Productiveness, makes a ‘Copernican turn’
regarding the nature and measure of productivity. It recommends that, from a Frommian
perspective, these metrics and related concepts should be defined from the inside and lead to the
external, as well as a way to do this. Chapter 6, A Giant Leaf for Mankind, offers a positive
account of Fromm’s humanistic ethics in section I, Humanistic Behavior. As a concept, this is
explored in section II, Being Mode, with a consideration of several real-world examples. This
last section completes the application by considering the actual behavior, and biophilic
consequences, that could be seen with a proper application of Frommian thought. The lynchpin is
a shifting of perspective by society, i.e. a complete culture shift from where we are today to
where we need to be to avoid the most drastic possibilities projected by the climate data to date,
and to generate a unifying ethical foundation that promotes a conjoined principle of internal
health for individuals and societies. To make this abundantly clear, this last section (and
dissertation as a whole) is not adopting an argument for particular or specific modes of
actionability i.e. modes worthy of consensus that ought to be rallied around. Those of the last
section serve only as examples that serve to support the main thesis of this work, that to truly
11

alter the nature of a system one must first shift its values. It is these values that give way to
particular behaviors, in this case, values that generate the appropriate mindset geared toward
adapting our currently outmoded means of existence, opting instead to adopt a system better
suited toward a green and sustainable future. Thus, this dissertation serves to set a preactionability foundation laid on a Frommian conception of biophilia an human health. All
elements which promote the flourishing of the human spirit instead of its dampening will be
referred to as humanism.
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Part I: The Current Climate Conversation: Work and Analysis of Contemporary Ethicists
The overall aim of the dissertation is to create a conversation that takes into consideration
key qualities found to be essential—and missing—in the academic climate discourse: namely, a
reframing, reconsideration, and inclusion of the concepts of health, solidarity, equality, and
human evolution. While part II will examine the alternative economic-philosophical approach to
climate ethics championed by John Broome in his work Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming
World (2012), part I aims to give a broader account of the discussion among leading climate
ethicists for the purpose of making space for a humanistic approach by way of Erich Fromm
detailed in part III. This part attempts to shed light on the climate philosophy community in an
endeavor to support and further supplement the field through a qualitative analysis. In other
words, it seeks to lend explicit recognition of existential matters beyond that of merely existing.
In reference to the scholarship of this part, I will primarily be drawing on Climate
Change: Essential Readings, published as an authoritative anthology of papers, several
selections from The Monist, and the works of two leading figures in the field, James Garvey’s
The Ethics of Climate Change: Right and Wrong in a Warming World and Stephen Gardiner’s A
Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change. I will offer greater detail with
respect to these references below, but again, I specifically selected these texts because they offer
a snap-shot of the Zeitgeist of the climate ethics community and offer what I believe to be a fair
description of climate ethics.

13

Given the current planetary overshoot7 in relation to our historical trend 8—a consistent
lack of economic and biophysical homeostasis in relation to their threshold and the inexorable
“speeding up” of this overshoot’s perpetual unfolding 9—humanity has been placed in a position
to consider the determinative factors for the current state of affairs. More drastically, humanity
must produce an ethical framework to assist us in the mitigation of our environmental crises by
adjusting the means by which we comport ourselves. Therefore, our necessary evolution is twofold: to achieve sustainability by shifting our behavior, along with our mode of exchange, and to
achieve a cultural evolution that will better promote harmony between physical existence and the
meaning found therein.
To achieve, maintain, and harness sustainability, an existential ethics that considers survival as a
primary task must incorporate and inculcate qualities such as cooperation, equality, solidarity,
communally entrenched individuality, assuredness, universality, synthesis, equity, and
interdependence. Conversely, concepts and models that assist in the generation of more growth
such as non-cooperative/non-regulated market competition, liberty (the freedom to, as opposed
to freedom from10), self-reliant individualism, value skepticism, relativism, and inequality of

7

See Ed Ayres, “The Four Spikes.” Futures : The Journal of Forecasting and Planning. 32; no. 6 (2000): 539-554,
for insight into impact on climate. For insight into extinction spike and impact of biodiversity loss aka "extinction
debt" cf. Tilman, et al., "Habitat destruction and the extinction debt," Nature 371 (1994): 65-66; Barnosky, et al.,
"Has the Earth's sixth mass extinction already arrived?" Nature 471 (2011): 51-57; Hylander, et al., "The
mechanisms causing extinction debt," Trends in Ecology & Evolution (TREE) 28.6 (2013): 341-346; Essl, et al.,
"Delayed biodiversity change: no time to waste," (TREE) 30.7 (2015): 375-378.
8
See Lester Brown. “The Acceleration of History.” In State of the World, 1996: a Worldwatch Institute report on
progress toward a sustainable society, edited by Linda Stark, 3-20. Norton, 1996.
9
See Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 2006. Fukuyama, is a neoliberal Hegelian believing that history had “come to an end,” and that the American victory of the Cold War brought
an end to ideological struggle. Conversely, L. Brown’s definitive understanding, settling the debate, was that history
is actually speeding up, and that Fukayama, albeit making an observation by means of societal, political, and
economic considerations, ignores the biophysical and environmental dimension. This particular reanalysis is such
that it promotes and produces a need for a reconsideration of ideologies, this time, with a deadline.
10
A distinction that will be elaborated later in the dissertation.
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opportunity all involve the preservation of the status quo. In other words, they come together to
form an outmoded pathological mindset that continues to contribute to our current state of
societal maladaptation. Thus, the scope attempts to identify and discuss a valuation and
revaluation of these the mindset generated by these values, while ultimately attempting to ground
them in human ontology.

15

Chapter 1: Preliminaries
Climate ethicists, most of whom are externalists, 11 are renowned for making the argument
for greater empathy toward others, the end of speciesism, 12 and a greater inclusivity of moral
worth, extending not only to animals but to entire eco-systems. 13 While such ethical
considerations certainly imply an intellectually progressive lean, they still fall short of an
immediate and totalizing paradigmatic revolution. An example of such considerations is
illustrated by James Garvey in The Ethics of Climate Change: right and wrong in a warming
world (2008). Having compared and analyzed varying philosophies, he stipulates that we do not
necessarily need to re-think our ideas about human value by creating a new moral framework but
that climate change itself presents enough of a challenge as to put us in a position where we can
stick to what we are used to in order to solve issues from within our traditional framework. 14
After all, to throw the baby out with the bathwater is to act counterproductively; in a time when

Externalism is a term that refers to individual’s whose sole analysis is based on the ‘external’ i.e. the empirical
world, that which is tangible and visible. Ergo, half of the life of a human being is that which can be viewed and
assessed by others; that which interacts and engages with the world. The other half of human life takes place
‘internally;’ our ‘inner’ life/world so to speak. This includes our thoughts, emotions, fears, cares, hopes, wonders,
etc. All things not measurable or seen. All things hidden from the external world.
12
Cf. Singer, Animal Liberation, Chap.6, 213-ff. Peter Singer argues that the preferential treatment of humans over
animals is a form of “speciesism” and is just as unjustifiable as racism, sexism, or any other thing that allows for
arbitrary value judgment.
13
Some (environmental) philosophers would take issue with the claim that externalist philosophers, despite ‘caring’
for animals, are still partaking in an anthropocentric philosophy as the exclusion of non-sentient objects. Aldo
Leopold, for example, argues for a greater inclusivity of our bestowal of moral worth. Flora are just as important as
fauna, not to mention entire ecosystems that allow for the specific burgeoning, rendering it, such that it is, a land
ethic.
14
James Garvey, The Ethics of Climate Change: right and wrong in a warming world (New York, Bloomsbury
Academic, 2008), 54.
11
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we can ill afford to do so, perhaps it is best to simply shake things up.15 We can note how
practical his considerations are.
Section I: Cape Town and Totalizing Systems
One might adduce that the underlying reasoning for holding a conservative perspective is
a type of culturally embedded “realism.” While this may seem, prima facie, a reasonable starting
point, considering the example of Cape Town’s water crisis, it demonstrably is not. Nonetheless,
there are attempts by many climate ethicists to preserve as much as possible of the old
paradigm’s methodology for judgement.
Garvey, attempting to explain society’s situatedness, quite understandably, says:

There is a sense in which my actions and the actions of my present fellows join with the
past actions of my parents, grandparents and great-grandparents, and the effects resulting
from our actions will still be felt hundreds, even thousands of years in the future. It is also
true that we are, in a way, stuck with the present we have because of our past. The little
actions I undertake which keep me warm and dry and fed are what they are partly
because of choices made by people long dead. Even if I didn’t want to burn fossil fuels,
I’m embedded in a culture set up to do so.16

Though what he says seems plain-as-day in that, insofar as all things are contingent upon one
another, they are the consequence of cause and effect, and the context of the day is solely a result
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of past actions. This could also be read as a type of apologia—a justification (and implicit
calling) for us to remain within our given social structure or, should any social change be
enacted, to generate modifications from within the already extant framework. More seriously,
complacency might be misunderstood as pragmatism and efficiency as related to the cultural
milieu surrounding these discussions. Note that in all philosophers to be discussed, the
evaluation (and potential substitution) of the societal scaffolding and conforming brackets that
sustain and perpetuate current institutions is not up for discussion, but we must add them to the
conversation if we are to underwrite any major changes.
Part of what makes the advent of climate change particularly treacherous is that our
current form of ethical analysis fails to enable the rapid, radical adaptation necessary for our
future, assuming that the worst-case scenario/projections are accurate. Gardiner, another one of
the leading climate ethicists, in his book A Perfect Moral Storm, argues that we are working with
one half of our philosophical tool-kit but, while he is doing the necessary analytical work, he is
not developing an actionable plan that includes humanism at its core. He writes,

while it is true that, according to the default position [that humans are finite creatures
with infinite desires chasing finite resources], I am making some appeal to a narrowly
economic motivation…As we have seen from the discussion of political inertia, the world
has been aware of the climate problem for a while…and yet has allowed a rapid increase
in emissions in the period. This is largely because it has permitted consumption of fossil
fuels and the goods that depend on them to continue unchecked, ignoring the dangerous
climate externalities. No doubt the claim that individual consumption is the primary
driving force behind climate change is much too simplistic. Nevertheless, the basic idea
18

can easily be extended to other important arenas of decision making, such as business and
politics. 17

It is as if this mindset, naturally produced and driven by a very liberal and progressive economic
view, misses the larger need of a systematic overhaul. Although Gardiner accurately proclaims
that the problem of the carbon overshoot is partly the fault of the consumer, the blame can also
be placed on businesses and politics alike. Reasonably, Gardiner attempts to merge responsibility
between the private/individual and a public/communal entity by expanding the sphere of
accountability. He says that “the basic point [of commercial responsibility] would remain even if
we were more generous and said that the time-horizons of a given set of managers, shareholders,
and employees extended across their working lives.”18 Hence, if a greater share of the
responsibility were to be shouldered by managers, shareholders, and employees, the greater
weight of the blame could and should be fairly pointed in the direction of businesses, i.e.
corporate industry, and government(s) alike.
The fundamental issue of the classic liberal perspective is that such a system, vis-à-vis
ideologically externalist roots, is systemically defective because it has a blind spot for the
endemic mindset of its citizenry. In other words, climate change is a crisis potentially so large
and complex that it will radically change everything our species has come to know and has long
been accustomed to; this cannot be prevented without a radical change in how we conceive of
social problems. Nevertheless, many, like Gardiner, espouse that we need not radically change
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ourselves in order to preserve what we have always had. If one assesses the situation in terms of
systems theory and structural pathways, expanding the blame-game in order to make it more
inclusive seems to be missing a vital part of the bigger picture. For example, between mid-2017
and mid-2018, there were severe water shortages in Cape Town, South Africa. In late 2017, there
were mentions of a “Day Zero,” or an expected timeline when the city water supply would fall
below 13.5 per cent. “Day Zero” would usher in government mandated water restrictions
whereby the water supply would be largely turned off and water rationed daily, effectively
making Cape Town the first city to run out of water.19 By September 2018, Cape Town’s
government had eased restrictions, indicating that the worst of the crisis was over, having
acquired roughly 70 percent of the dam’s water retention level. 20 Regardless of who is to blame,
this demonstrates the urgency and importance of this problem.
When approaching the outcome of the crisis from the point of view of structural
dynamics, one must take note that its success was holistic in nature. Every potentiality of
positive action was manifested in order to bring the crisis to an end. Thus, a recognition of events
gave way to a recognition of patterns, which in turn took into consideration (institutional)
structures, and finally, made necessary a shift in the mental models of Cape Town’s society.
Christian Alexander, in an article titled “Cape Town’s ‘Day Zero’ Water Crisis, One Year Later”
writes:
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Technical fixes and regulatory controls implemented by the municipality were important
to curbing water consumption but reaching such levels of conservation would not have
been possible without large-scale cooperation by a wide swath of residents, businesses,
and other stakeholders. “It doesn’t matter how much technical expertise you’ve got, but
you actually have to stand back and understand the system more broadly,” notes Gina
Ziervogel of the University of Cape Town, who has researched the crisis. For the city,
this meant using data more effectively to prompt people to save water. Starting in 2017,
the municipality had begun ratcheting up its drought-awareness campaign, publishing
weekly updates on regional dam levels and water consumption and using electronic
boards on freeways to notify drivers of how many days of water supply Cape Town had
left. Then, in January 2018 and with Day Zero looming, the city got more aggressive. In
addition to announcing its Day Zero countdown, the city launched a city-wide water map
to show water consumption on a household level, allowing people to compare their
consumption to their neighbors and the rest of the city. Heightened outreach regarding the
crisis prompted wide discussion: The municipality’s weekly water report became a
regular topic at social gatherings and on the radio. Governmental and civic organizations
published water-saving techniques, and people traded tips on social media. In an unusual
turn of events, techniques used in the poor, water-strapped township areas gained traction
in wealthier areas. Prompted by new water-use tariffs, businesses also began increased
efforts to communicate the need to save water to customers and employees. Bathroom
signs explaining “If it’s yellow, let it mellow … ” became ubiquitous in restaurants and
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bars, while startup and corporate types initiated “dirty shirt” challenges to see who could
go the most days without washing their work shirt.21

What we encounter in this success story is a government that took initiative by
reallocating water in regions originally earmarked for agriculture and redirected its flow to urban
residents, ramped up water tariffs and enforcement of prohibitions on heavy users, and
prohibited use of municipal water for swimming pools, lawns, and similar non-essential uses,
etc. The city’s government also implemented a new water-pressure system in January, saving
roughly 10 percent of overall municipal water consumption, cutting its peak usage by more than
half in three years. The January 2018 announcement of “Day Zero’ alone galvanized a 30 percent
drop in residential consumption after a steady but slower decline in earlier stages of the drought,
according to City of Cape Town statistics.22
Moreover, and more importantly, as noted in the first sentence of the block quote above,
despite all the necessary changes adopted by Cape Town’s government, overcoming such a
doomsday scenario would have floundered should there have been a lack of mutual cooperation
among “residents, businesses, and stakeholders.” Hence, having seen an acknowledgement of
events and patterns—namely the lack of fresh water and its causes—in conjunction with a
structural change enforced by governmental institutions, i.e. attempting to close the gap on any
water externalities, would not have been enough without a shift in the mindset of the citizenry
and its culture. Signs in the lavatories, reading “if it’s yellow, let it mellow,” along with “dirty
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shirt” challenges signal a shift in the rooted behavior of the citizenry and with it, the alteration of
a Zeitgeist to a more sustainable lifestyle. The movement was total. Add to that a pinch of luck in
the form of rainfall during a drought and you have the opposite of a perfect storm, but rather,
what could only be best expressed in German as Perfekter Einschlag or Perfect Impact—a
negative, or reverse, perfect storm, if you will. Hence, in September 2018, with dam levels close
to 70 per cent, the city began easing water restrictions, indicating that the worst of the water
crisis is over.23 Note that the solution to this preview of one potential future for humanity
required a shift in values and a mindful consideration of others.
In sum, and taking the Cape Town water crisis as an exemplar, such all-encompassing
change must include events, patterns, structures, and mental models, in order to invoke and
establish a new vision. In contradistinction, the very nature of the ideological foundations of the
West, more particularly that of the United States, e.g. its businesses, politicians, and people alike,
not only enable but produce a citizenry whose understanding of happiness and freedom is seen
through the vantage of individual buying power undergirded by a pseudo-Darwinian “survival of
the fittest” competitive model. This is what ultimately promotes and gives way to throwing the
baby out with the bathwater, idiomatically speaking. The natural default position, polemically
speaking, is something akin to an act of insanity: doing the same thing over and over again while
expecting different results. Whether an individual, a businessman, or a politician, decides to
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make a change by simply introducing alternative means of consumption, is not enough to curtail
the current course of climate change (or water shortages, plastic residuals, chemical pollutants,
waste, breakdown of ecosystems, mass extinction of fauna, etc.). Ameliorative action must be
introduced and injected into society so that any changes undertaken are made simultaneously
from the top-down, i.e. government to citizenry, and the bottom-up i.e. citizenry to government;
adaptation must be both holistic in nature and systemic. It is not solely the fault of industry, or
the consumer, or the governmental powers that be. It is, by and large, our entire way of life—the
fetishization of constant growth and the maximization of happiness via the maximization of
individual preferential action which instigates such existential crises as the Cape Town water
shortage.24
Examples of analytical thinkers with an externalist lean such as Garvey and Gardiner, on
the one hand, rightfully advocate heavily for change—changes in governmental policy,
consumer behavior, transnational cooperation, the widening of the ethical sphere to include
animals and ecosystems, etc. On the other hand, they appear to naively believe that all necessary
adaptations can be achieved piecemeal and within the current institutional framework. As a
result, when considered from an evolutionary perspective and structural dynamics, their
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recommendations in matters of social adaptation turn out to be incomplete and maladaptive in
nature; a perpetuation of the current cultural bubble and societal mindset.
All changes suggested pertain to the external life of the individual but none are
suggestive of a shift in our internal life. As will be shown in the next section, these analytical
thinkers are well aware of the broad and complex issues at hand, yet they tend to make
arguments which often begin from empirical data and applied ethics, and end with normative
ethics. Instead, their arrival at normative ethics should have begun in meta-ethics and human
ontology. Essentially, we must ask what is it to be human and what are the things necessary for
us to flourish existentially, not just physically?
Section II: A Lack in Step Two: Actionability
In the previous section, two prominent climate philosophers were used as a means of
showing the extent of the systemic problem. In an effort to more fully articulate the point above
and the position of general externalist climate ethics analysis—a Step One of a two-step
philosophical strategy—this section will examine the analyses of leading scholars of climate
ethics along with their conclusions. This has a two-fold purpose: First, it serves to bridge the gap
between the philosophy of John Broome—which tackles the issues of valuation and how
economics is poised to solve the problem of climate change—, a philosopher-economist who will
feature prominently in chapter 3, and the rest of the climate philosophy community. Second, it
attempts to reveal how their conclusions and proposed solutions often remain either too shortsighted, often missing a unifying underlying principle for dealing with climate change—this
further prevents any agreed upon action to be taken—a “Step Two” so-to-speak—or affirms that
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something is missing and that new ways of thinking need to supplant and replace the old.
Therefore, these motions will be referred to below as “Step One” and “Step Two.”
Briefly, the problem of valuation is being able provide and justify, in rank order, our
value priorities so as to make them actionable. Thus, for the subsequent authors to be discussed,
the intellectual procession appears to follow a pattern of recognizing the problem, understanding
the problem—what (physical acts) generated it along with the extent of its (physical) impact and
effects—, taking stock of how much energy can and should be allocated toward correcting the
problem, and finally, taking action. Hence, if Step One, the articulation of one’s comprehension
of the issue and position on the matter, is overly uncertain, one sacrifices immediate action for
potential future accuracy. This makes Step Two, the generation of an actionable plan, less likely
or effective—this, of course, depends on the overall urgency of the problem at hand.
Nevertheless, the problem of valuation that Broome et al., continuously points to is a
pressing matter for problem solving in general. First, even though it deals with the difficulties of
empirical uncertainties, the actual problem at hand rests in gauging the information. In other
words, the most important issue is the application of practical wisdom since it is seldom the case
that when a decision is made, given the particularity and uniqueness of each and every situation,
the answer is cut and dry. Information is always missing and often the best we can do is take an
educated guess based on prior experiences and knowledge already accrued. Second, it is also
possible that the values that underlie and govern the ‘eye’ that scans for and interprets
information, have long become dated and ill-fitting. For example, in Climate Matters, which will
be more fully explored in chapter 3, Broome takes up four specific issues regarding values: how
to take uncertainty into account, how to compare harms and benefits that are widely separated in
time, how to set value on human lives, and the problem of population. Many of the climate
26

ethicists to be discussed below tackle the same issues in some shape or form and similar to
Broome, when discussing a Step Two, a next step, many fall into the category of a “transitional”
plan, at best. This reveals either an outdated mode of thinking or a missing yet critical cog in the
vast network of intellectual interplay.
The question remains, regardless of any plans or solutions offered, towards what system
exactly are we to transition into? A more stable national/international economy? A more biofriendly tech industry? Green consumerism? While each of these proposed solutions might bring
humanity more in line with the demands of planetary ecology, whichever solution is being
proposed, none of them independently offer reasons as to why that solution ought to occur versus
another. Proposed solutions are taken as obvious or as a matter of fact, often using the current
institutional framework as a spackle to fill in any holes. Thus, Broome enters the conversation
with the problem of valuation. He foists the responsibility of taking a next step upon the data and
lets the data show the way. But, as Broome noted, “economists need philosophers for moral
grounding.”25 The implication here is that though data reveals the lay of the land, action is
governed by principles. Therefore, one might conclude that if particular cultural principles that
are the impetus for motivating factors, data analysis, and future-orientation dispositions, are no
longer fully functional or applicable, decisive action will quickly stall; stagnation will become
prevalent along with hyper-analytical thinking. A sure sign of a decaying institution that has
succumbed to paralysis from over-analysis.
To begin with and to give credit where it is due, analytic climate ethicists readily spot and
freely admit many of the entangled social and climate issues that lie before the current
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generation. The multifarious debacles exposed by climate change are surgically disentangled and
assessed individually in the form of ethics, economics, public policy, etc. Thus, analytic climate
ethicists generally depict the consequences of climate change, in all its individuated realms, with
accuracy and nuance. Below is a brief breakdown of Gardiner’s assessment and metaphorical
explication of the ethical complexities manifested and revealed by climate change.
Gardiner speaks of “A Perfect Moral Storm,” whereby he astutely notes that the
complexities of climate change seemingly prevent us from discussing any issues without
“invoking ethical considerations.” 26 Ethics, therefore, has become the most salient and thorny of
all subjects. Unfortunately, ethical considerations, according to Gardiner, are exceedingly
complex since they are often conjoined with any conversation that might be had about the
economy, the competence (or lack thereof) of government, the durability and efficacy of
infrastructure, etc. We are left with an unfortunate dichotomy. If we attempt to get as clear as
possible with our terminology, then we must inevitably restrict our discussion to a single area of
consideration lest we muddy our terms with vague and ambiguous application across unrelated
fields. Alternatively, if we attempt to utilize broad and inclusive language, then our terms are
necessarily fuzzy when applied across wide intellectual gaps. With either option, the attempt at a
strict analytic analysis of the intermingled topics is stymied by our perceptual and linguistic
limits. The result, according to Gardiner, is that we often lack the appropriate perception and
language to effectively deal with such a looming ethical crisis.

Gardiner, “A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics, and the Problem of Corruption,” in
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York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 87.
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Briefly, Gardiner notes that this perfect moral storm is generated by three distinct storms
all set on an ineluctable collision course with each other. The first storm, which he refers to as
the “Global Storm” is a description of the current crises and humanity’s inability to adequately
adjust to the oncoming threat. He describes the first storm as the practical difficulty resulting
from “dispersion of causes and effects,” e.g. one place emits carbon while another feels the
impact of those emissions, a “fragmentation of agency,” i.e. there is no one person or institution
directly responsible, and “institutional inadequacy,” which is responsible for generating a nonunified global response to the crisis. 27 Taken together, this means that there are multiple actors
behaving unilaterally and often solely with personal economic considerations.
In addition, the remaining two storms compound the issue with the onset of the
“Intergenerational Storm.” Here, Gardiner acknowledges that the addition of time to the
equation, makes things even harder. Where the aforementioned issues of the “Global Storm” are
spatial in nature, issues of posterity and intergenerational responsibilities only serve to further
complicate things. What might then keep each generation on task and on the same page?
Gardiner suggests that “this problem will be iterated. Each new generation will face the same
incentive structure as soon as it gains the power to decide whether or not to act.”28 In other
words, in addition to the difficulty described by Gardiner regarding the Global Storm, he points
out the exponentially increasing complexity of this Global Storm once we begin to consider it
across time as well as space.
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Lastly, Gardiner discusses a “Theoretical Storm,” which is “constituted by our current
theoretical ineptitude.”29 He suggests that our theoretical ineptitude is comprised mainly by the
fact that most of our theories are built to derive immediate and short term solutions and have
difficulties addressing issues such as “scientific uncertainty, intergenerational equity, contingent
persons, nonhuman animals, and nature.”30 Climate change involves all of these things on a longterm timeline. The final picture that Gardiner paints of this perfect moral storm is the dire crisis
of the global storm compounded by the intergenerational storm, both of which we are incapable
of adequately confronting due to the theoretical storm. These “storms” present philosophers with
a firm and clear account of the ethical conundrum rooted in practical considerations. 31
Section III: Gardiner’s Analysis
Taking Gardiner’s assessment as he presents it, for the moment, the next iteration of
Gardiner’s thought needs to be addressed. In addition to the excellent articulation of the problem
at hand, Gardiner also offers an attempt at something in the way of a solution as well. This
solution has its own set of ontological realities and must be examined to develop a fuller
understanding of the current climate ethics zeitgeist.
In his paper, “Is ‘Arming the Future’ with Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil?”
Gardiner expresses doubts about the ethics of geoengineering and the manipulation of the
climate system. He begins by briefly talking about the problem of political inertia 32 and, after
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briefly describing his perfect moral storm theory, segues into the subject of geoengineering after
highlighting the importance of the “Theoretical Storm.”33 The Theoretical Storm does not only
serve to characterize Gardiner’s position on the difficulty of adequate analysis due to inadequate
information, 34 but rather appears to be representative of reasons for institutional breakdown.
Given Gardiner’s poignant ethical analogy, there are, alongside the given ethical
difficulties, further complications that give way to more skeptical deliberations; issues that add to
the problem of valuation and forward thinking. Gardiner writes,

We do not yet have a good understanding of many of the ethical issues at stake in global
warming policy. For example, we lack compelling approaches to issues such as scientific
uncertainty, international justice. This causes special difficulties 35

Compounding these problems, the quote continues:

In particular, given the intergenerational storm and the problem of skewed vulnerabilities,
each generation of the affluent is susceptible to arguments for inaction (or inappropriate
action) that shroud themselves in moral language but are actually weak and selfdeceptive. In other words, each generation of the affluent is vulnerable to moral
corruption: if members of a generation give undue priority to what happens within their
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own lifetimes, they will welcome ways to justify overconsumption and give less scrutiny
than they ought to arguments that license it. 36

Gardiner is making the argument that action should be taken and that time should not be
wasted. Unfortunately, not only do ethical problems abound alongside (purported) scientific
uncertainty and international politics, but one must also take into consideration those who refuse
to “play ball” because of self/national-interest, ignorance, or a stubborn unwillingness to change
their behavior. Similar to Garvey’s assessment above whereby society need not throw out the
baby with the bathwater, Gardiner’s incisive description of forces that maintain the current
political as well as individual psychological entrenchment, can be seen/used as an argument for
“practical” adaptation, thereby risking only a superficial and ineffective change, instead of a
holistic and systemic one.37 In other words, we should do what is feasible: write and enact laws
that will force particular industries or means of consumptions to alter.
Though Gardiner focuses mainly on describing general ethical challenges posed by
climate change, he does recognize that despite these challenges—intergenerational ethics,
international justice, environmental philosophy and scientific uncertainty—“it does not follow
that ethics has nothing substantive to say about our current predicament, and the shape of the
direction forward.”38 Importantly, Gardiner, taking from Rawls’ conception of ideal theory,39
which aims to work out the best way in which to deal with some domain or issue in an otherwise
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neutral or even moderately practical setting, contrasts the ideal with an ethics of the transition,
which “articulates how we might proceed ethically, starting from existing, and sometimes deeply
constrained or ethically compromised, social realities in the direction of better solutions and
general circumstance.”40
As seen above, Gardiner’s moral description of the problem we are confronting is robust
and, juxtaposed with the difficulties of uncertainty as well as ideological entrenchment, can leave
us in a vulnerable state without an actionable plan. Gardiner suggests that while, on the one
hand, “ideal theory has an important role to play in addressing the global environmental crisis” 41
such as being able to envision the target at which people of reasonably good will would like to
aim without having to include current and contingent constraints, e.g. the existence of
background injustice, maladapted institutions, or hostile agents, 42 on the other hand, ethics of the
transition can offer “thought as to how or even if [an] aim might be feasible under current real
world conditions.”43
Thus, Step Two, according to Gardiner, is an actionable plan for dealing with climate
change that will assist in breaking the political logjam and begin the process of taking climate
change into consideration. Constructing an ethics of the transition is therefore akin to taking
action. According to Gardiner, such

…projects operate in the service of a robust ideal theory, but more often the challenge is
how to muddle through even in the absence of a guiding ‘grand theory.’ Either way, the

40

Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm, 400.
Ibid., 400.
42
Cf. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm, 399.
43
Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm, 399.
41

33

ethics of the transition aims to identify how policies should be targeted and assessed
given our actual constrained starting position. This is typically done through the use of
intermediate normative criteria, parameters, benchmarks, and so on.44

What these intermediate normative criteria, parameters, and benchmarks might be are not
made explicit. Nonetheless, Gardiner attempts to give a Step Two by focusing “on how we might
make some modest progress with the ethics of the transition.” 45 He outlines Step Two in a total
of five brief sections: 46 section I points out how the foundational international agreement taken
up by the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change) already takes
a first step toward an ethical direction and how this in turn creates a strong duty to act. Since the
convention has been ratified by all major nations, the main actors have acknowledged that they
have ethical duties. Furthermore, since the convention was ratified nearly three decades ago,
those nations responsible for any progress are subject to ethical criticism for their inaction in
solving a problem they had themselves recognized as crucial. For Gardiner, ethics is and has
been acknowledged by all nations who ratified the UNFCCC as a key component for
mobilization. This shows a step in the right direction.
In sections II-V, Gardiner outlines and confronts key arguments obstructing effective
action. Thus, section II addresses objections based on scientific uncertainty. Gardiner concludes
that, “We are far from understanding nothing about the climate threat, and what we do
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understand seems more than sufficient to justify significant action.” 47 Claims of scientific
uncertainty are therefore not legitimate reasons to halt action, since a) uncertainty is “a fact of
life;” b) inaction due to claims of scientific uncertainty faces a burden of proof that climate
science is theoretically potentially certain, i.e. to demonstrate that it is possible to know anything
for certain with respect to climate; and, c) even if it is technically uncertain, this does not justify
inaction. 48
Section III confronts objections considering past emissions such as arguments from
ignorance, that polluters were unaware and therefore not responsible for what they did not know;
first-come, first-serve arguments, that many past emitters are now dead, or political infeasibility.
Despite these considerations of alternatives, Gardiner concludes that “the burden of proof
remains on those who would reject all historical accountability.” 49 Section IV involves future
emissions—which will be shown below, is a major fixation in climate philosophy—and the
problem of intergenerationality. 50 Section V addresses the problem of reconciling individual and
collective responsibility. Gardiner asks the reader what is to be done if we suppose that it is true
that humanity currently lacks the appropriate institutions to deal with global environmental
climate change. He concludes the section by saying that,

If political institutions normally operate under delegated authority from the citizens, the
answer seems clear. This is a case where the delegation has either not happened, or else
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has failed to be successful…If the attempt to delegate effectively has failed, then the
responsibility falls back on the citizens again—either to solve the problems themselves,
or else, if this is not possible, to create new institutions to do the job. If they fail to do so,
then they are subject to moral criticism, for having failed to discharge their original
responsibilities.51

Here, Gardiner is refusing to let the question of responsibility fizzle out: either it is the
government’s burden, or it is the citizens’, it is at the very least one of the two. Further
uncertainty regarding who is to be held accountable is not sufficient enough of a reason to
believe that no one is responsible at all, or that it absolves everyone of responsibility. Finally,
section VI considers the interplay between ideal theory and ethics of the transition attempting to
influence and modify institutional constraints. In this concluding section, Gardiner pivots in an
interesting fashion, perhaps to better segue into his final chapter, titled “The Immediate Future.”
Gardiner does not dismiss ideal theory but recognizes the important role that it plays in
generating a trajectory for human values and subsequent actions. Unfortunately, ideal theories
are often based on a model of atomistic, self-sufficient nation-state, but, according to Gardiner,
“If we truly entered a new epoch on the earth, a geological era dominated by humanity—the
‘Anthropocene’—then such a model seems at least seriously incomplete, and perhaps hopelessly
outdated.”52 He continues, writing in a tone of admonition, that, “Theorists should ask whether
this requires revising their grand visions of ethics and justice,” 53 given that the issues of climate
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change overrun and undercut any current theory that we might have to tackle such a mammoth
problem.
Conversely, Gardiner suggests that “we should not be too quick to dismiss the ethics of
transition” and that “Even if existing institutions and theories are hopelessly inadequate”
humanity still needs intermediate theories that would assist and begin social transformation.54 He
ends this section by pointing to the importance of background beliefs playing the role of
assessment. In this case, beliefs about political reality raise serious questions about the
boundaries of the ideal. Gardiner uses Rawls as an example of someone who apparently claimed
to have founded his own political philosophy on a notion of a “realistic utopia” that aimed at
reconciling the real constraints of human nature and the world with the concept of “utopia.” 55
Gardiner pessimistically asks, “how are we to decide what the ‘real constraints’ on ideal theory
are?”56 and proceeds to suggest that “perhaps the differences between ideal and non-ideal cases
are more a matter of degree than of kind.” 57
In sum, what we see in Gardiner’s Step Two at the end of A Perfect Moral Storm: The
Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change, is the claim that ethics is playing a vital role with respect to
how we engage the future, what are the major issues currently preventing progress, and how
crucial the role of theory is — more particularly theories which can assist in a pragmatic way.
Thus, Gardiner stresses the importance of a transitional ethics, one which perhaps blends itself
with ideal theory, to take into consideration “reality” and alternative approaches (along with
potential outcomes) therein. His final message in chapter 12, to be discussed below, is an
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endorsement of a shift in values; an implicit argument being made when beckoning philosophers
to change gears in their theoretical approach. 58
Conclusion
This chapter focused on three essential matters in the climate conversation. The section
brought to light the nature of systems theory, suggesting that any permanent change to be
enacted within a system must change the system altogether. Using the “Iceberg” model as a
modus operandi for instituting genuine change and the water crisis in South Africa as an
anecdotal analogy, it was proposed that to alter a system one must take note of events, be able to
anticipate patterns/trends, and recognize and delineate underlying structures and sub-systems that
create the impetus of the problem. Having understood these things, it is still not enough to
generate genuine change as the deepest part of the iceberg are mental models—the
mindset/mental state that provide the support for the perpetuation of the (sub-)system(s) at hand.
The claim being that without a shift in outlook there can be no change; change must be
totalizing.
Climate philosophers such as Garvey and Gardiner, avant-garde philosophers in climate
philosophy, often suggest that we can maintain social structures and simply adapt them to fit the
current demands of climate change; a thing which I argue is not really possible since it fails to
fulfill the demands of iceberg model. Furthermore, a deeper dive into Gardiner’s work and one
notices that he often hints at an underlying problem, revealing that there is a key component
missing from the conversation e.g. the mental models. Thus, often Step Two of climate
philosophers falls short of providing an effective theory that expressly articulates practical
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boundaries and assists in generating a space for practical action to take place. The issue becomes
obvious. Whether a theory is of a transitional type or the ideal sort, neither would suffice in the
long-run—which may be why Gardiner might be calling for some type of hybrid theory. Ethics
of transition are just that, temporary ideas to be used as a means for immediate action.
Critically, Step Two measures often flounder due to a lack of consensus. Similarly, as
Gardiner notes, current ideal theories are “hopelessly inadequate,”59 due to the fact that “existing
institutions and theories must be radically reconceptualized to reflect new global and ecological
realities.”60 Theorists then find themselves between a rock and a hard place. To do away with
ideal theory would be to do away with description and explanation, which would in turn lend
value-principles for action. Without such grounding, our actions would be morally arbitrary and
ethically unprincipled, adrift amidst the ethical Doldrums.
Additionally, without a viable theory to ground our actionable trajectory, the compounded worry
is that a) an ambivalent attitude will result in hyper-analytic thinking that only focuses on more
analysis instead of action and b) that theories of a descriptive nature, e.g. Gardiner’s Perfect
Moral Storm theory, or of a transitional nature, may root themselves in such a way that nonholistic theorems become standardized and considered adequate in nature. The intellectual
lacunae of adaptation can only evolutionarily succeed if the effort of the climate philosophy
community is total in effort. One must therefore include and embrace matters of existential (both
of physical and psychological) import and needs as part of the conversation, i.e. a humanistic
approach. Ideas such as: What does it mean to be a human? What does it mean to have a good
life? What are the things that make life worth living? In essence, these are questions that are
59
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about Being rather than Having; about relating rather than quantifying. It seems poignant that
such questions are being brought to bear despite the current lack of widespread application of a
humanist mindset—as though in exploring the inhuman we are brought back to the human. This
is easily seen throughout the demonstrated conversations in the current literature, which will be
the focus of chapter 2 that demonstrates the inefficacy of non-binding conversation. In other
words, a conversation which does begin with agreed upon principles of life.
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Chapter 2: Critical Conversations
In order to demonstrate the mindset of the general approach of contemporary climate
ethicists, and to offer some intellectual cartography to situate Gardiner, and later Broome, we
need to take a broader view. Below, I present two conversations within the general literature
taken mainly from Oxford University Press’s essential reader of climate ethics. The first is
currently one of the most crucial topics in climate ethics and potentially primary in its
importance with respect to international progress. It revolves around the subject of dividing up
future carbon entitlements along with the expenditure thereof. The second conversation, which
will conclude the chapter, discusses explicit arguments for the need for a culture shift. The
reason I have decided to proceed with this chapter in this fashion is so that I can give the reader a
brief survey of the climate dialogue but also to supplement my previous points regarding the
conversations circumscribed to an externalist account, along with all that comes with it—a lack
of communal consensus from an increase in complexity of issues and the absence of an
analytical criteria that unifies all assessment and provides a clear trajectory.
Section I: The OUP
With respect to the first conversation, the purpose of an anthology or reader is to provide
a general lay of the land for the current conversations in climate philosophy along with the most
pressing issues at hand. The OUP’s climate ethics reader is divided up into five parts: Part I:
Introductory Overview, Part II: The Nature of the Problem, Part III: Global Justice and Future
Generations, Part IV: Policy Responses to Climate Change, and Part V: Individual
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Responsibility. In terms of broad-brush strokes, one might say “fair enough,” and that these
topics are a decent place to begin when attempting to familiarize oneself with the subject at hand.
But, given that this book is compiled in such a way as to provide the audience with what is
recognized as most important and pressing within the field, any issues pertaining to
existentialism, humanism, culture, evolution, human and planetary convergence of health, and an
analysis of contemporary values, often take a backseat and are far less prevalent, if included at
all. Furthermore, the conversation below is of a particular import since it represents an issue that
needs practical solutions but that is precariously bounded by current ethical and economic
doctrines.
Peter Singer’s paper, “One Atmosphere”—located in Part IV: Policy Responses to
Climate Change—demonstrates the difficulty in sorting out emission contributions. By and large,
who would be responsible for what? Briefly, he gives a quick survey of different types of justice,
specifically, that of Robert Nozick’s famed “historical” versus “time-slice” principles, the former
of which takes a “polluter pays” or “you broke it, you fix it” approach, while the latter principle
advocates that everyone is in this together and that each person should do their part in an effort to
help. At the very least, according to the “time-slice” principle, all should pitch-in to aid the
worst-off.
Singer argues that utilitarian principles of justice would reject Nozick’s libertarian
principles in favor of placing the burden on the countries that could most easily bear it. Singer
continues the discussion on justice, contra Nozick, touching upon the Greatest Happiness
Principle, stating that “Classical utilitarians would not support any of the principles of fairness
discussed so far [i.e. those principles given by Nozick].” and that, in their conception of fairness,
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“would ask what proposal would lead to the greatest net happiness for all affected.” 61 He
concludes by saying that the utilitarian view would otherwise lead to the United States, Australia,
and other rich nations bearing much of the burden of reducing GHGs in lieu of the poor nations,
or “perhaps even the entire burden.” 62
Singer eventually goes on to propose an equal per capita share for future entitlements
with respect to the sharing of atmospheric sink capacity. 63 In other words, in the future, the
accepted capacity of a nation to pollute the atmosphere should be based on its population. He
argues that despite some saying that this would be excessively harsh on industrialized nations, it
would be fairest due to its “simplicity, hence its suitability as a political compromise, and
because it seems likely to increase global welfare.” 64 Emissions trading would be the mechanism
that would best ensure that countries that have benefited from a historical industrial advantage
would bear the largest burden. Singer believes that when trading for emissions one needs to do
so with those who would be less likely to use theirs, it would serve to mutually benefit both
parties. He writes that an “equal per capita share principle, can make this transition much easier
for the industrialized nations, while at the same time producing great benefits for the developing
nations.”65 He goes on to state that such a situation gives impetus to the need to think about
developing institutions and principles of international law that limit national sovereignty, since
“It should be possible for people whose lands are flooded by sea-level rises…to win damages
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from nations that emit more than their fair share of greenhouse gases.” 66 He ends his paper by
suggesting that sanctions might one day be used as means to promote international
environmental protection.67
Conversely, Gardiner, along with Dale Jamieson, express their hesitation at an equal per
capita proposal. Both suggest that it might encourage an increase in population growth. 68
Gardiner states in “Ethics and Global Climate Change”—located in Part I and introductory of the
reader—that Singer merely suggests that an equal per capita system will give nations insufficient
incentives to combat population growth and that this is an issue because under a fixed ceiling,
such growth effectively reduces other countries’ shares. 69 Gardiner is hesitant with this idea,
saying that

whether there is an incentive to increase population is an empirical issue, involving more
than one factor: while it is true that the growing country’s allocation will go up, that
country will then have an extra person to look after. So, a larger population is desirable
only if an extra person ‘costs’ notably less than the emissions allotment. 70

Thus, what is seen in a conversation with respect to justice and fairness of allotment is that it
becomes increasingly more complicated when injecting additional priorities such as population,
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carbon sink allocation, poverty, etc. into the conversation. Finding a determining factor which
will adequately balance the spreadsheet becomes increasingly more difficult the more variables
are added making further analysis a never-ending process. There is also the additional
conundrum pertaining to whether we should still attempt to mitigate climate change or simply
forfeit such efforts and focus solely on the aftermath.71
Furthermore, in “Greenhouse Development Rights”—also located in Part IV—, Paul
Baer, Tom Athanasiou, Sivan Kartha, and Eric Kemp-Benedict,72 having taken climate
mitigation into consideration,73 also “reject allocation based on equal per capita emissions
rights.”74 The issue Baer et al. take with Singer’s proposed equal per capita proposition is the
same as Singer, poverty. While Singer argues that an equal per capita system takes into
consideration each nation’s contribution to the shared atmosphere spread across the Earth, Baer
notes that “it is normal to see the world as largely being divided into rich countries and poor
countries”75 and that a more nuanced view of the world points out precisely that “many of these
countries that are still grouped as ‘developing’ are hardly poor.” 76 This might indicate that these
not-so-poor developing countries have a greater than initially thought responsibility for
mitigating the effects of climate change. As stated earlier, the complexity of climate change
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increases when attempting to take into consideration all of the related morally relevant concerns,
including the prioritization of poverty.
Interestingly, Baer et al. propose that the best way to combat climate change is to focus
on poverty, saying, “the world can, and should continue to prioritize human development rather
than climate policy for many more than those just barely escaping poverty.” 77 Thus, for Baer,
greenhouse development rights (GDR) should be calculated by the allocation of obligations in
proportion to capacity (income) and responsibility (historical pollution) and the calculation of
those indicators (capacity and responsibility) in a way that takes into account the distribution of
income within countries and is relative to a development threshold (money required to purchase
necessities as opposed to disposable income) as it relates to individuals within a nation and not
the national GDP overall. 78 The purpose of this is twofold: first, as stated by Baer et al., the
calculations generate a more detailed approach to national “shares” of global climate
obligations—shares that could be applied toward the obligation to reduce carbon emissions, to
pay for adaptation or compensation. Second, it focuses on the responsibility and capacity index
(RCI), the number which determines the national share of obligation based on GDP per capita
growth, as opposed to national growth.
Baer et al. say that, should a grand international fund be created in order to support both
mitigation and adaptation, “the RCI [responsibility and capacity index] could serve as the basis
for determining each nation’s financial contribution to that fund” 79 and because of the “expected
rapid growth of GDP, energy use, and emissions…in developing countries, they will have a
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larger (and some cases much larger) share of global obligations.” 80 In sum, international
obligations can be better assessed and understood by taking the RCI of a given country and
comparing it to a global total, thereby minimizing national shirking. 81 This, for Baer, would
bring about a more equitable distribution of climate obligation commitment.82
While the sources above are notable figures within the field of climate ethics, the
snapshot given of these three views—that of Singer, Gardiner, Jamieson, and Baer et al.—do not
encapsulate the breadth and depth of the dialogue found within this conversation. The arguments
presented in this first ‘dialogue’ demonstrate two crucial things. First, the moral complexity of
the crisis is abundantly understood. By this I mean that there is a crisis and that the nuances of
the intersectional complexities are nothing to be scoffed at. These ethicists have managed to
elucidate multitudinous facets of the moral issues presented by climate change and have
attempted to present a Step Two, i.e. how to proceed forward. However, equally well
demonstrated is the second: the immediacy of the crisis, while appreciated, fails to motivate
action. Any underlying values that would assist in untying the intellectual Gordian knot are not
present. Without such a unifying ethical foundation, these thinkers lack the motivational power
to turn mere suggestions into actionable solutions thereby displaying the analytic camp as
unsuited in generating consensus and a clear call to specific action.
Singer, Gardiner, Jamieson, and Baer et al., demonstrate that the complexities of climate
change require the radical revaluation and replacement of social norms. Though the
aforementioned representatives of analytic climate philosophy agree on the whole, many of them
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find themselves at odds with one another about how best to address the problem of global
climate change, ultimately preventing consensus and action at a time when both are crucial for
humanity and all species alike. This conversation is not as productive as it was once believed to
be, particularly if the values these externalist climate ethicists claim to promote are applied to a
general assessment of the combination of their works. This issue becomes the subject of another
conversation, which quickly transforms into a discussion about culture, the need to change it, and
what to change it into. While this section has been an endeavor to broadly consider the current
state of the climate ethics literature, section II will consider the historically consistent nature of
this discussion.
Section II: Ethics Across Time
Shifting to the second conversation, the need for a shift in culture is revealed more
explicitly in the climate literature as well as by observing the conversational pattern across time.
Prior to beginning the exposition, I would like to note that the climate conversation has been
going steady now for roughly thirty years. Previously, it has been occasionally alluded to that
hesitancy and the call for changing some things while preserving others is seen as a reasonable
response; one that is rooted in the skeptical tradition and gives way to a (mis)perception that any
‘drastic’ measures appear as an overreaction and forfeit any claim to composed critical thought.
The call for moderation and for finding the ideal solution to appease all parties by not requiring
sacrifice (or urgency) is perceived, or masquerades (depending on intentions), as a type of
practical wisdom; practical wisdom and redundancy then, become interchangeable implications.
Therefore, despite having all the pertinent information at hand 83—much of the literature remains
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constant, with the addition of minimal new insight, when looking at the overall timeline of
climate dialogue from its inception to present.84 This forces one to ask, “what’s missing?”
Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, a compendium of climate papers published in 2010
by Oxford University Press, as mentioned in the previous section, attempts to present what the
editors believe to be a collection of some of the most important works written by the most
prominent scholars in the field, and offers them up as an example of contemporary relevance. In
the preface to the Reader, by way of exposition, Gardiner writes, “The aim is to capture the best
work so far, work that is currently dispersed across two decades and many venues.” 85 The
earliest paper published in this edition was written in 1983 by Derek D. Parfit titled, “Energy
Policy and the Further Future: The Identity Problem.” The latest paper is by Simon Caney,
published in 2010, specifically written for this printing, and is titled “Climate Change, Human
Rights, and Moral Thresholds.” The thirty odd year interim separating these works is populated
by other works in the field, ranging from the early 90’s and early 2000’s, and lends the reader an
authoritative sampling of what the editors of this volume believe to be the essence of the climate
ethics discussion so far. Among the authoritative literature compiled, only two papers—one by
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and another by Dale Jamieson (further discussed below)—refer to
individual responsibility and the importance of values or lack thereof—both can be found in Part
V: Individual Responsibility. Gardiner, the author of the introduction of the essential reader,
acknowledges that “one of the surprising facts about twenty years of climate policy is how little
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has changed” and goes on to say that “rather than hide that fact, we recommend it for future
study.”86
These academic conversations should take a turn toward the future, expressing urgency,
demanding immediate action, and providing new theories that will act as a beacon for humanity,
contingent upon all likely and unlikely scenarios that might come to pass, and the promotion of a
new culture which takes into consideration qualities that make existence itself worthy of having
been experienced. Given the largely heretofore fruitless discussion, the academia of the future
should not solely be concerned with rummaging through historical texts and current data, but
with invoking a sort of philosophical engineering by supplementing a humanistic approach.
Briefly, one can see how the intellectual inertia over the course of the past thirty years—
given a saturation of analytic climate analysis—ultimately ‘bottomed-out.’ W. SinnottArmstrong’s paper titled “It’s Not My Fault” is a prime example of hitting such an analytic deadend. In it, he goes through many ethical theories only to astoundingly conclude that none of them
can give an adequate ethical response to “whether I have a moral obligation not to drive a gas
guzzler just for fun on this particular sunny Sunday afternoon.”87 In the current academic culture,
Sinnott-Armstrong expresses that regardless of the “assumed” 88 horrors that the scientific and
academic communities believe will come to pass, that “even assuming all of this, it is still not
clear what I as an individual morally ought to do about global warming.” 89 The reason he
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assesses differing theories and whether they can adequately answer the question (of whether
taking a joy ride with a gas guzzler on a particular Sunday is ethically permissible given his list
of climate impact premises) is largely due to the fact that even though he believes that it is
morally permissible, he still does “not feel confident in this judgment.” 90 He is tentative in his
answer since he knows that others would disagree with him and that he “would probably have
different moral intuitions about this case if he had been raised differently or if [he] now lived in a
different culture.”91
Sinnott-Armstrong looks to theories of reason to bridge the gap between a subjective
moral intuition and objective reason. He also makes the additional point that “individual moral
obligations do not always follow directly from collective moral obligations” 92 and that “The fact
that your government morally ought to do something does not prove that you ought to do it, even
if your government fails.” 93 Thus, Sinnott-Armstrong, armed with the sword of analytic
skepticism, attempts and fails to use the same toolkit as a means to solve the problem of
individual responsibility to the larger collective. 94
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After dissecting fourteen different philosophical principles—ranging from Utilitarianism,
to Virtue Ethics, Deontology, Contractarianism, and more—Sinnott-Armstrong confidently
concludes that “we are left with no defensible principle to support the claim that I have a moral
obligation not to drive a gas guzzler just for fun.”95 In his view, none of the theories grounds the
argument that individuals owe a responsibility to the whole. Ironically, he undermines his
argument by saying that,

the fact that we cannot find any principle does not show that we do not need one…we
seem to need a moral principle, but we have none. This fact does not show that such
wasteful driving is not morally wrong. It only shows that we do not know whether it is
morally wrong … My fundamental point has been that global warming is such a large
problem that it is not individuals who cause it or who need to fix it. Instead, governments
need to fix it, and quickly. Finding and implementing a real solution is the task of
governments.96

Unsurprisingly, Sinnott-Armstrong’s conclusion lands him in intellectual aporia. Since
principles do not apply to wasteful driving, and since moral intuitions are unreliable, one cannot
know that his/her wasteful driving is morally wrong. But, paradoxically, according to Sinnott-
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Armstrong, even if individuals have no such moral obligations, it is “still morally better and
morally ideal for individuals not to waste gas.”97 Despite offering multiple negative arguments
against all principles that attempt to provide an answer, he in no way attempts to defend this
contrarian claim using “reason.” Thus, having arrived at such a perplexing conclusion, he does
two things: he claims that we cannot justify such behavior with knowledge, i.e. principles of
morality, and he asserts that despite not being able to generate a flawless and precise answer, we
should nonetheless not desist from attempting to behave ethically. 98
Given the discussion of Sinnott-Armstrong’s work, it should be clear that this branch of
the climate discussion has hit a cul-de-sac. The apparent contrarian sheen to his arguments is
symptomatic of the larger, underlying difficulties externalist climate ethicists have been having
for many years. It seems that a genuine shift in discussion is called for to break out of this
ineffective cycle, which has been circling around the same debates for some time with little to no
forward progress. Ironically, one alternative, offered by D. Jamieson, in his work “When
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that they have done their duty, so they rarely come down out of the hills to work for political candidates who could
and would change government policies. This attitude helps nobody…It is better to enjoy your Sunday driving while
working to change the law so as to make it illegal for you to enjoy your Sunday driving” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 344)
While he appears to “encourage” the effort on the part of the individual, his true argument is that it is not enough—
perhaps even pointless—and that the individual “should come down from the hills” and “work for political
candidates” instead. Laughably, according to Sinnott-Armstrong, having individuals desist from taking a joy ride on
a Sunday afternoon of their own volition is not to be acknowledged as legitimate until there is a law preventing you
from doing so. Only then does it become moral action proper, and justifiable.
98

53

Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Ethicists,” is to make Utilitarians—a brand of externalism in ethics
and the prevailing climate ethicists—more like a different group of moral theorists; in
Jamieson’s case, virtue ethicists. As always, while correct in spirit, this solution is representative
of the need for a culture shift. Not only do both philosophers offer explicit reasons for why
current climate ethics is insufficient, but one (Sinnott-Armstrong) disagrees with the other
(Jamieson) in his suggested course of action. Once again, this leaves the field at large without
consensus, and no legitimate course of action toward the new paradigm to come.
Jamieson, in an attempt to shift gears, calls for the self-transformation of the individual.
Whereas Sinnott-Armstrong believes that no real change can be achieved without government
mandate and that individual behavior evades ethical scrutiny, Jamieson argues the alternative. He
writes, “it is true that our problem cannot fully be addressed without the use of state power,” it is
also true that “investigating” which virtues would generate “shared or collective intentions of the
right sort” is equally important to achieving a “solution to the problem.” 99 In a contrasting
fashion, one scholar argues that to behave as a collective, we all need to make specific demands
of governments and hold them accountable, while the other suggests that in order to do that, the
individual first needs to possess particular virtues. That people are not likely to take up such
responsibility because of a culture comprised of a neo-liberal laissez-faire mindset would be
undermine and ultimately prohibit a concerted effort that involve communal cooperation and
consideration.

99

Jamieson, Dale. "When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists." 2007. In Climate Ethics Essential Readings, ed.
by Stephen Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson, and Henry Shue (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2010), 320.

54

Thus, Jamieson, in a couple of paragraphs toward the end, sketches out what he would
consider to be “green virtues”: humility, temperance, and mindfulness. 100 In his paper, “Ethics,
Public Policy, and Global Warming,”—found in Part II: The Nature of the Problem—he puts it
neatly, saying that “rather than being management problems that governments or experts can
solve for us, when seen as ethical problems, they become problems for all of us to address, both
as political actors and as everyday moral agents.”101 Therefore, to address the individual first
would be expedient when addressing action. Recognition of individual responsibility along with
the willingness to suggest that the individual should, at a minimum, be rebuked on some level, is
to begin the process of transitioning from a culture of individual liberty to a culture of communal
solidarity and interdependent cooperation. After all, to say the individual snowflake in the
avalanche is not at fault, and to blame the avalanche as a whole for the mess deprives the
individual snowflake of its inherent power regardless of its infinitesimal nature. It is only
through the power of coordinated aggregation that something weak, on an atomistic level, can
become powerful. Simply because it is impossible to accurately measure the impact of the
contributing individual and its causal relation to the whole, does not absolve that individual of
responsibility to do and to be better.
Once again, in the concluding chapter of A Perfect Moral Storm, Gardiner arrives at a
similar insight. After invoking the difficulties of navigating through the complex nature of the
Perfect Moral Storm, he acknowledges that “conventional approaches may not only fail the
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global test, but also be accused of a basic abdication of moral responsibility.” 102 This analysis is
worsened when other considerations are brought to bear, such as moral corruption and the de
facto plurality of human motivations aside from morality. Gardiner, in his closing paragraph,
offers a prescription as a means to treating institutional intractability, namely with a correct
attitude and an appropriate mindset. He writes,

What then should we say? How might future climate policy succeed where the past has
failed? If I am right to suggest that mutual self-regulation is needed, then it is unlikely
that the conventional grab bag of public motivations will deliver. Self-interested
consumption and interest group politics as conventionally understood do not seem up to
the task. Instead, our best chance of addressing the storm seems to rest with ethical
motivation, and especially concern for future generations. If this is correct, knowing how
to channel such motivation into appropriate institutions, capture it in good moral theories,
and support its development in people’s characters and lives becomes a major task.103
He continues by acknowledging that this task of channeling motivations into appropriate
institutions and capturing good moral theories is not and should not be limited to specific or
particular professions but rather should involve everyone in a concerted effort that leaves no
stone unturned.

Many can contribute here, at all levels of society. In the academy itself, psychology, law,
economics, political science, sociology, and many other disciplines all have a role to
102
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play. But we should not lose track of philosophy, especially moral and political
philosophy. Clearly, the perfect moral storm in general, and the pure intergenerational
problem and global test in particular, pose substantial challenges to business-as-usual. 104

The difference between this paradigm shift involving climate change and those of the
past is that, with this one, timing plays a governing role. To postpone and procrastinate is to roll
the dice with mass extinction. Humanism can aid in our quest for survival not only by shedding
light on what is functional but also by using such arguments to promote a cohesive trajectory that
would, for the first time in history, put evolution into our hands with a unified thrust.
Section III: A Consequence of Hyper-Analysis
While the section I of chapter 1 focuses on a lack of academic consensus on the part of
climate philosophers as well as an underlying criterion to aid their analysis, and section II
discusses a philosophical ‘logjam’ over the course of the past thirty years and a call for culture
change, this section will attempt to demonstrate how such intractable musings within the
academies, if not directly aiding/impacting stagnancy in international environmental forums, at
the very least, are guilty of partaking in them. As mentioned in the previous sections, though
these philosophical conversations might include substantive assessments of events, patterns, and
sub-system structures, they are, as Jamieson and Gardiner note, in need of concrete dialogue
pertaining to cultural values and social mental models. Said outright, what the discussions seem
to lack is a unifying ethical foundation that is interdisciplinarily penetrative and promotes a
conjoined and systemic principle of internal health for individuals and society by helping to
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provide a comprehensive plan that can yield actionable behavior. Thus, when engaging with
climate analysis, it is as though the philosophical community is exclusively considering the
minutia of external forces without first creating a foundational holistic methodology to assist in
resolving such matters. The failure to so in the academies has greater consequences which in turn
bleed into the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), partaking and contributing to
a culture of international immobilization.
Singer, Gardiner, and Baer, et al. focus on what would be most fair and would allow for
political compromise by benefitting all parties, a task which becomes increasingly impossible
when adding further complexities such as population, poverty, international economic
competition, and so on. Unsurprisingly, a practical attempt on the international level similarly
fails to address the very issues on which analytic climate ethicists fail and arrive at consensus.
With this failure in the theoretical discussion, there is bound to be a concomitant failure in the
practical application across all levels of discussion, especially where it matters most.
To illustrate this failure at the international level, I will be referring to the IPCC’s fifth
(and latest) Assessment Report, aka the AR-5. This is the United Nations (UN) climate report
indicating where we are currently situated and includes multiple possible avenues for forward
action. Within the IPCC AR-5 there is the implicit suggestion that we are in desperate need of
direction—in this case, policy action to help manage all the increasing difficulties—for an
internal principle of health, providing a social vector. Here, the hope is placed in the hands of
economic analysis and refined cost-benefit analysis:

Economic analysis can help to guide policy action, provided that appropriate, adequate,
and transparent ethical assumptions are built into the economic methods. The significance
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of economics in tackling climate change is widely recognized. For instance, central to the
politics of taking action on climate change are disagreements over how much mitigation
the world should undertake, and the economic costs of action (the costs of mitigation)
and inaction (the costs of adaptation and residual damage from a changed climate).105

The report continues, claiming: (1) there needs to be a guiding force, (2) there is wide
recognition of the importance of such force, in this case, economics, (3) a preference to an
attitude expressing skeptical hesitancy, (4) there is the problem of cost.
Here is a demonstration of the panel’s focus on the minutia surrounding climate action
rather than recommending a specific action itself. Such a set of considerations would be
acceptable if the report ultimately offers an actionable solution. Unfortunately, much like the
works underpinning the theoretical grounding of the report, we are left in aporia.
Section III of the report is a prime example of an underlying non-sacrificial ethos:

Decision-making about climate change is therefore likely to be contentious. Since values
constitute only one part of ethics, if an action will increase value overall it by no means
follows that it should be done. Many actions benefit some people at the cost of harming
others. This raises a question of justice even if the benefits in total exceed the costs.
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Whereas a cost to a person can be compensated for by a benefit to that same person, a
cost to a person cannot be compensated for by a benefit to someone else. 106

Here, the authors are framing a way to approach the discussion that involves a trade-off of
values, with the appearance of applicability across different value schemas. However, it ends by
ultimately falling back on an economic cost-benefit analysis applied metaphorically to ethics and
considerations of justice, as though rights and duties are tradable commodities. This lip service to
alternative value schemas fundamentally serves to perpetuate the economic tools currently being
given priority in the discussion. 107
Finally, and most importantly, ethical assumptions must be made for economic methods
to inform policy choice. When we finally arrive at the ethics portion of the report, astonishingly
no ethical claim is ever made and nothing is said about how ethics should assist us in the data
complexities of climate and economic analysis. 108 Instead, what we have are broad descriptions
of differing ethical theories and current moral conundrums. 109 It is not until section 3.4.3,
entitled, “Wellbeing,” that we get some type of definition, though again, not a definitive one:
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Most policy concerned with climate change aims ultimately at making the world better
for people to live in. That is to say, it aims to promote people’s wellbeing. A person’s
wellbeing, as the term is used here, includes everything that is good or bad for the person
— everything that contributes to making their life go well or badly. 110

Given the phrasing and careful presentation, this manages to say nothing. We are given no
insight into what wellbeing is by this definition, merely further questions. From this point
forward, all that is given is a survey of different views of what constitutes ‘wellbeing.’ Again, no
definitive claim is made, and no unifying ethical foundation that promotes a conjoined principle
of internal health for individuals and societies, legitimizing one ethical model/theory over
another.
Aside from broad ethical terms, such as wellbeing, no specific ethical stance is taken by
way of rational justification as a means to promote and insist on particular behavior. Hence,
despite the fact that all might agree that something needs to be done or that the wellbeing of
humanity (and potentially animals/nature) is important, what that means or what criterion is used
to establish such a definition is not on the table for discussion whatsoever. Climate literature as
well as intergovernmental assessment reports seem deficient in the same way; they are both
missing an existential quality that would lend a unifying ethical grounding along with a
pragmatic trajectory.
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Conclusion
Considered broadly, the goal of Chapter 2 has been to offer a general accounting of the
conversation within the climate ethics community in order to showcase a blind-spot within the
conversation that warrants a need for a humanistic philosophy to politely interject. This was
done by observing three major instances where the field tends to intellectually elide inadvertently
engendering (a perception of) intellectual intransigence at the global level. I attempted to show
these dialectical lacunae by shedding light on a) the OUP’s publication of ‘well-rounded’
literature over the course of the past thirty years. This revealed the continuous effort of rigorous
analysis, no collective agreement has been established within in the field—not even whether
profligately emitting carbon emission by driving around for pure joy might be pushing the
unethical boundary. The argument was made that it would be nearly impossible to achieve
consensus when continuously adding additional intersectional variables (thereby increasing the
order of complexity) to the analysis e.g. applying justice to the impoverished, to women, to
minorities, to ecology, to Annex I nations, to Annex II nations, and so on; furthermore, that there
is no criteria with which to base that assessment on—each paper focused its analytical critique
toward its own small corner of discussion and not in alignment with a prevailing discussion as a
whole. This was evinced in the example conversation above between Singer, Jamieson, Gardiner,
and Baer et al. Furthermore, the topics discussed within the scope of climate ethics were often to
narrow, focusing solely on external issues limited to, the intergenerational problem, climate
justice, population, and poverty and analyzed mostly from a utilitarian position, but almost
always failing to include broader topics such as appropriate transitions, existentialism in a
paradigm, humanistic values, the role of ideology, conscious and purposeful evolution, a
reinterpretation of health that factors in human and planetary homeostasis, living in a sustainable
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i.e. non-expansive economy, all approached from an alternative ethical system i.e. deontological,
African Ubuntu, Indigenous philosophies, Virtue Ethics, Humanistic philosophy, etc. Thus, b)
over the course of thirty years, admittedly by the very same philosophers, the subject matter had
not progressed much. Lastly c) that assessment undergirded by skepticism breeds stagnancy and
non-compliance, a fact that has practical consequences on the international level as revealed in
the IPCC report, where no plan of action was proposed. To reiterate the point, while scholars are
unified in their appreciation of the issues at stake, this section revealed the lack of unifying
ethical foundation that promotes principle of internal health for individuals and societies. The
picture that has come into focus is more along the lines of a patchwork of potential external
solutions, rather than a unified front among moralists for facilitating and easing the oncoming
paradigm shift and moving past this evolutionary bottleneck.
The conclusions reached foreshadow the difficulties that will be noted in the next part regarding
the economist-philosopher John Broome, his faith in economics and his recommended solutions.
However, before outlining how to move past this bottleneck, a deeper understanding of the exact
nature of the problem at hand is needed. To that end, chapter 3 will discuss Broome more
thoroughly, and offer a more specific delineation of the problem facing humanity via climate
change. Rather than solely trying to avert or mitigate this very specific, existential crisis, there
should be a supplementary conversation that explores a mode of being that might more
adequately combat evolutionary catastrophe by adapting to a unifying ethical foundation that
promotes a conjoined principle of internal health for individuals and societies. Part II, will then
attempt to offer a coherent view of this concept, drawing from the works of Fromm, in order to
motivate the inclusion of those crucial, but absent, concepts into the climate ethics discussion:
health, solidarity, equality, and our evolution.
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Chapter 3: Broome and Climate Ethics
This chapter will attempt to show that despite externalist ideology often being on the
right side of the argument, it can easily sideline itself by failing to see the bigger picture. More
specifically, I will take a closer look at the economist turned philosopher John Broome as an
analytic climate ethicist who is a specific example of such an instance. The analysis of John
Broome, and externalism writ large, will be considered from the position of Erich Fromm’s
normative humanism, keeping in mind four key elements to be used as analytical filters: health,
solidarity, equality, and evolution. In part II, Fromm’s conception of mankind will assist in
filling any intellectual lacunae left open by externalist arguments/proposals and even help to
orient the conversation toward existential matters in a time when the topic of existence itself is
most prevalent and necessary.
This chapter will touch upon Broome’s work, especially Climate Matters: Ethics in a
Warming World (2012),—since it is his latest book published on climate ethics—with the hope
of opening a dialogue and shedding light on the potential shortcomings of externalist thinking.
This is not meant to condemn Broome in any way but to simply assist in expanding the sphere of
philosophical discussion within the climate ethics community as discussed above. Broome
himself has been part of the avant-garde of that community and a leading voice for realistic and
practical answers grounded in morality from its inception. As an analytic climate ethicist,
Broome has situated himself as a bridging figure. On the one hand, he is utilizing the
methodologies and mindset of his fellow analytic climate ethicists. On the other hand, he is
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calling for actionable solutions to practical problems. Thus, he will be taken as a paragon
instance of his intellectual ilk.
Broome began his academic career as an economist in 1968. After publishing a book
largely on theoretical market equilibria in 1991 Broome published his second book, Weighing
Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time, which was his philosophical debut. In the first line of
his preface he informs the reader that “This is a book about ethics, which uses some of the
methods of economics.” He continues, noting that “it is already widely recognized that formal
methods derived from economics can contribute to ethics” and that “this book is concerned with
some features of the structure of good, and in that area I believe these methods are especially
fruitful.”111 Thus, he joins an old tradition of merging philosophy and economics, urging
economists to be patient with philosophers and their remedial mathematics and philosophers to
be patient with economists and their predilection towards preference-value as a means to ground
judgment.112
A brief overview of John Broome’s corpus reveals two things: first, he consistently
reaches into his economic toolkit in order to gain greater clarity in philosophical matters, and
second, he continuously attempts to tackle problems of seemingly impossible complexity and to
offer pragmatic solutions to them. It would be safe to call him an analytic thinker who, over the
course of a lifetime, has shed light on the ever-looming but seldom acknowledged problem of
choice, otherwise known as “decision theory,” 113 as well as the overlapping grey area between
ethics and value. Thus, much of his work is centered on garnering insight into evaluation proper.
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His work on decision theory, being a mix of philosophy and economics, primed him to be one of
the leading voices in climate ethics, and as a principal contributing author of the United Nation’s
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, is a voice which has garnered much clout both inside and
outside the academic community.
A brief survey of Broome’s work will first be given in order to familiarize the reader with
his books and background, as well as to later provide a framework for his arguments and show
where they may lack a unifying ethical foundation that promotes a conjoined principle of internal
health for individuals and societies.114 I will present some of the arguments put forth in his last
book on climate ethic, Climate Matters, along with some of his pragmatic prescriptions, in order
to later make the argument that such potentially halfway measures would fall short of a viable
solution toward sustainability and the welfare of humanity alike.
Section I: Situating Broome in the Discussion
Several of his books,115 Counting the Cost of Global Warming (1992), Ethics out of
Economics (1999), Weighing Lives (2004), and Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World
(2012), are tethered together, thematically and by a similar analytic style of the evaluation of
ethical conundrums, both to each other and other, already discussed, works in the field. They
deal with difficult questions pertaining to the structure of the good, the value of life, the value of
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a person, wellbeing, betterment, etc.,116 all seem to be appropriate considerations to ask when
confronted with the complex nature of climate change and which course of action to take—all
topics tackled in his previous research. Broome writes,

Climate change raises important and difficult problems of value. For example, it raises
problems about life and death and how to set a value on these things, since climate
change is killing many people and will affect the world’s population. Because of the scale
of complexity of the problem, the methods of economics have to be used in making the
valuations, but these methods need to be founded on an account of what is truly valuable.
This can only come from the theory of value within moral philosophy. Moral philosophy
is crucial to dealing with climate change. 117

Broome’s books on climate change offer arguments on matters such as justice and well-being,
e.g. justice between generation and the distribution of well-being, and the aggregation of wellbeing under utility theory. These concerns were also addressed by Gardiner.
In Climate Matters, Broome revisits these topics with the addition of supplementary
material from earlier works. For example, though he has chapters that focus on justice and
fairness, goodness, the future versus the present, he supplements the work with subjects on
population, weighing lives, uncertainty, and private versus public morality. 118 Broome’s work on
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climate change is representative of a context where practical matters are in need of theoretical
guidance.
According to Broome, moral philosophy “is crucial to dealing with climate change,” 119
since it “raises important and difficult problems of value” 120 such as “the problems with life and
death and how to set a value on these things.”121 Broome shares with his readers that “the most
important thing [he] learnt about climate change is a matter of economics;” 122 the problem of
economics, not having adequately accounted for climate change, stems from externalities and
inefficiency. 123 As a result, Broome, in Climate Matters, attempts to offer a pragmatic approach
to close the gap of living inefficiently, along with suggestions about how to break current
political intransigence by insisting that “Making sacrifices unnecessary is a way to break the
logjam to get the process moving again.” 124 Therefore, as an economist doing philosophy,
Broome supports and finalizes his moral arguments by way of cost-benefit analysis, discount
rates, and offsetting.125
Indicative of his metaphorical union card, 126 in 2014 Broome, along with Lukas Meyer,
became the first philosophers to be lead authors of the IPCC’s AR-5, whose job was to
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investigate the options for mitigation response strategies in an integrated risk and uncertainty
framework.127
It is difficult to get a gauge on whether Broome is an economist injecting some morality
into his process, or a moralist injecting a specific kind of quantitative analysis into his
considerations. In theory, either option might end up being the same, but the fundamental
difference in order of priority is staggering. In considering Broome’s most recent position on
these issues, through a close reading of Climate Matters, it is possible to get a sense of his
intellectual drift from the former to the latter. The reason I will demonstrate this shift is to make
the point that though economics has its place in the ongoing effort to combat the consequences of
climate change, it falls short of generating a unifying ethical foundation as admitted by him. The
solution to climate change cannot solely be a quantitative measure but must begin and end with a
qualitative account.128
It is important to keep in mind that the explicit arguments generated by Broome can give
the impression that constituents of a worthwhile defense are primarily things capable of
empirical evaluation, data collection and analysis deeply rooted in a transactional tradition. For
example, the application of cost-benefit analysis is paramount, and, consequently that all things
in life are/or should be based on exchange.129 This reading of Broome would be incorrect since
he ultimately attempts to ground all of these things in concepts such as goodness and justice.
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Thus, when reading Broome, it is important to remind oneself that despite being economics
heavy, it is ultimately grounded on ethical principles. This can be easily overlooked given that
Broome uses economics as an evaluative toolkit for generating answers to philosophical
questions.
In Climate Matters, Broome defends cost-benefit analysis as the primary mode of
assessment due to the often nebulous nature of scientific projections of outcomes given the
degree of complexity. This is indicative of the appreciation of the intricate nature of the problem,
as noted by other thinkers in the field. Due to such causal intricacy, he briefly sketches out the
political reaction, describing it as essentially nugatory and explaining that the “emergency is
great but the response has been feeble.” 130 The political process, for Broome, is composed within
a milieu of indecisiveness.131 Broome adds that “even environmentalists are hesitant about some
measures to reduce emissions,” since “alternative sources of energy are sometimes rejected for
environmental reasons.”132 Hence, a lack of clarity of direction has taken hold of society. It is
precisely for these reasons, Broome suggests, that it falls to economists to lend us that clarity.
To make matters bleaker, Broome maintains that, even if the effects of climate change
could be predicted, the task of action and directionality is far from clear. The mission of
economists and moral philosophers, says Broome, would be to set a value on them. 133 One
extreme example he gives is setting a value on human lives since “lives will be lost through
climate change…slowing climate change will have the effect of reducing this loss of life.” Thus,
the “benefit of doing so needs to be taken into account along with other benefits.” We would
130

Ibid., 6.
Cf. Climate Matters, sec. “The Political Reaction,” 5-7.
132
Ibid., 5-7.
133
Ibid., 8.
131

70

essentially have to “consider how good it is to save lives.” 134 This judgment, according to
Broome, is “not an easy [one] to make…” and “work is required to calculate the benefits of
reducing emissions through alternative energy.” 135 So, the consideration of saving lives and
alternative energy requires extremely difficult comparisons of costs and benefits. 136 To make
these comparisons in practice requires data to be collected, methods of analysis to be developed,
and complicated calculations to be done. Ergo, “much of the work has to be delegated to
economists.”137
Broome assigns moral philosophers—including himself— the task of valuation. Since
values underlie all the calculations of costs and benefits that economists engage in, it is up to
philosophers to imbue the calculations with morality, that often lie unearthed or absent from such
systemized assessments.138 Broome states that the purpose of the book is to lend the reader some
guidance, yet he undermines that purpose by saying that he “does not claim to give [the reader]
definitively correct views about the morality of climate change” but only hopes to provide
“materials for thinking through issues of climate change for [themselves].” 139 Consequently,
Broome discredits his own expertise on the subject of morality, refusing to incur that
responsibility.
Broome has excluded the philosophical profession, for which he is an advocate, by
extricating himself—and possibly them—from any final say. He opts to be a moral cartographer

134

Ibid..
Ibid..
136
Ibid..
137
Ibid.. Broome repeats this claim in 7 of the preface to Weighing and Reasoning published three years later in
2015.
138
Cf. Climate Matters, sec. “Public Morality,” 9.
139
Ibid., 9.
135

71

of sorts rather than someone who might direct us to a destination, and, implicitly, leave it up to
economists to make the final evaluative decision. Thus, the book takes up four specific issues
regarding values: how to take uncertainty into account, how to compare harms and benefits that
are widely separated in time, how to set value on human lives, and the problem of population. 140
As previously mentioned cost-benefit analysis, offsetting, and discount rates are some practical
methods he offers to tackle these difficult problems.
The difference between Climate Matters—his second and latest work on climate
change—and Counting the Cost of Global Warming are twofold: scope and tone. The first shift is
the obvious inclusion of additional problematic complexities to have arrived at our doorstep;
where Counting the Cost focused primarily on the intergenerational challenge, as discussed
previously with Gardiner, Climate Matters further includes the valuation of life and population.
The second and less obvious shift is Broome’s tone and identity. As mentioned, Broome
originally came from an economic tradition and transitioned into philosophy. Though he
recognized the importance of philosophy, much of his analysis understandably relies heavily on
his economic training, and accordingly tends to give economists and analytic thinkers the lion’s
share of legitimacy on such matters. Broome acknowledges:

This is an area where the work of philosophers and economists overlaps. Generally, each
discipline has simply ignored the other, and when other has been communication there
has also often been some misunderstanding. This report tries to bring together work in the
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two disciplines. It is chiefly intended for economists, but I hope other social scientists and
philosophers will also find it useful. 141

By the time Broome wrote Climate Matters, philosophy had begun to take a more central
role. Despite his claim that much of the work ought to be delegated to economists, Broome offers
the important caveat that, “the decisions cannot be left to [economists], because their work does
not encompass all that is needed.”142 Comparisons of costs and benefits ultimately entail the
comparison of values, and values are based on what is perceived/known to be ‘good’ or ‘bad.’
For economists then “values underlie all the calculations of costs and benefits that economists
engage in but values do not lie within the scope of their particular expertise.” 143 Hence,
philosophy is an integral part of supplying the context wherein appropriate evaluation can take
place. While the shift from a philosophizing economist to a philosopher utilizing economics is
small, it is nevertheless prodigious.
In a publication entitled “Philosophy in the IPCC,” Broome blogged about what his role
as a philosopher was—the IPCC having included philosophers for the first time, viz. Broome and
Meyer. Here Broome discusses the shortcomings of economics in detail. Where in the past he
repeatedly mentions that economists need philosophy for moral grounding, he is now forced to
take a more hardline philosophical approach. Economics tends to measure aggregate well-being
in terms of money, money itself has different valuations that are not considered by economists,
and, most importantly, in his final paragraph, “it [fails] as a means of judging values.” 144 In other
141
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words, economics cannot bridge obvious gaps, including “non-human values such as the
suffering of animals.”145 While Broome tends to limit the topic of complexity to the form of
outcomes, there are additional (definitional) complexities when taking into account systems
interconnectivity i.e. the intricate union between fauna, flora, ecosystems, human wellbeing and
overall planetary health. These are often not subject to quantitative (e)valuation within today’s
economic tradition. In other words, experiential, existential, and qualitative value is not
something that can be measured by nor adequately analyzed via data based on consumer
preferences. 146 Broome apparently offers a final word on the matter in sec. 3.5 of the AR-5 titled
Economics, rights, and duties: “Because of their limitations, economic valuations are often not
on their own a good basis for decision making. They frequently need to be supplemented by
other ethical considerations.”147
Broome alternatively, in a 2019 work for The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and
Economics, writes that,

Economics and the methods of economics offer several lessons that moral philosophers
could beneficially learn … So my conclusion is not merely that lessons from economics
could be beneficial. They are actually essential for dealing properly with some topics
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within moral philosophy. 148

Thus, once again, we see Broome place greater emphasis on economics than on philosophy.
Much like many of his works on climate ethics, after a brief lip service to the foundational nature
of philosophy, Broome returns to his economist roots, ultimately relying on those tools to inform
the philosophical discussion rather than the reverse.
Returning to the text and taking uncertainty into account, with regard to the reliability of
scientific predictions, Broome says that “we need more from science than a good explanation of
what is happening now; we need predictions for the future.”149 However, he notes that we can
safely predict that the world will continue to warm and the sea level will continue to rise—with
the stipulation that this would occur even if we were to immediately bring greenhouse emissions
to zero—we still “need more detailed, quantitative predictions.” 150 The future progress of climate
change will be influenced by many external factors, many of which are not limited solely to
things directly responsible for the shift in climate. For instance as populations grow and
technology continues to develop, how we choose to respond to climate change will shift along
with these tangential factors.151
Broome suggests that “the IPCC reports predictions for a wide range of different
possibilities, which it calls ‘scenarios’” but even still “although the science of the greenhouse
effect is not subject to much doubt, these quantitative predictions are very uncertain.” 152 In sum,
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for Broome, we need better and more numbers, illustrating the now common theme of needing to
understand the comprehensive minutia before making any decisions. 153 The true problem is the
intractable policies and “political log-jam.” Humanity is taking minimal action despite the
potential catastrophe that awaits the planet. Hence, economists can assist. That being said,
Broome jots down three options by which to best proceed:

(1) Business as usual: Leave things as they stand.
(2) Efficiency without sacrifice: Emitters reduce emissions enough to eliminate
inefficiency, and are fully compensated.
(3) Efficiency with sacrifice: Emitters reduce emissions enough to eliminate inefficiency,
but are not compensated.154

In the preface to Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome,
Broome discusses the most important thing he learned about climate change:

Still, the most important thing I learnt about climate change is a matter of
economics…Foley wrote to remind me of something that should have been obvious to
me: since greenhouse gas is an externality, it creates inefficiency. The externality could

153

As stated earlier, Broome is not a climate skeptic, but there always appears to be a skeptical element to analytic
thought—this will be further discussed in the last part of this dissertation. This can at times becomes problematic, in
that if the answer is not demonstrable in a way that accounts for one hundred percent of the system, then further
information is necessary in order to extrapolate a definitive assessment of a proper trajectory. The unintentional
implication here is that a consistent request for more information, though undeniably invaluable and necessary at
times, can be misconstrued as an apologia for the current way of doing things i.e. business as usual.
154
Ibid., 45.

76

therefore be corrected without any sacrifice on anyone’s part. Yet the process of
international negotiation seems to demand sacrifices from the current generation for the
sake of future people. The process gets nowhere because governments will not accept
sacrifices on behalf of their people. I think the negotiations should be restructured.
Governments should see themselves as negotiating about the distribution of benefits
rather than sacrifices. The realization that no sacrifice was required may be the way to
unlock the process and move negotiations forward.155

This no sacrifice idea carried over into Climate Matters, making it the central theme to
combating global warming. Consequently, in addition to the problem of valuation and
directionality, the foundational issue seems to be with the current economic system as a whole.
According to Broome, it simply does not take into consideration “waste” and is therefore
inefficient. To be sure, this is an issue, but remains superficial and does not get to the root of the
issue. While he states that economics is in need of a guiding ethical theory, he continuously fails
to offer an account of what that theory of valuation would be. For Broome, climate change
became solely a problem of inefficiency in that “the problem with emissions of greenhouse gas is
that the harm they cause is not paid for.”156 The obvious solution, for him then, is not necessarily
to force people to make the necessary sacrifices—since this is ultimately the crux of the political
inertia—but rather, to make them pay the full price of the waste produced in generating a
product. Ergo, making the system more efficient. 157
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Through cost-benefit analysis, Broome tells us that, of the three options above, efficiency
with sacrifice is the best possible option. 158 Given Broome’s definition of efficiency, emitters of
greenhouse gas must pay the full cost of those emissions 159 and, in addition, preserve more and
consume less resources for present and future receivers who suffer the harms of emissions. But,
to benefit receivers, emitters must cut back on their emissions. Though this would stand to
benefit receivers, it would require a sacrifice on the part of emitters. However, Broome suggests
that “emitters can be compensated for their sacrifice by transferring resource to them from
receivers”160 and “after emitters have reduced their emissions and received a suitable transfer in

productivity with output, output with growth, and growth with the transformation of resources from its natural form
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compensation, they will be no worse off, and receivers will end up better off.” 161 This can also be
applied intergenerationally.
Despite many of the receivers being largely non-existent and yet to be born, a transfer of
compensation is still possible. Broome notes that, as things stand, the current generation will
leave future generations many resources, both unused natural resources and artificial ones, e.g.
economic capital, buildings, machinery, cultivated land, etc. If we were to sacrifice more by
emitting less greenhouse gas, we “could fully compensate ourselves by using more of those
artificial and natural resources for ourselves. We can consume more and invest less of these
resources to future generations.” 162 Those yet to be born will therefore be better off on balance
since they will suffer less from the greenhouse gas we leave in the air. 163 Thus, resources in the
efficiency with sacrifice model are invested in the future, which would in turn produce greater
output and thus benefit a greater number of people. 164
Since economists have a habit of playing politics, their fixation on of generating a context
where efficiency with sacrifice makes “the best the enemy of good”165 and fails to generate
necessary forward momentum. “Curing the externality is extremely urgent,” 166 Broome writes,
“improving the distribution of resources between generations is not so urgent.” 167 Hence, despite
efficiency without sacrifice containing a serious demerit, essentially an injustice where emitters

161

Ibid.
Ibid., 44.
163
Ibid., 45.
164
Note that much of the argument established by Broome is for the preservation of economic activity. There is an
implication that good economics produces a good existence. While this may be true when it comes to the meeting of
basic needs, anything additional does not necessarily improve the quality of life.
165
Ibid., 47.
166
Ibid..
167
Ibid..
162

79

are bribed by receivers not to pollute and harm them, it is preferential to business as usual.168
Therefore, since efficiency without sacrifice is technically possible, it is the big task for
economists to make this possible and put it into effect.169 Broome therefore, makes the argument
that making efficiency without sacrifice is both pragmatic and moral, in that it serves to move the
political process forward. This is how Broome resolves the Global Storm and the
Intergenerational Storm explained by Gardiner.
Section II: Broome’s Econo-Philosophy
The previous section largely focused on Broome’s position in climate philosophy. This
section will pivot to a consideration of the patterns of thought and the oft-used tools consistently
demonstrated by Broome. To accomplish this, I will be following in tandem with Broome’s
thought processes. In doing so, and in serially following multiple strands of Broome’s
arguments, I intend to indicate the major features of the mindset and mental methodologies of
Broome as a litmus case. This will conclude part I, which focused on the current climate ethics
conversation and, more specifically, Broome’s philosophical maneuvering, both of which
motivate the need for an ontology of man; a thing which could act as a basis serving as unifying
ethical, the project of part II.
Of all his books on climate change, only Climate Matters contains exposition on highly
involved philosophical concepts. For example, the concept of goodness for Broome requires the
assistance of cost-benefit analysis and quantitative judgments. When one emits greenhouse
gases, the harm caused is spread throughout the earth and, similarly, through centuries over
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time—since some of that gas will remain in the air for a long time. One person causes a tiny
amount of harm, at a very slow rate, to each of billions of people. In order to work out how much
harm is caused, one must quantify and aggregate each of these harms over time and people. 170
For Broome, then, the process of making judgments of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ is called
valuation, where “the word ‘value’ is a synonym for ‘goodness.” 171 The particulars of valuation
can assist in specific moral issues. Following his discussion of goodness and reaffirming the fact
that quantitative measures are paramount, Broome makes and shares two theoretical arguments
that arise concerning climate and justice: the compensation argument and the non-identity
argument. Both arguments militate against the idea that the current generation actually causes an
injustice to future people through its greenhouse gas emissions and are apparently difficult to
defend against when applied to morals pertaining to public welfare.
Regarding the collective impact on future society, the “compensation argument”
maintains that the current generation is benefitting future generations despite the onset of climate
change. Collectively, it can be said that society, by and large, is decimating the planet in our
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incessant use and pursuit of resources. Posterity therefore is likely to inherit a planet that
possesses less fauna, more polluted seas and skies, erratic and unstable weather, potential health
risks, as well as the potential for economic instability. The list of (possible) negative impacts is
never ending.
That being said, given his presentation of the compensation argument, the current
generation is actually doing a lot for future generations. It is adding to the world’s stock of
resources in several ways. It is developing and expanding its use of technology; this further
allows us to grow more food at a cheaper rate, seek and extract natural resources that were once
unobtainable, construct more efficient dwellings to house more people, adding to the overall
stock of human knowledge. The list of potential positive impacts is also never ending. All of
these assets come at a price and the payoff is that future people will be richer than us, materially
speaking.
Posterity, Broome concludes, will be poorer environmentally but wealthier than the
current generation in other respects. Broome optimistically reflects on this thought, saying,

We can hope that on the balance of these two factors they will be better off. If they are,
although we as a generation are damaging their lives in one way, we are more than
making up for it in other ways. We could therefore claim to be compensating future
people for the environmental damage we are bequeathing to them. 172
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Ergo, we can forego any perceived injustice we might have about leaving the planet
environmentally impoverished. Future generations will be better equipped to handle the problem
of climate change, thanks to all the resources and amenities they stand to inherit.
The second argument, against injustice toward future people, which Broome calls the
“nonidentity problem,”173 takes into account the individual. 174 As an example he considers a
person that lives 150 years from now and asks whether that person has a right to complain about
his/her given situation due to the impact of climate change. Could s/he claim that they have been
caused an injustice by the current generation, and that s/he had a right to a better life, which was
denied by our excessive polluting? The answer often given, according to Broome, is no. 175
Suppose society took it upon itself to reduce carbon emissions so that we avoid reaching
a critical watershed moment that results in severe negative climate impact. To do so, the affluent
would have to find a way to travel less by car and plane, change diet, consume less, change
habits, perhaps even move to areas that would allow humanity to be better stewards of nature.
This abrupt shift would mean that everyone would have entirely different outcomes in their lives.
Who they interact with, the places they would go, and even whom they might procreate with
would be entirely different. Even those who might have the same partner as they actually do
would have conceived their babies at different times.
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Broome points out that the identity of a person depends on his/her origin. 176 While he
does not give a complete definition, Broome seems to be utilizing a compendium version of
identity, where each specific factoid related to a particular individual indicates a necessary part
of their whole, with implications about other parts as well. So, to change the initial conditions for
the genesis of any particular individual would necessarily result in the radical alteration of the
resulting individual, at least as compared across suitably local possible worlds. Consequently, the
slightest variation in how the future unfolds would change the lives of nearly everyone. Within a
couple of generations, the entire population of the world would effectively be radically different
from what it is now. This is what Broome calls the non-identity effect. Thus, any person who
would have existed in the future, if we continued to act as we currently do, would not exist at all.
Their ability to complain is possible only because things transpired the way they did. Should the
current generation of people decide to behave differently, there would be no opportunity for
anyone to make any claims about injustice in the future. Hence, for Broome, any individual born
150 years from now cannot plausibly claim that s/he has a right to a better life, and can safely
conclude that our emissions do no injustice, because it we behaved in a way that is more just
now then the complaining individual would not exist in 150 years. 177
Broome says that both arguments contain their flaws. For the compensation argument,
Broome notes that, “although the present generation might compensate each future generation as
a whole, we will not succeed in compensating each future individual.” 178 Hence, some future
people will not be adequately compensated, despite the harms that they will incur. Broome,
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given the moral significance that he places on the individual, believes that this failure of
individual compensation results in a violation of justice. In an attempt to circumvent oncoming
problems, we may be compensating the future rich, but the future poor will most likely go
uncompensated; “some, for instance, will be killed by climate change, and will not be
compensated.”179
Another gap in the argument noted by Broome is that an “injustice is not necessarily
canceled by compensation.”180 He suggests that people might simply have the right to specific
goods and an unpolluted environment. If they do, and the current generation deprives posterity of
those things, we violate their right by leaving greenhouse gases in the air. He proceeds, astutely
recognizing that though “we may do them good in other ways, that does not necessarily cancel
the injustice.” Hence, Broome himself notes that the compensation argument contains two major
flaws: first, not everyone will be compensated and will unjustly incur damage or even death, and
second, even if future generations are being compensated, the compensation provided is not
necessarily equivalent to the goods and experiences that they will be deprived of.
In the case of the non-identity problem, Broome admits that there would in-fact be an
impact but he finds it “less convincing when applied to the emissions of a single individual.” 181
For example, while an individual can continue to emit greenhouse gas profligately, one could
instead release less. To do so would mean that there would be a shift in choice and lifestyle.
These effects in behavior would cause a ripple effect from the person changing his or her
behavior to more remote people. Broome though surmises that “the identities of most people in
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the world would not have been affected by your reduction in emissions,” since the ripple effect
would be so small. Broome concludes that we need not worry about such a shift spreading across
the whole world in less than several generations, so much so that there would be no worry about
the immediate course of these potential future identities. 182
Furthermore, Broome adds, that a reduction in greenhouse emission would surely bring
about immediate, albeit small, benefits to people all around the world. Therefore, “all over the
world, for several generations, many of the same people would have been born as they actually
are, and those people would all have benefited to a small extent from your reduced emissions.” 183
By continuing to release greenhouse gases without any attempt at conscious restraint, harm
would befall the unseen for one's own benefit and self-gratification. Broome reminds us that if
one does not compensate those individuals for the benefits received, they have a case against you
for the injustice perpetrated.184
Broome concludes that emissions of greenhouse gas constitute injustice to those
presently living and potentially living. Both compensation and non-identity arguments constitute
an argument for doubting that injustice is done to future generations. In particular, Broome notes,
that the non-identity problem is quite convincing when applied to a whole generation or a
generation within a single nation but the arguments tend to fall apart once applied to individuals.
Both the compensation argument and the non-identity argument are offered by Broome as a
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justification for his prescriptive quantitative analysis within this troubling paradigm of climate
change.
From this point forward in his Climate Matters, Broome makes the case for pragmatic
solutions; mainly, that of a discount rate and offsetting. He begins by making a distinction
between public morality and private morality, whereby the former involves moral responsibilities
associated with governments and the latter are moral responsibilities allocated to individuals.
With respect to climate ethics, duties of justice are associated with individuals. Thus, individuals
have a responsibility to avoid emitting as much greenhouse gas as possible. Conversely, duties of
governments, or public morality, are more complex since governments are in a position to
promote stability and goodness. Therefore, “in choosing their policies they need to weigh against
one another all the good things and bad things that will result from them” 185 and thus, those
calculations of cost-benefit analysis are particularly complex.
To improve the world would require goodness, and that can only be established by
undertaking appropriate political measures. Public morality needs to be established via
governmental action. Action such as economic discount rates falls to that legislative body. 186 In
the case of the individual, each person, according to Broome, has a duty to emit less—if at all,
since it benefits one person while harming another—and can easily be done, despite being
stringent, by offsetting. On the other hand, despite the individual reducing his/her emissions, this
will not be sufficient to solve the problem. Therefore, the individual should modify his or her
behavior on the grounds of justice, not of goodness.
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Broome uses discount rates to extend his cost-benefit analysis across time. Broad costbenefit analysis and discount rate can assist governments in the decision making process since
such “expected value theory [is a] well-established correct way of dealing with uncertainty.”187
Analysis of this type can help zero-in on “choos[ing] the option that has the greatest expectation
of goodness.”188 Since the mitigation of climate change via governmental policies may take
several decades to bear fruit,189 the evaluation of such potential policies has to be weighed
against each other.190 Cost-benefit analysis applied to goods over time can also be applied to
moral judgements, since “the morality of climate change is a quantitative matter”191 and thus “we
need to know just what the size is of the response morality calls on us to make.” 192 Discount
rates can help accomplish such a task.
According to Broome, economists generally give less value to future commodities than to
present ones since one would factor in revealed time preference 193 and opportunity costs194
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probably incumbent upon a reflection of your overall savings and investment portfolio. For example, you may want
to hold off and wait the ten years because you may have the savings and one hundred dollars will not make much of
a difference. Better to wait, just in case. Most people though, it is assumed, will want the money up front because of
the risk tomorrow might bring. Therefore, it may be better to invest it or put it in a savings account where it can
accrue interest—in ten years’ time, at five per cent compounding interest, you would have a total of $162.89.
Therefore, the equivalent future value of $100.00 would be $162.89, given current interest rates. These values are
not taking inflation into account and is maintaining the “real value” at a constant.
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If one were to ask of you how much would you be willing to pay now in order to avoid $100.00 worth of
damage to your home in a year from now, one might answer ~$95.24 since s/he could put that hundred in the bank
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together; this is what leads them to discount the benefits of future commodities. For investors,
returns lose a portion of their “net present value” for every year they calculate into the future. 195
The overall amount, as a percentage, that a benefit recedes into the future is the discount rate.196
The moral question that is imposed on economists is connected to the specific discount
rate they recommend since whatever percentage/interest-rate they base the discount rate on also
suggests the level of risk and urgency for a potential problem. Broome claims that the
discounting of commodities should not be based on well-being. Instead, he suggests, the sole
consideration that should be prioritized is that the economy continue to grow, thereby leaving
posterity with greater material resources than we have now. Future commodities should be
discounted because they supply less to the well-being of the future person than that of the
present.
Given that this is a cost-benefit analysis on a grand scale, Broome concludes that making
sacrifices might be beneficial when it comes to the redistribution of resources between present
and future people but that this should not be conflated with the externality of greenhouse gases.
Thus, “asking for sacrifices is to burden the aim of controlling global warming with the further
aim of improving the distribution of resources between generations.” 197 He concludes that it

that pays 5% interest and have $105.00 a year from now. That would leave one with $100.00 to pay off the damage
and $5.00 in profit. Thus, one could divide the interest rate from the $100.00 to achieve its current worth of $95.24.
Ergo, one would pay $95.24 now to avoid $100.00 worth of damage to their home in the future. Keep in mind that
depending on how much an investment pays, relative to other uses of the same resource, is known as its
“opportunity cost” — for every investment made, you choose to forego other opportunities.
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“Most empirical models of climate change imply that the world’s economy will continue to grow, so that future
people in general will be richer than present ones” (Broome, 190).
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would be politically more effective to keep externalities and sacrifices separate and that “nobody
needs to make any sacrifices to eliminate the externality of climate change.” 198
In addition to discount rates, Broome recommends offsetting. Offsetting, for Broome, is
one way we can help mitigate the oncoming problem. Offsetting is a way of bringing the carbon
debt back to zero and possibly back into the green. Simply put, by utilizing offsetting, if you
were to produce a unit of greenhouse gas, you would then simultaneously cause the unit to be
subtracted. This is a practical solution to the duty of individual morality and the allotment of
justice, i.e. respect for others who might lack the resources of another. A common example given
when discussing offsetting is to plant a tree. Broome asserts though that to plant so many trees
would only forestall the issue since one day, the tree planted will die and its death will release all
that carbon into the atmosphere. In order for this to be a genuine offset, Broome notes that
“somehow you will have to ensure your forest will be replanted and replanted again perpetually
even after your death”199 since one would need “to make sure that the trees’ carbon is
permanently removed from the atmosphere, and that would be hard to achieve.” 200 Therefore, doit-yourself offsetting is extremely difficult. Broome goes on to recommend presently available
alternative methods, which he calls preventative offsetting. 201
There are currently many companies and commercial organizations that offer to offset
carbon emissions for individuals. They are paid a fee per ton of offsetting, and they “use your
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money to finance projects that would diminish emissions somewhere in the world.” 202 These
projects generally occur in developing countries and invest in renewable energies such as
hydroelectric power stations and wind farms. Similarly, they can also promote the efficient use
of energy such as the installation of efficient cooking stoves which helps to reduce carbon
emissions. While this does not address your own emissions directly, this would reduce the
emissions of others, effectively reducing the overall rate of emissions worldwide.
Broome argues that preventive offsetting “leads to a real reduction in global emissions of
greenhouse gas…[while] making sure that your presence in the world causes no greenhouse gas
to be added to the atmosphere.”203 One might not be able to effectively extract carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases from the atmosphere but one can offset them by helping others to
prevent further contributing and compounding deleterious emissions. Broome recommends to his
reader that for a small price, one can offset their own emissions by preventing others in
developing nations from further emitting. This would bring said individuals’ total greenhouse
gas emissions to zero.204
In sum, Broome’s argument repeatedly and explicitly suggests that, in order to bring
about change, we should look to practical measures that can be generated by economists and
enacted by politicians. So long as we are discounting the future in a way that leaves future
generation with more resources than the current generation and offsetting is introduced as a
means to curtail externalities then active change can be brought about by the economic and
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political framework we currently have in place. As mentioned earlier, the issue, on the whole, is
considered to be a political problem. Economically speaking, so long as the economy continues
to grow, the only genuine concern is to manage it effectively and, more importantly, efficiently.
No matter where humanity finds itself in 150 years, the future generation will have essentially
been left with a better world than now along with a greater availability of options so long as
action is taken. This is the apparent position taken by Broome and many of the member in
climate philosophy.
Section III: Fromm Left Field
Above is a brief presentation of Broome’s palliative argument with respect to the
potential oncoming problems of climate change. The central point of his argument is: the current
generation does not need to sacrifice in order to curtail this potentially disastrous situation and
that the issue, on the whole, is a political one—mainly, that governments need to pass the
appropriate laws which will divert and allocate monies in the right direction. His
recommendations are deeply rooted in his economic methodologies, which in-turn, are generated
by his outmoded) mindset. All three of these will be subject to an expanding critique beginning
with Broome’s practical argument and becoming more theoretical in nature as we work through
his methodologies and finally conclude with his mindset. The purpose is to make space for Erich
Fromm by providing parallels to the first chapter i.e. that a complete system overhaul is
necessary and in order to achieve it the mindset must also be subject to change. Broome’s
practical suggestions, his methodologies, and his mindset, serves as such example. The second
half of the dissertation attempts to adopt a system better suited toward a green future by focusing
on the mindset and thus setting a pre-actionability foundation for future discussion. Therefore, at
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the end of this critique I will point to an alternative mindset, one that is more aligned with
sustainable values, given by the extensive psychoanalytic work of Fromm, and how the Frankfurt
School might serve as a template for moving forward in a substantial and progressive fashion.
Prior to presenting this alternative, a negative argument must be made against Broome and his
kind i.e. the externalists, in order to grant a suitable segue.
Beginning with Broome’s given compensation argument, he claims that so long as we,
the current generation, are providing future generations with something, then we commit no
injustice. In an earlier example Broome states:
As things stand, people—‘emitters’—emit greenhouse gas and benefit from doing so,
while other people—‘receivers’—suffer harm from those emissions…Emitters must
reduce their emissions. This will benefit receivers but, other things being equal, it would
be a sacrifice on the part of many emitters. However, the emitters can be compensated for
their sacrifice by transferring resources to them from receivers. Just because emissions
are inefficient, we know that a transfer is possible that is enough to compensate emitters
fully and yet still leaves receivers better off than they were originally…After emitters
have reduced their emissions and received a suitable transfer in compensation, they will
be no worse off, and receivers will end up better off. 205
Thus, according to Broome, the transferring of resources from the current generation to
future generations is given in the form of “artificial resources”206 in the form of economic capital
such as buildings, machinery, cultivated land, technology, etc. He says, “we will also leave
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natural resources, since we shall not use up all the natural resources that are in the ground.”207
For Broome, “we can fully compensate ourselves by using more of those artificial and natural
resources.”208 In other words, “we can consume more and invest less for the future.”209
Immediately, there seems to be something of a contradiction in Broome’s thinking. For
one thing, it is the current generation that needs to sacrifice on behalf of the future generation.
This sacrifice comes in the form of non-emissions. Since we somehow are to cease or curtail our
emissions, we can compensate ourselves for this sacrifice by consuming more. More, in terms of
both artificial and natural resources. How further consumption is to generate less emission is not
something Broome specifies. Nevertheless, we are somehow intended to consume more, to emit
less, yet also leave future generations with more resources.
His other justification argument, as discussed, is the non-identity argument. Broome uses
the name “Sarah” when discussing the person of the future that “cannot plausibly claim that she
has a right to a better life.”210 There is an underlying question though: why that particular
context? According to Broome, we “simply could not have given Sarah a better life by emitting
less gas [and therefore] is not plausible that we violated a right of hers by continuing to emit
profligately.”211 The reason for this is because Sarah has come into existence given a very
specific series of events that include one of the scenarios in which we emit greenhouse gases. If
we had not, the world would have worked out differently and she would not have exited, ergo,
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she has no right to complain and we have no obligation to concern ourselves with Sarah and the
situation we have put her in.
The complaining, or thinking, that one is deserving of a better life is separate from the
reality of the situation. One can always find something to complain about but the fact remains
that the state of the world can be one that is more amenable to a healthy existence whether I find
cause for complaint or not. Broome seems to be a bit dismissive of future individuals, essentially
telling them that they should be grateful that they’re even alive.
Furthermore, Sarah is also arbitrary. Why Sarah? Why not Tom, Dick, or Harriette?
According to Broome, if we were to emit less carbon then Sarah would not have come into
existence at all for “even the slightest variation in the timing of conception… a very slight
change in people’s lives means that they conceive different people.” 212 Broome points out, “had
we significantly reduced our emissions of greenhouse gas, it would have changed the lives of
nearly everyone in the world in ways that are more than slight.” 213 In an infinite amount of
realities that can potentially come into fruition, why is Sarah so important? By choosing Sarah,
Broome is making a comparative value and deciding that Sarah’s existence should be given a
greater priority in the argument than that of Tom’s existence, who would have been born in her
stead should we have decided to emit less greenhouse gases. Broome failed to explain to the
reader how, in a manifold timeline, he comes up with the method of deciding which groups of
soon-to-be people are more worthy of life than an alternative, should we currently decide to
make different choices. Both the compensation and non-identity arguments take on a flavor of
contrivance in service to maintaining the status quo, rather than addressing an overall cultural
212
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shift which is necessary to address the root of the climate change problem. As a side note,
Broome still uses these arguments despite noting that both are heavily flawed. A problem which,
once again, can be seen to have international consequence as the Non-Identity argument was also
used in the AR-5.214
As solutions to the difficulties presented to his arguments, Broome offers discount rates
and offsetting as methods which might assist us in combatting climate change. While he and
many other analytic climate ethicists argue over the best discount rate, regardless of the discount
rate chosen, their criterion for evaluation seems to be equally flawed in its arbitrary nature.
Ironically, this leads them back to square one: how might they evaluate the evaluation? Broome
admits that when taking a cost-benefit analysis of the loss of human life we should “measure the
value of lives by one of the quantity measures, and not try to combine it with a monetary
measure of other values.” 215 By doing so, though, it would “leave a large hole in the cost-benefit
analysis of climate change; it will often lead to no definite conclusion.” 216 For Broome, “if some
policy would save lives, but have a cost in terms of money, cost-benefit analysis will not
determine whether or not this is a good policy on balance.”217 The fact that Broome explicitly
states that cost-benefit analysis can be rendered ineffective by introducing particular
complexities, i.e. the commodification of human life, is beside the point—adequate cost-benefit
seems to work when confined to quantifiable matters, mainly, that which can be monetized.
Ethics aside, even if human life was made quantifiable by being monetized, assessment would
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suffer from the same problem; the value of life to currency would be dependent on an arbitrary
set of criteria once again.
The other actionable proposal offered by Broome is offsetting. One way a consumer can
offset their behavior is by preventing others from emitting greenhouse gases. The checkbook can
be balanced by creating a theoretical/imaginary potential and subtracting that from one’s own
damaging actions. While generating larger carbon sinks might not work, the version of offsetting
offered by Broome fares little better. It is not a genuine, or at least complete, form of offsetting.
While genuine offsetting removes any externalities generated by an individual/society, his
version merely passes the buck and places a greater share of the responsibility on people of
developing nations. Any proactive contribution made by members of already affluent and
developed societies simply comes in the form of a monthly payment without the necessary shift
in outlook and/or behavior. This means that polluting behavior can continue so long as
somebody has the means the pay.
While Broome’s recommendation might be an important one, it is not enough. Before
any discussion of offsetting can be made, one must first answer the question of what the
planetary equivalent of a balanced checkbook is. We should keep in mind what we are
attempting to accomplish in the first place. To his credit, Broome does recommend bringing
one’s carbon footprint to zero, though for him, this should be done by paying companies to offset
potential emissions in developing countries. We need not sacrifice on our own behalf. Broome’s
version of offsetting seems to be preventative in nature but not reparative. He confidently states
that though it is
true, [that] once you have put a tonne of carbon dioxide molecules into the atmosphere,
those molecules will wreak their damage. However, if at the same time you remove the
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same number of other carbon dioxide molecules, you prevent those ones from wreaking
damage. Your overall effect is zero.218
How he manages to do the math on that latter part of the statement has yet to be seen. I, as a
consumer, would still be pumping carbon into the atmosphere. Simply because I am preventing
future carbon from being emitted by others does not take away from the fact that I am
continuously emitting profligately. I am still a key contributor to the problem at hand. While this
will succeed in keeping the rate of emissions constant, it fails to effectively reduce the rate of
carbon emissions.
Discount rate and offsetting were Broome’s actionable pragmatic suggestions to the
potential problems of climate change. Both were his way of showing that current people do not
have to sacrifice for their way of life for future generations. So long as we offset and keep a
relatively low discount rate, we are free to conduct business as usual. This is undergirded and
justified by his compensation and non-identity arguments.
As previously shown, according to Broome, the procedure that will help humanity
determine a solution to the problem of value, thereby affording us the proper motivation to act, is
that of cost-benefit analysis. However, should cost-benefit analysis be presented as a tool for
generating decisive action to someone who does not believe in it as a legitimate means of
behavioral justification, cost-benefit analysis would find itself with no leg to stand on of its own
merit; it would be left simply begging the question. Externalists tend to fall prey to the famed
Thor fallacy: when your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
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While I am confident that the above critique is justifiable based on my understanding and
presentation of Broome and his fellow analytic climate ethicists, it falls prey to the same failing
that they do: it does not address the underlying impetus that resulted in these attempts at
solutions. The main thesis of this work can be described by a single word: health. It is important
to situate the analysis and arguments of Broome, other climate ethicists, and Fromm within the
context of health. To utilize a medical metaphor, the planet might be understood as a person
dying from a chronic systemic disease, and it needs to be saved. Climate ethicists are acting as
diagnosticians, recommending a battery of tests at semi-regular intervals in the hopes of
discovering the perfect diagnosis and cure. This is an important but time consuming process that
has run out the clock. The planet-patient is collapsing, and the EMT needs to be called. This is
where Broome comes in. His suggestions, much like the other climate ethicist, will not actually
solve the issue. Nonetheless Broome’s solutions are necessary to marginally restabilize the
planet until we can arrive at the hospital. Here is where Fromm steps in as a psycho-surgeon to
actually address the underlying problem. He does not look to alleviate the obvious systems
which Broome and the other analytic climate ethicists focus on. Instead, he recognizes these as
indicative of an underlying issue, and in a deft movement replaces the corrupt with the
progenitive resulting in the much sought after panacea. Less metaphorically: climate ethicists
have generated and analysed the relevant climate data to give a clear understanding of the issues,
Broome is offering actionable proscriptions to generate the time to better address them, and
Fromm provides a unifying ethical foundation that promotes a conjoined principle of internal
health for individuals and societies. Taking this metaphor seriously, I will now suggest some of
what is missing in the climate ethicists discussed so far, and the consequences of the absences.
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Constant and consistent growth is the modus operandi of every successful economy. As
societies become more affluent, population and per capita consumption both continue to grow
and contribute to generating a negative feedback loop. Hence, when considering Broome’s
philosophy, the largest issue is the fact that his “nobody needs to sacrifice” solutions merely
require minor shifts in policy, but fail to consider the broader difficulties of a global system; one
that legitimizes and reinforces outmoded and unsustainable behavior, habits, outlooks, and
culture. Broome represents the portion of the analytic climate ethicist community that attempts to
fix the problem without addressing why the problem has come about in the first place. Though
he addresses the ‘how’ as a symptom of externalities, his prescriptions are devoid of an adequate
exegesis of the underlying causes, and so fall short of a systemic overhaul. This is an attempt to
correct superficial behavior, without understanding the genuine cause, in order to adequately
address and extirpate it.
On the other hand, contra Broome, climate ethicists such as James Garvey, Stephen
Gardiner, Peter Singer, Henry Shue, Paul Baer, Dale Jamieson, and Simon Caney—and others
that encompassed the body of the aforementioned essential reader—recognize that there are
fissures in our social framework and, limiting the discussion to climate and environmental ethics,
repeatedly speak of expanding our ‘ethical sphere’ to include fauna, flora, and entire ecosystems.
In the case of carbon emissions, the conversations become laden with discussions about justice,
fairness, equality, and future oriented (e)valuations. Not that these are unimportant, but they are
still part of a “diagnostics” conversation, in a time when we are in desperate need of
mobilization. Like Broome, when discussing scientific or legislative uncertainty, comparative
analysis, valuation, distribution, etc., climate ethicists often fail to take the additional step of
providing theories with a comprehensive social revolution. Their work inevitably falters when it
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is time to come up with a basis for a unified actionable plan, as was expressed by Gardiner in
chapter 1 and was made further evident in the U.N. AR,-5, WGIII, chapter 3 “Social, Economic,
and Ethical Concepts and Methods” when it managed to provide broad overviews of major
ethical theories but failed to suggest that one/some might be more accurate/adequate than others,
as well as why that is the case.
The core of the issue is reducible to the problem of the criterion. The question becomes,
as was discussed in the last chapter as the Step Two dilemma, what is the cultural crimp that
continues to promote maladaptive behavior? The problem of culture, more specifically, the
problem of behavior, has been an issue for philosophers since ancient times. The missing
ingredient in this conversation can be supplied by Fromm’s notion of humanism, which does two
important things.
First, it makes the case for objective qualities to be found in mankind—a quiddity which
can be universally referenced by some measure of empirical processes beyond a purely
physicalist/materialist metaphysics. A contributing difficulty to the ongoing discussion is that
humanity does not define itself and to do so would be to limit the descriptions of individuality
that our current societal foundation prizes. Any attempt to express life as a set of qualities would
inevitably fall short of an accurate model. Given this ontological problem in defining what it
means to be human, existence can only be understood as a phenomenon of countless possible
descriptions. While this outlook demands that the definition of a human being be unconstrained
by a uselessly broad definition, thereby keeping a greater degree of accuracy, it axiomatically
ensnares us into a truncated conversation unable to get beyond our inability to coherently discuss
what constitutes human nature. This prevents any agreement, or disagreement, on what we are,
along with how we might move forward and finally break past the ‘political logjam’ (or what the
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idea of “forward” would mean in such an ontologically vague system). Fromm offers such an
ontology, one that grounds our analysis and allows an appropriate justification for the set of
solutions offered.
Second Fromm’s humanism is an answer to precisely the question of producing a futureoriented trajectory, in terms of actionability. Any decisions made with respect to what ought to
be done are contingent upon implicit axioms that describe and color one’s interpretation of
reality, the meaning derived therein, and how to navigate through the landscape of life. For
Fromm, in order to give an answer to the ought question, we first need to consider any
objectively defensible qualities man may possess which would in turn help set a standard of
criteria from which to judge actions. Therefore, while philosophers and economists alike attempt
to sift through the scientific projections and conjure a viable response to the issue at hand, the
dialogue can be supported via consensus pertaining to ontological and ethical axioms; by doing
so, it would grant academics and politicians a clearer normative trajectory. Conclusion
Chapter 3 has made the effort to express John Broome’s ideas as presented in his text
Climate Matters. This allowed us to focus on a sole analytic thinker in more detail in order to be
able to more precisely pinpoint the problem of the mindset. That which believes some
adjustments can be made to adequately combat this oncoming leviathan. Even though Broom’s
philosophy is pragmatic, there seems to be something missing and Broome himself seems to be
aware of it as was revealed in Sections I, “Situating Broome in the Discussion, and II, “Broome’s
Econo-Philosophy.” While on one hand, he tout’s economics as a panacea for the world’s
problems, on the other, he acknowledges that although economics is a highly practical tool, it
ultimately does not rest on “first principles.” He appears, at times, to be torn between what is and
what needs to be—a completely new culture, mindset, and way of doing things. This is often
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expressed in terms of the problem of valuation and the values that underlie cost-benefit analysis.
It also becomes increasingly apparent when he writes about private morality. Though he might
make the argument that the individual should shift his/her behavior because of a duty of justice
toward others and also noting that moral arguments will not suffice to change life-long behaviors
ensconced in a Western tradition of hyper-individualism and intra-social competition. This
becomes an odd internal monologue that is written out over the course of three decades for the
reader. Section I of Chapter 3 showed how Broome, a classical economist, looks to philosophy to
help ground economics, but always falls back on economics to solve the problem of valuation.
Section II focused on Broome’s practical solutions and methodologies, outlining the
Compensation argument and the Non-Identity argument to help bolster his suggested solutions of
using cost-benefit analysis, discounting, and offsetting as a short-term solution to move us
forward. Section III, “Fromm Left Field,” makes small but compelling arguments as to why
Broome’s solutions, though a good start within our given system and our current political
climate, are ultimately not enough to prevent or deal with the looming impact of climate change;
it does not provide a long-term solution. Something that is missing within the climate philosophy
as a whole. The problem argued (and will continue to be argued in the subsequent pages), stems
from a mentality that harbors certain values as the primary existential filters. In other words,
values employed by the individual of particular society that lend the necessary tools and faculties
which in turn render a navigational compass within that society. It is these values that create the
ideology of a culture, or mindset, that needs to be altered if there is to be genuine systemic
change capable of achieving sustainability given our current technological knowhow.
Economics itself needs to be altered radically in a way that can accommodate sustainable work
and sustainable lifestyles. One that aligns itself with universal ethical principles that work at the
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behest of all, not just a select few. To do this, the Zeitgeist of our current paradigm, i.e. incessant
growth and profits, division, self-orientedness, and system that promotes a steady and consistent
existential angst, must cease. A small shift, while maintaining our current way of life, is not
adequate. Nevertheless, as Broome suggests, using economics as a means of transition is
certainly a step in the right direction—that of “breaking up” the political “logjam” while
simultaneously decreasing greenhouse emissions—but it falls short of describing the full scope
of what is genuinely needed. Conversely, Fromm would implore us to consider such economic
practicalities concomitantly with reassembling the underbelly of the human motive and
experience.
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Part II: Fromm and Humanism
This part will delve into Erich Fromm’s body of work, in order to offer a supplementary
contribution to the climate crisis conversation. It is the intention of this part to show that
Fromm’s humanism, influenced mainly by Freud and Marx, can lend us the requisite tools for
achieving the appropriate attitude for what would bring about a sustainable future beyond the
merely satisfactory. Considering the mindset of the current social paradigm, Fromm’s
conversational interjection offers us a ‘Copernican turn’ in the field of climate ethics, prioritizing
the ‘inner’ world of human beings over the external. As discussed in part I of the dissertation,
Climate ethicists largely use external/extrinsic circumstances as primary motivating factors, e.g.
poverty, pollution, population, etc., as well as a means for solutions, e.g. science, economics,
government. Fromm, on the other hand, begins from the internal, the psychic/psychological life
of individuals, and works his way toward the external. Ergo, instead of empirical cause and
effect he directs our gaze toward immaterial considerations, working from the inside out, from
one’s psyche and into its effect on our environment.
The importance of Freud and Marx is as plain as day, as they are a recurring theme in
most of Fromm’s work, which include works such as Sigmund Freud’s Mission: An Analysis of
his Personality and Influence (1959); Marx’s Concept of Man (1961); Beyond the Chains of
Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud (1962); and the Greatness and Limitations of
Freud’s Thought (1980). In addition to having entire books dedicated to them, Freud and Marx
are often a major point of discussion from which Fromm continuously returns to draw water
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from. It is important to briefly consider Fromm’s intellectual influencers in order to demonstrate
that he understood his project to be founded on what he believed to be objective laws of man’s
nature, not to be transgressed but to be respected and nurtured.
Through Freud one can see that Fromm’s humanism is borne of and rooted in a scientific
tradition. This is a crucial insight because it is easy to be dismissive of a humanistic philosophy
as some may suggest that it is too fluid of a concept, leaving its lack of specificity vulnerable to a
wide variety of interpretations. Any recommendations given by Fromm, pertaining to existential
matters, are grounded on scientific observation and clinical investigation. Thus, while his
humanistic theory would implore us to work from the immaterial to material i.e. from our inner
world to the outer one, it nevertheless is backed by investigations into the necessary empirical
implications—rooted in the scientific tradition—of his immaterial theory, having begun with
Freud’s influence and lending Fromm scientific legitimacy.
The tradition follows as such: Freud was the pupil of Franz Brentano, Carl Claus, and
Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke, all innovative scientists at the University of Vienna, along with Josef
Breuer, the doctor who opened the door for Freud, allowing for the merging of science and
health. Freud conducted research on the eel life cycle alongside Claus, a Darwinist professor
specializing in marine zoology who studied cell biology. 219 Despite his eel study results being
inconclusive, Freud’s experience with invertebrates did not end there. He spent many years
studying the differences between human and vertebrate brains and that of frogs and invertebrates
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like lampreys. 220 These years were spent studying under Brücke, a physiologist whose influence
on Freud and his research was arguably the most significant. From him came the idea that living
things are dynamic and ruled by the sciences of physics and chemistry. 221 Lastly, Breuer was the
final piece of the puzzle in setting Freud in the direction of psychoanalysis in the famous case of
Bertha Pappenheim known as Anna O. and the “talking cure” used to treat her diagnosed
hysteria. Thus, his insights were ultimately based on empirical observation: that the psyche and
empiricism were interconnected and co-influential.
Freud’s influence on Fromm—along with Fromm’s subsequent acceptance or rejection of
particular aspects of Freudian theory—demanded that his critical theory account for the inherent
underlying influences of ontology, physiology, neo-Darwinian evolution, and psychological
structures involving energy pathways and momentum. Fromm is therefore continuing this
inherited journey, which he joined, adopted, and adapted alongside Marxist sociological,
economic, and collective parallels.
Fromm begins Marx’s Concept of Man (1961) by writing, “Marx’s philosophy, like much
of the existentialist thinking, represents a protest against man’s alienation.” 222 It is made plain
from the onset of the book that the basis for Fromm’s humanism is the relationship man has with
himself. The relationship one has with himself is paramount, since it ultimately translates to
activity; mindset generates perspective and it is perspective that is the direct causal conduit to
220
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one’s behavior. For Fromm, the individual’s relation to the world is given by his particular mode
of activity. 223
Objectively speaking, man must have sustenance and shelter prior to the pursuit of
politics, science, art, and religion. The production of material means—and consequently the
degree of economic development—form the basis upon which the social and political institutions
have evolved. Therefore, the prevailing practice determines man’s mode of production and
consequently his relationship with himself, the world around him, and his practice of life. 224
Marx “analyzed in detail what these institutions are, or rather, that the institutions
themselves were to be understood as part of the whole system of production which characterizes
a given society,”225 thus “various economic conditions can produce different psychological
motivations.”226 The broad argument made by Fromm is that a system that produces a culture
that idolizes possessions as a means of creating a criterion for status and social hierarchy
(especially within the context of climate change), will unwittingly create a group of maladapted
individuals. This is because they are concentrated mostly on attaining, possessing, maintaining,
using and discarding (external) goods rather than focusing on the (inner) self, along with the
qualities that make life worth living. Such conduct likely makes for an alienated populace. It was
this Marxist fear, that the type of society which has much, would stymie the free unfolding of
man’s human powers and potentiality, and would ultimately cripple the individuals that partook
in it.
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The point for Marx, and later for Fromm, is to maximize the positive expression of the
individual’s potential. The means of production constitute the social arrangement of any given
society and are a single expression of a given potential. But, in being expressed, it consequently
detracts from the multifarious potential, by limiting man to the social constraints of such
expression. Fromm writes that “[man] is not what he ought to be, and that he ought to be that
which he could be.”227 Hence, from a humanistic perspective, the duty of society is not to merely
allow the individual to work to exist, but to exist in order to work so that its citizens might
flourish, having found meaning in their productivity. Fromm quotes Marx from his Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in what was to be later used by him as the descriptive
basis for his characterology and the healthy existential attitude, i.e. Marx’s alienated labor,
became Fromm’s humanistic alienation of self; the unhealthy way of life behaving as a
framework from which to formulate a depiction of health by utilizing a method of
dichotomizing.
The conjoined movement of both internal and external processes alike for Frommian
thought, by way of Freud and Marx, is an ongoing social evolution with socialism as its telos.
Socialism, in a Marxist sense, he tells us, “can only come, once man has cut off all primary
bonds, when he has become completely alienated and thus able to reunite himself with men and
nature without sacrificing his integrity and individuality.” 228 For Fromm then, the individual
must therefore “…accept responsibility for himself and the fact that only by using his own
powers can he give meaning to his life.”229 These ‘powers’ are elements which, when focused
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on, become the productive social forces that foster, as a primary import, the pursuit of human
development as a whole and the individual alike.
Given Marx’s influence, Fromm was able to identify the importance of society and the
impact that it has on individual development, allowing him to take a position of balance: that
individuals and society are inextricable components of each other. If social institutions are
failing, they will affect individuals. If individuals, in turn, are failing to adequately contend with
the aforementioned existential strain, they will affect the purpose of institutions and the ideals
they might espouse. Therefore, Freud’s assessment of the individual’s relation to the whole and
Marx’s analysis of the impact the whole had on the individual, are what synergistically came
together to influence his humanism; a vision that strives to strike a balance between the two
extremes with the hope that it will assist humanity by allowing it to take evolution into its own
hands in a way that is beneficial to the species, and the planet as a whole.
Marx’s contribution to Fromm was entirely different from Freud’s. While Freud lent Fromm the
consideration of objective qualities which could behave as the basis and criteria of psychological
health, Marx’s contribution gave Fromm specific qualities that would allow a society to make
progress. In other words, Marx lent vision and trajectory to Fromm’s humanism.
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Chapter 4: Fromm Here to There
Prior to discussing Fromm in relation to climate change and the benefits he might bring
to the discussion, a solid understanding of Fromm is necessary. This needs to begin with his
ontology of man as a frame for understanding the rest of his thought process which culminates in
the application of his humanist ideals. To that end, this chapter aims to discuss the prevalence of
dichotomized thought in Fromm’s corpus, but more specifically taking from the Anatomy of
Human Destructiveness (1976)230 in order to show how he created a criterion and standardization
for existential health. With respect to the general thesis statement of this dissertation—that the
climate philosophy community might benefit from adopting and incorporating a humanistic
perspective231—this chapter will attempt to assist in that endeavor by supplying two things. The
first is to finally provide a more concrete definition of humanism. The second is to provide a
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conversational framework or structure in order to allow for a potential implementation of an
underlying and unifying ethical foundation that establishes a principle of health for individuals
and societies. Therefore, the structure of this section will proceed as follows: first, I will consider
the conceptualization and utilization of hope in the first section, “Fromm’s Motivating Force:
Getting Gas.” Next, in section two, “Fromm’s Ontology: Here,” a brief account of the AoHD will
be given along with what I believe to be its intent and purpose in relation to the rest of his
oeuvre. This will be followed by a further exposition of his dichotomies in the third section,
“Frommian Dichotomies: Albuquerque, along with how they interrelate and how they provide a
basis for a foundational theory for mankind’s universality. Last, in section four, “Manifest
Destiny: There, I detail the architecture of man’s nature, along with how such a theory ultimately
produced a psychological account and framework for a humanistic ethics and subsequently,
healthy behavior. The intent is to finally synchronize this chapter with the ‘Green’ mindset
given in the next chapter to converge with the over-arching goal of transitioning from mindset
back to behavior—having analyzed behavior and mindset in the previous chapters and making
our way from mindset to behavior again. The idea is to grant ourselves tools so that we might
better analyze part I of the dissertation, having made the leap from outlook to action, theory to
suggestive practical examples, and destructive tendencies to healthy ones, finally concluding on
a potentially new criterion that can help to guide actionability.
Section I: Fromm’s Motivating Force: Getting Gas
I would like to begin this section not with an immediate exposition into Fromm’s theory
of human nature but by instead discussing the importance of hope as necessary for an outlook
bound to a healthy existential orientation. Having given very specific overview of Fromm’s
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intellectual inheritance –-deciding instead to give the reader more insight into his theoretical
legacy as opposed to a biographical account—for the purpose of giving context to his theory of
being and his art of living, this section, albeit stemming from and grounded on scientific and
empirical observation, ought to begin with the flavor of spirit. There is an old Arabian proverb
that says “He who has health, has hope; and he who has hope has everything.” For Fromm,
apparently in full agreement with the proverb, the proper attunement for a healthy human begins
and ends with hope.
For Fromm, having been influenced by Marx and Freud, and having accepted the
humanistic call-to-arms from their work, remained more in line with the Marxist spirit than with
the Freudian one.232 The contrast between their philosophical interpretation of man’s place (as
well as potential) in terms of evolutionary history was precisely that of faith. While Marx, on the
one hand, was unwaveringly partial to the idea that mankind possessed the ability to transcend
and progress, Freud, on the other hand, had a more skeptical outlook.233 Despite the fact that
Freud worked as a healer, attempting to alleviate psychosomatic stress and pain of the individual
and restore them to a place of health, in terms of his more macro conception of mankind i.e.
human evolution. It could best be described as the great chagrin destined to be frustrated in
perpetuity. In other words, there is no upward mobility or existential progress outside of
technological advancement. Should man give up his drive for progress and return to a primitive
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state, he could have pleasure but at the expense of wisdom. Should he instead double down on
civilization, he would attain a measure of wisdom but increased discontent was sure to follow.
Fromm writes that “For Freud, evolution is an ambiguous blessing, and society does as much
harm as it does good.”234 There is no genuine upshot then whether humanity develops, stagnates,
or regresses. Each option has its benefits as well as its cost. Pathological tendencies abound and
are inevitable in lieu of social decay and annihilation. Fromm then, while adopting Freudian
theory to supplement and serve his own theory of human nature, ended up traveling down the
path of the Marxist tradition, ever hopeful for a better future. Hope then is the essential
ingredient toward genuine progress, as well as a key indicator of overall health.
Though scientific facts and data can lend us insight by describing the ‘lay of the land,’
intentionality, directionality and foresight, can only be conceptualized through man’s assessment
of the empirical. For Fromm, “’facts’ are interpretations of events, and the interpretation
presupposes certain concerns which constitute the event’s relevance.” 235 At the risk of sounding
cliché, health, is the cornerstone of human flourishing and is an interactive composite of body
and mind. Health is something that is both obvious and self-evident while at the same time being
hidden and vague. Additionally, psychological health can often be shifty and elusive. Much of
the behavior expressed in an unhealthy mindset can be easily rationalized and justified in any
number of ways, most insidiously of all, in the (often) unaware individual doing the expressing.
When observing the behavior of an individual or a community, the outlook and mindset are far
from an inconsequential matter and should not be overlooked. For Fromm, social constraints,
pressures, and relationships, are major factors in producing and promoting personality types,
234
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along with the corresponding attitude. But equally important is the power an individual has to
recognize and willfully shift from an unhealthy mindset to a healthy one. By doing so, the shift
of mindset can produce a prodigious change in the individual, along with his behavior, and, when
applied to a mass of people, this can cause a radical social change. The two dance the same
tango. The looming problem then is not being able to see the forest for the trees. How is an
individual, or a society for that matter, able to shift in mindset should everyone suffer from a
pathological defect? How likely is it that the constant addition of more facts and data will be
interpreted in ways that afford a maladaptive society to spontaneously shift in attitude and
behavior?
Hope, for Fromm, is a sign of mature and healthy psyche since it denotes and colors a
certain type of existential outlook. Interestingly, Fromm concludes the AoHD with an epilogue
titled “On the Ambiguity of Hope.” Having just written a book which took a firm stance against
the either/or option of the two predominating psychological camps at the time—Instinctivism,
supported by the likes of Konrad Lorenz (1963),236 and Behaviorism or Environmentalism
established by J.B. Watson (1914), reaching its theoretical zenith with the ‘neo-behaviorism’ of
B.F. Skinner (1953, 1971, 1974)—opting instead for middle ground that was evinced in his
argument and supported by case studies and clinical observations. He concludes the book with a
unique perspective about hope. The AoHD is an extensive work which analyzes both of the
aforementioned intellectual poles and where Fromm proposed an alternative theory to better
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describe the nature of man and his psychological health. By the end of the book, one finds
himself confusedly asking, why did Fromm end on such an obscure message of hope? After all,
what does hope have to do with health? As far as I could tell it was because health and outlook
share a symbiotic relationship. A healthy psyche and disposition work together to form its
supporting existential orientation and behavioral comportment, respectively. Reciprocally, in
Fromm’s view, the same can also be applied in the reverse; proper existential orientation and
behavioral comportment help to generate a healthy psyche and disposition. The message of
normative humanism then is simple: If we can manage to pay proper homage to the existential
needs that are inherent in all, however one might choose to (subjectively) pursue them, it would
assist in promoting harmonious relationships amid the individual with himself, society, and on a
grander scale, the planet’s ecological boundaries.
On the topic of hope, “The attitude of the majority…,” Fromm grimly writes in the
epilogue of the AoHD, “…is neither that of faith nor that of despair, but, unfortunately, that of
complete indifference to the future of man.”237 Given the current temperamental climate, this
may be a bit dated. Emotions are certainly bubbling, and one prays that they do not spill over. He
describes the attitude of those who are not completely indifferent in our society—those who fall
into the all-to-often assigned categories of “optimist” or “pessimist.” For him, the distinction
between the two is not a significant one. Given our society, the optimists are often those who
“…are the believers in the dogma of the continuous march of ‘progress.’” 238 People who tend to
confuse the difference between human achievements with technical achievement and
consequently, often have a rather myopic comprehension of particular values. Whereby the
237
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concept of freedom, to many, is the freedom from direct coercion or, the freedom to choose
commodities of their liking in a consumerist society. Their confidence in the current institution is
unshakable, so much so that “…even the threat to the future of their grandchildren does not
genuinely affect them.”239 Many of the philosophers discussed in prior sections of the
dissertation adequately evince such classification and serve as prime examples of this type of
thinking.
Continuing to describe the problem of society’s outlook in the AoHD, equally effete and
ineffective are those who look to the future pessimistically since they too are just as unengaged
and deluded. For them, the fate of humanity is as little concern as that of the optimist. And, for
Fromm, “they do not feel despair,” for if they did, “they would not, and could not, live as
contentedly as they do.”240 The function of a pessimist then is to protect themselves from a callto-action and the inner demand to do something. Both optimist and pessimist alike are alienated
beings who simply wish to remain cocooned from the realities confronting them. Thus, their
value schema remains circumscribed to cultural particulars: values such as cooperation,
solidarity, kindness, compassion, and sacrifice take a back seat to the ones which uphold the
delicate veil of the status quo.
Hope then is that which allows one “…to be ready at every moment for that which is not
yet born, and yet not become desperate if there is no birth in our lifetime” 241 and must be
undergirded by faith.
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Today the lack of faith is the expression of profound confusion and despair. Once
skepticism and rationalism were progressive forces for the development of thought; now
they have become rationalizations for relativism and uncertainty. The belief that the
gathering of more and more facts will inevitably result in knowing the truth has become a
superstition. Truth itself is looked upon, in certain quarters, as a metaphysical concept,
and science as restricted to the task of gather information. Behind a front of alleged
rational certainty, there is a profound uncertainty which makes people ready to accept or
to compromise with any philosophy impressed upon them. 242

Where hope is an acknowledgment of the sober realities of current circumstances along
with a projected aim for the better, faith is the foundation which hope rests upon. Faith is not an
irrational act but an ability to recognize the elements which are at play and to visualize the ‘unsee-able,’ given one’s understanding of the potentiality of ongoing dynamic. Ergo, this
interaction between hope and faith is paradoxical in nature; it is the certainty of the uncertain
alongside the willingness to draw from that uncertainty a respective certainty. In other words, it
is certainty of man’s vision and comprehension, not a certainty in terms of the final outcome of
reality. 243 Fromm maintains that no faith is needed in what is scientifically predictable, nor can
there be faith in what is entirely impossible. Faith is not an irrational endeavor but a rational one.
One which is based on our experience of living and self-transformation. An instance of faith he
provides as an example is that my “Faith…” in the fact “…that others can change is the outcome
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of the experience that I can [change].” 244 Given this understanding of faith, Fromm asserts that
any process of critical and creative thinking begins with a “rational vision” as a result of previous
study, reflective thinking and observation. 245 In fact, science itself is often replete with instances
of faith. An active attribute necessary for its performance.

When the scientist succeeds in gathering enough data or in working out a mathematical
formulation, or both, to make his original vision highly plausible he may be said to have
arrived at a tentative hypothesis. A careful analysis of the hypothesis in order to discern
its implications and the amassing of data which support it, lead to a more adequate
hypothesis and eventually perhaps to its inclusion in a wide-ranging theory.246

Hence, according to Fromm, every theory is postulated by having faith in the governing
axioms. In the case of a scientist, his ability to generate a hypothesis derives from an implicit
(and often unconscious) acceptance of reason as being the most dependable tool for empirical
study. Faith lends the scientist a motivation to pursue and engage in the activity/research of his
choosing, that a hypothesis leading to a potential theory is plausible, and even that the
acquisition of knowledge is possible. It is therefore “rooted in one’s own experience, in the
confidence in one’s power of thought, observation and judgement”247 and absolutely vital if one
is to “…dare, to think the unthinkable, yet to act within the limits of the realistically possible.” 248
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It is that which tethers ones existential disposition, and ultimately lends impetus to the potency of
one’s behavior. Thus, the objective psychological dynamic forces, discussed above, become
manifest in a world whereby one’s inherited phenomenological confidence is rooted in rational
faith of his accepted axioms i.e. the “facts of life” seldom questioned.
Such a question (also posed by radical skepticism) cannot be answered by proof or
demonstration of reason—because it is reason itself that is in doubt. An apt example of this
problem is demonstrated by the 11th century Islamic philosopher Al Ghazali. In considering
whether reason is reliable, he noted the problem succinctly: “the only way to put together a proof
was to combine primary cognitions [i.e. first principles]. So if, as in my case, these were
inadmissible, it was impossible to construct the proof.”249 Therefore, the only way of answering
such a question is through belief—through adopting the notion as an axiomatic assumption that
serves as the foundation of all other thought, and the basis for answering all other questions. In a
more limited way, physics rests on the axiomatic assumption that all phenomena can be
described in terms of mathematical equations. There is no way of demonstrating the axiom, but
until one accepts it as true, one cannot begin to do physics.
A further complexity, Fromm makes division between rational faith and irrational faith.
Faith therefore works in two distinct ways. The first is what was stated up until this point. That
faith is that which upholds one’s axioms about the nature of existence and lends some basis for
how one ought to conduct himself throughout its course. The acceptance of these core
assumptions is based on faith and is the most fundamental and most basic step when interacting
and engaging with empirical reality. This is responsible for generating our understanding of
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interactive relationship between the ‘dynamic forces’ of our internal life and its external
counterpoint—both of which have their own set of pre-given assumptions. All axioms are
therefore undergirded by a measure of faith.
Second, for Fromm, faith must be of a rational quality instead of an irrational one. An
irrational faith, for him, is an alien source. In other words, it is not generated and accepted by
oneself but is suffused and imbued into one’s character traits through culture or an authority
figure. Speaking of irrational faith, Fromm says, “By irrational faith I understand the belief in a
person, idea, or symbol which does not result from one’s own experience of thought or feeling,
but which is based on one’s own emotional submission to irrational authority.”250 Conversely,
rational faith is a “firm conviction based on productive intellectual and emotional activity.” 251
Such an example would be the activity of the scientist discussed above. Therefore, creative
thinking/activity often beings with a “rational vision”252 that is rooted in the qualities of a
rational faith. Qualities such as previous study, reflective thinking, and observation. All of which
‘add up’ to something universal and produce a type of personally assessed and accepted
objectivity, as opposed to “the acceptance that something is true only because an authority or the
majority say so.”253 Since, the qualities rendered from personal conviction are universal in
breadth and depth, rational faith becomes an indispensable quality for procuring/attaining
significant engagements with the world such as friendships, love, or being able to see the
‘potential’ in others, etc. since all of these require a type of rational faith. 254
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Faith then is the first ‘movement’ in interacting with the external. Rational faith is the
recognition that we are endowed with the proper tools in order to adequately navigate it. It is one
additional step further albeit minute in scope. It is, for all intents and purposes, an activity. One
which chooses to engage with the world personally, instead of passively. Furthermore, it is this
engagement with the world, which begins with ourselves, that ultimately manifests as particular
activity. Returning to the beginning of the section, hope then, takes this concept even further by

foundation of all axioms, since I would likely be unaware of those axioms in the first place? Nor would I need to be
aware of them in order to function well. Second, if everyone should look to their own judgement in order to possess
a rational faith, would this not lead to a type of relativism? How is it possible that everyone who self-asserts and
accepts their existential axioms does not inevitably lead to the problem of relativism? At best, this appears to be a
problem of definition whereby the faith which undergirds the axiom is different from a rational and irrational faith.
How do these two definition work together? The problem (and solution) seem to stem from Fromm’s understanding
of the faith altogether. In The Pathology of Normalcy, he discusses this problem in depth by using the example of
the dichotomies and contradictions found in human existence—as discussed above, some of which are that we are
both in and apart of nature while being independent of it, animalistic in nature but distinct from animals, possess
both reason and imagination, etc.—and that we “confronted with these contradictions in our existence…have to
make some sense of our life.” Therefore, an existential axiom would be that “we cannot stand living, merely eating
and drinking and making sense. We have to give some answer to the problem of living and we have to give some
answers theoretically and practically.” Due to this axiom, “we need a frame of reference in which we orient
ourselves in life, which makes the process of living and our position in it somehow sensible and meaningful” and
that “This is not only an intellectual frame of reference, but we need also an organizing principle of an object of
devotion, of something to which we devote our energies beyond those which we need for producing and
reproducing.” In the following paragraph, Fromm goes on to suggest that if he were to be pressed on this issue and
asked “is this perfectly axiomatic?” and if so, “how can one prove it?” he would be forced to say that he would not
be able to “prove it to anyone’s satisfaction” and that this is an consideration drawn from his own “observation.” (cf.
Fromm, The Pathology of Normalcy, 26-27). The paradoxical dichotomies of the psychology of man is the axiom
itself and is taken on faith via observation and study. This process, though personally procured, would be equally
recognized by someone else should he too decide to dismiss the capriciousness of irrational faith, and instead opt for
the objectivity to be found in rational faith. The reason being is that these axioms or assumptions generate value
judgements which are in fact “objectively valid and not a matter of taste.” Fromm goes on to explain that “just as the
doctor or physiologist can make an objectively valid statement that we begin with one axiom, and that is: to live is
better than to die, or life is better than death, then indeed this food is better than another one. This kind of air, or rest
or amount of sleep is better than another one…” and that “…we can make an equally objective statement about what
is good and what is bad for our soul, based on whatever knowledge we have about its nature the laws the govern it.”
(cf. Fromm, The Pathology of Normalcy, 18-19). Then it appears as though Fromm understands rational faith—the
fundamental assumptions we make about the cosmos, who we are, and how to comport ourselves within it—is
capable of being ‘matched-up’ with objective reality. That given these inherited tools of reason—which we take on
faith—, can yield an understanding of an objectively ascertainable and understandable world, and along with it a
more accurate worldview. The only difference between a rational faith and an irrational one is that I must seek these
indelible truths for myself as opposed to having them foisted upon me by culture since, it appears, it is through a
plethora of cultural truths where one ends up plagued by a relativistic outlook. I wish to say to my committee, that I
recognize that this is all taken on a measure of ‘faith’ and it is Fromm’s use of such a word that saves him from
some obvious pitfalls regarding metaphysics, epistemology, teleology, etc. Further research into this topic would be
personally edifying and perhaps even shed light on his philosophy as a whole.
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revealing an attitude oriented around health. Fromm then poignantly concludes the AoHD with
an explication of a healthy disposition after having written a book describing the pathologies of
particular characterologies.
When gauging socio-psychological phenomena in terms of the distribution of the
manifest dynamic forces, what becomes relevant is not solely the explicit actions of the
individual but also the underlying character structures, or semi-permanent sub-structure, which
behaves as the primary motivating agent for the behavior. Fromm suggests that this type of
theoretical classification allows for a type of characterological objectivity that further provides a
type of scientific portent. Hence, it was surmised that a theory which takes into consideration the
fundamental mechanics of the psyche could actively engage one’s potential in ways that not only
maximizes it but also affords the individual a greater probability at achieving eudaimonia
through properly oriented activity given the inherent mentality.
The key correlate between this theory and Fromm’s understanding of the important role
of hope is the direct relationship hope has with activity. In other words, it is a relationship of
mutual reciprocity and interdependence to be exercised from within to without. Hope then, “is a
state of being.”255 A particular composure which influences outward activity having understood
the potential that lay dormant in mankind but that can be tapped into for health-bound activity
and life-serving action as opposed to the alternative apathetic “optimism” and “pessimism” or, a
more sinister and destructive mindset. Viktor Frankl summed it up nicely when he wrote
“Everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms—to choose
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one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way.” 256 Hope then is that
which grants the individual the activity borne of a perception of a propitious future.
Section II: Fromm’s Ontology: Here
The previous section discussed the relationship between Fromm’s conception of hope,
faith, and activity. The intention was to show the progressive steps that begin with faith, advance
to hope and finally graduate to biophilic activity as the basis for orienting the individual and
community toward a more progressive and sustainable iteration of itself. The assumption is that
the odds of discovering the ‘right values’ by some obscure mathematized method, even if
successful, will fall short of any long-term solution and ultimately fail the test of time if those
values are not inculcated and reflected within the system.
An alternative solution, if not found in the analysis of the analytic camps and
mathematical extrapolation, is to produce a branch of study whose main function would be to
unearth and “recognize laws inherent in human nature and the inherent goals for its development
and unfolding.”257 To do this we must begin by first admitting and identifying that “just as man
transforms the world around him, so he transforms himself in the process of history.” 258 For
Fromm,
The approach of normative humanism is based on the assumption that, as in any other
problem, there are right and wrong, satisfactory and unsatisfactory solutions to the
problem of human existence. Mental health is achieved if man develops into full maturity
according to the characteristics and laws of human nature. Mental illness consists in the
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failure of such development. From this premise the criterion of mental health is not one
of individual adjustment to a given social order, but a universal one, value for all men, of
giving a satisfactory answer to the problem of human existence. 259

Hence, the main thesis of the AoHD, along with Fromm’s overall development of a
humanistic ontology, was that to take a purely biological stance with respect to how we confront
and interpret the nature of mankind would be inane. Such was the intent of the Instinctivists 260 of
the late 19th and the Neo-Instinctivists of the early 20th century who, as described by R.A. Hinde,
set forth biological models that “share the idea of a substance capable of energizing behaviors,
held back in a container and subsequently released in action.” 261 Conversely, a purely
sociological/environmental biological model, such as the Behaviorist and Neo-Behaviorists’ of
later decades is equally flawed.262 These two views were diametrically opposed. The behaviorists
believed instead that “man’s behavior is exclusively molded by the influence of the environment,
i.e. by social and cultural, as opposed to ‘innate’ factors.”263 This would only serve to give us a
limited description of man since each theory is one side of the same coin. Limitations are bound
to arise since both theories lack a full account in their assessment and moreover, have a tendency
to take an absolutist position.
Fromm’s AoHD, provides an argument—supported by clinical case studies—that act as
an empirical foundation for his humanism (and the advent of any future research to be conducted
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on such matters). By focusing on the problem of human aggression, he attempts to readjust the
focus of each of these extremes by merging and transcending the fallacious false dilemma of
man, i.e. that he is a solely a product of biology or solely a construct and consequence of social
Shibari. 264 Fromm attempts to overcome this intellectual misgauge by making three particular
assumptions:
First, that the main passions and drives in man result from the total existence of man.
Second, that the passions and drives within man are definite and ascertainable and that we are
not condemned to be governed by epistemological shortcomings. And third, that some of the
passions and drives of man are conducive to health and happiness while others give way to
sickness and unhappiness.265 This includes the complete composition of what man’s nature and,
ergo, biological capacities are; what his environment is; the potential/ability in working with,
overcoming, and transforming either of these influential factors; and how either side of the
duality is further interpreted and understood by the individual and society. Either of these
descriptive poles of human nature work together to influence the belief in the overall capacity of
personal empowerment.
By way of exposition for these assumptions, Fromm notes that “any given social order
does not create fundamental strivings”266 but rather acts as a conduit from which very specific
personal constructions emerge out of an already “limited number of potential passions [that] are
to become manifest or dominant.”267 With this totalizing approach, inquiry into existential affairs

264

This is a form of Japanese bondage in which the bondage is intended to be pleasurable to the bondee as well as
the bonder, thus encouraging the bondee to stay bound, and to return to be rebound, as often as possible.
265
Fromm, The Sane Society, 14.
266
Ibid., 14.
267
Ibid.

126

becomes essential since an active investigation of both intrinsic biological and extrinsic
environmental factors working together can shed light on any neuroses and pathologies that may
be currently at play should we truly be in need of an immediate cultural and institutional
overhaul. In other words, a science of man can search and clarify the basis for an objective
standard of healthy versus unhealthy mindsets and can be a step in the direction of overcoming
our maladaptive behavior and laying a foundation for more environmentally ameliorative and
benign behavior. The more insidious issue with unhealthy mental states is that they can
aggregate and accumulate to form a socially patterned defect that, if it were to become
commonplace within a culture, can enable an individual—as well as entire societies—to live
with psychical defects without being perceived as ill but instead appearing to be perfectly
normal. 268 In relation to climate change and the current global circumstance, as noted in the
penultimate sentence, such investigation becomes imperative since it can lend important insight
into the active resistance toward taking substantial adaptive measures. To give an example that
helps to elucidate the point: we are consumers in a consumer society which encourages constant
and ever growing consumption, i.e. social health is equivocated with economic growth, so we are
left to constantly apply band-aids, and can never be in balance with nature since the system we
have developed forces us to out-grow it (and discard it once used).
Fromm can provide us with a starting point with respect to the creation of an effective
humanistic science of man since he spent a considerable amount of time investigating parts of
the cognitive sub-strata which he called characterologies. Currently, these varying internal
character structures work in conjunction with external forces to produce what might
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appropriately be regarded as a disenlightened society in pursuit of a maladaptive course of action
despite an overwhelming amount of empirical data advising the contrary. This is an exposition
beyond the tools available to the analytic climate ethicists discussed in part I. With their focus on
the external, and the minutia of the issue, these thinkers lock themselves into a mental orientation
that does not allow for the generation of a unifying ethical trajectory. Explicitly, Broome’s use of
various economic modelings and expositions relegates his recommendations to the same
problematic realm that generated the problem he is attempting to fix. Fromm allows for an
evaluation of these tools, providing the missing criteria for the criteria, the latter of which is the
subject of concern for the analytic climate ethicists who have been dominating the conversation
so far.
If political policy is currently undermining the scientific data—assuming there’s some
measure of accuracy behind it—a humanistic inquiry into the nature of man would ask such
questions as: If the ethos of a society as a whole is pathological to the point of keeping the
entirety of the international community hostage, stagnantly affixed to a historical cross-road,
how and why have the citizens of such a nation come to be willfully ignorant of their
maleficence and from where does the nature of such destructive behavior stem from? Fromm’s
AoHD attempts to supply an answer to the nature, problem, and manifestation of human
aggression, along with its iteration into anti-biophilic behavior by drawing from his descriptive
dichotomies. These dichotomies are the value natural labels ascribable to individual and social
psychical motivations. They are parameters for measuring psychic eupepsia. Fromm himself uses
a philosophy of dichotomies to enable him to overcome the problem of the intellectually
antagonistic description of mankind. Understanding these dichotomies is essential to
understanding his philosophical corpus, which will assist us in basing our evolutionary trajectory
128

on matters of health and the flourishing of life in every respect by cthonically undergirding a new
principle of health for both individuals and societies alike.
In order to shed light on these relevant dichotomies, Fromm looks to Freud to provide the
contrast, more particularly to the instinctivist/biological portion of his theory of human nature.
Fromm reveals a discrepancy in Freud’s work: the need for a theory of love. The shortcomings
of Freud’s theory of aggression and destructiveness are robustly explored in the appendix of the
AoHD as perhaps a way of revealing the parallels in Fromm’s humanistic psychoanalytic theory
since they were not included in the body the book. According to Fromm, in line with neoinstinctivist theory, Freud’s theories of human motivation revolved around the axiom of “tension
and reduction.”269 This axiom, which undergirds Freud’s theory of the libido and the pleasure
principle as well as his later developed theory of the death instinct, “owes its existence to the
thinking characteristic of German mechanistic materialism.”270 The theories were formed in such
a way as to fit the physiological and biological mold of his education without the evidence of
clinical observation.271
Prior to 1920, Freud hardly paid any attention to human aggression. 272 It was only
afterward that he attempted to develop a theory of aggression. Thus, in Beyond the Pleasure
Principle (1920) Freud revises his libidinal instinctive theory—which, according to Fromm,
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prioritized hate as a more primary/primeval instinct rooted in the ego and instincts of selfpreservation273—to a newly dichotomized theory involving Eros and the death instinct—
discussed at length in the The Ego and the Id (1923). Initially, where aggression may have been
manifest in feelings of self-preservation as a mechanistic form of chemically induced tensiondischarge, the later theory of Eros and Thanatos take a more biological approach where each
living cell embodies each of these existential poles i.e. life and death. Fromm notes that “the
principle of tension reduction is preserved in a more radical form: the reduction of excitation to
zero (Nirvana Principle).”274
In this reshuffling, the most glaring contradiction in Freud’s work is not the addition of
an unconscious death-wish, so-to-speak, but the fact that it is concatenated alongside a theory of
love. Sexuality had been divorced from aggression and love, despite retaining and maintaining
his concept of the psyche being a type of energy reservoir with a pressure release valve. Fromm
writes that “this vision of Eros, present in every cell of living substance, has as its aim the
unification and integration of all cells, and beyond that, the service of civilization, the integration
of smaller units into the unity of mankind.”275 Freud had stumbled upon nonsexual love, where
love is identified with life and growth and a constant struggle against the death instinct in an epic
battle for the determination and outcome of human existence. With this contrast, man is no
longer subject to isolated and egotistical impulses but is in a state of relation to others, transfixed
by life forces that make him recognize a bond and union with them. Fromm qualifies this shift as
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“radical,” since “Life, love, and growth are one and the same, more deeply rooted and
fundamental than sexuality and ‘pleasure.’”276
In Freud’s death instinct, Fromm explains, the concept was produced as a means to
accommodate his new theory on aggression but was also instrumental in preserving his dualistic
concept of instincts where Eros and Thanatos supplanted the ego instinct and libido as a primary
codependent generating force. Fromm discusses the ad hoc nature of this revised theory and its
aftermath:

The death instinct became a “catchall” concept, by the use of which one tried without
success to resolve incompatible contradictions. Freud, perhaps due to his age and illness,
did not approach the problem frontally and thus patched up the contradictions. Most of
the other psychoanalysts who did not accept his concept of Eros and death instinct found
an easy solution; they transformed the death instinct into a ‘destructive instinct’ opposed
to the old sexual instinct.277

Theories of aggression and destruction evolved out of a need to salvage the theory from
the inconsistencies produced in a “catchall” theory divorced from any particular bodily zones—
lacking the same “rhythmic character of tension, de-tension, tension.”278 Instead, Freud shifted to
a biological and vitalistic description of energetic transmutation created by the interplay between
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the polar forces of Eros and Thanatos; a gap which, according to Fromm, Freud never attempted
to “bridge” but preserved their unity by a semantic equation of: life = eros = sexuality (libido). 279
Fromm’s departure from Freud was an attempt to restructure psychoanalysis into a viable
theory about characterological differences. The hope was that such a theory, empirically
confirmed, would serve to better understand and predict behavior by allocating it to particular
mental states. Adopting Freud’s theory of personality and psychosexual development then,
Fromm maintained the structure of polarity in his revised theory; elements which are originally
divorced from each other, come together and become classified in the dualistic archetypes of
masculine versus feminine; behavior influenced by mindset becomes described in terms of
having versus being; or psychological predispositions give way to particular thoughts and actions
in the form of health and pathology classified as biophilia versus necrophilia. The once broad
“catch-all” Freudian theory of the death instinct now becomes more refined, recast as a type of
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psychologically necrophilic280 disposition. Biophilic behavior in turn or, more broadly speaking,
biophilia, is defined by Fromm, as “a passionate love of life and all that is alive” 281 and is the
basis for his humanism. A person who exhibits biophilic tendencies often:
prefer[s] to construct rather than to retain. He wants to be more rather to have more. He is
capable of wondering, and he prefers to see something new rather than to find
confirmation of the old. He loves the adventure of living more than he does certainty. He
sees the whole rather than only the parts, structures rather than summations. He wants to
mold and to influence by love, reason, and example; not by force, by cutting things apart,
by the bureaucratic manner of administering people as if they were things. Because he
enjoys life and all of its manifestations, he is not a passionate consumer of newly
packaged “excitement.”282

Such are the tendencies of a mature and healthy adult. Virtue cannot be divorced from
the context of one’s psychological orientation. 283 Ergo, ethics, from a biophilic vantage, is all
that serves to advance life. The “good” is the promotion and welfare of life and the flourishing
thereof, whereas the “evil” harms it and contributes to its decay. Destruction is therefore
understood as necrophilic—the love of death. When comparing the difference between the two
terms in Fromm’s humanism, the immediate and most glaring distinction is that biophilia and
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necrophilia are not on equal footing with each other. In other words, although they are a
distinguished and dichotomized descriptive pair, it is not a balance and eternal struggle between
good and evil, like the yin-yang of Chinese cosmology. There is an obvious hierarchy between
the two poles as opposed to Freud’s theory. Freud’s concept of the two differs by the fact that
both were of an equal rank since both derived from an inherent biological up-swell.
The main argument in the AoHD, then, in keeping with the Eros-Thanatos dichotomized
format, instead substituted it for a the biophilic-necrophilic duality. More importantly, it
described biophilia as a state of “normalcy” in terms of human nature and its biological
imperative, leaving malignant behavior and its necrophilous extreme as a state of abnormality; an
aberration of conduct, or a sickness in need of correction and mending like that of a broken bone.
Depending on the degree with which the bone is offset, more drastic corrective measures would
be needed in order to bring it back into alignment. Necrophilic tendencies are a product of
psychopathology, emergent “as a result of stunted growth” and of “psychical crippledness.” 284
The factors responsible for producing a psychological state of immaturity include the failure to
arrive at a certain stage beyond that of narcissism and indifference, mainly due to an
‘interference’ of one type or another.
The destructive tendencies of a necrophilic disposition are not parallel and equal to
biophilic characteristics as they are in Freudian theory. For Fromm, these tendencies are instead
a direct substitution and replacement of biophilia. Should biophilic expression and education be
confined, suppressed, or maimed, an alternative outlet is available. Fromm contends that the
basis for psychic health is man’s ability to enact and fulfill an existential need for self-assertion.
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Impact and effect behaving as a causal chain helps to shape our identity. This results in an
existential feedback loop since identity and the world become an interrelated mode of action and
perception. Should an individual believe himself to be vitally impotent in a situation where he
cannot create anything, move anybody, or mark anything, any natural biophilic predispositions
will be displaced and succeeded with a penchant for necrophilic activity. Such behavioral
reorientation is a reaction to biophilically stagnant circumstances and an instinctive need to
relieve himself of this existential powerlessness. Hence, a person would “affirm himself in the
act of destruction of the life that he is unable to create”285 since biophilic behavior often requires
“great effort, patience, and care,” 286 as opposed to “destruction [where] all that is necessary is
strong arms, a knife, or a gun.”287 In doing so, one sacrifices core elements needed to secure long
term flourishing for the sake of the instantaneous gratification that comes with momentary selfassertion.288
Tying this concept to the previous section, the correlation between the self, despondency,
and necrophilic maladaptation often stems from the shattering of hope—a “hardening of the
heart” whereby there is a loss of compassion and empathy—which in turn lends an individual to
either conform to mass expectation or, much more drastically, results in violence and
destructiveness. Destructiveness is the alternative to hope, just as attraction to death is the
alternative to the love of life. And, as concluded in the previous section, health and outlook go
hand-in-hand and cannot be divorced from one another.
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With the distinction between life affirming versus death espousing predilections, then
aggressive and destructive behavior, according to Fromm, is the result of shirking objective
existential needs and responsibilities required for flourishing. This consists of both an adequate
ideological orientation as well as an actionable orientation, i.e. healthy attitude and healthy
action. Just as physical health can only be objective since it is bounded and constrained by
compulsory parameters of biophysics, equally so is man’s psyche tied to the demands of our
existential ordonnance. It is this aspect which Fromm attempts to draw upon in order to unearth a
universal understanding of human nature along with its demands. And, as mentioned before, to
ignore such specific requirements would be to potentially induce inevitable neuroses within an
individual or a community alike.
Human nature, then—if we are to draw a functional argument from which to engineer an
actionable framework—described from a biological and evolutionary perspective, has arrived at
a point in history where the emergence of man from a primitive state is based on two
fundamental conditions: The first condition is a biological trend found in animal evolution,
namely “the growth of the brain, and particularly the neocortex;” 289 the second trend, Fromm
states, was the “ever-decreasing determination of behavior on instincts.”290 In the former, it is
possible to plot a trend where on one end features the simplest of animals with the most primitive
nervous structure, while on the other, is man, with the larger and more complex brain structure,
“especially a neocortex three times as large as that of even his hominid ancestors, and a truly
fantastic number of interneuronal connections.” 291 The latter trend is a process of ever-
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decreasing determination of behavior controlled by instinctual impulses. Once again, according
to Fromm, if plotted as a continuum, the lowest forms of animal evolution contain the highest
degree of instinctive behavior, which decreases as the trend proceeds toward more complex
creatures such as mammals, and further into primates, and finally mankind. 292 In analyzing
biological trends, he summarizes his conclusion, saying
Considering these data, man can be defined as the primate that emerged at the point of
evolution where instinctive determination had reached a minimum and the development
of the brain a maximum. This combination of minimal instinctive determination and
maximal brain development had never occurred before in animal evolution and
constitutes, biologically speaking, a completely new phenomenon. 293
Regardless of whether Homo sapiens were the first to evolve as such, or to this extent, is
rather beside the point. The salient idea is simply that human beings are different. They are
neither completely controlled by instinct nor in complete control of it. Therefore, we cannot fall
prey to an associative fallacy by making a hasty generalization. Furthermore, this bounded inbetween state—yet another dichotomy—as discussed earlier, is a theoretical state allowing our
existential framework to be woven into our psychological expression. Man’s cognitive
progress—that of self-awareness, reason, and imagination—has disrupted the harmony with
which instincts continue to preserve and corral animal existence, keeping them intact and
sufficient,294 and has therefore served to manifest the dichotomies responsible for an awkward
coloring of our phenomenological experience. Hence, we cannot stand to exist in a state where

292

Ibid., 251.
Ibid., 252.
294
Ibid., 253.
293

137

we live in order to merely sustain biological needs or to live a life of infinite repetition without
giving meaning to it.295
Additionally, when attempting to construct an accurate description of man, along with
some of the unique elements confined to and comprising his essence, Fromm believes that one
must refrain from doing so by ascribing specific qualities to paint our qualitative experience.
This is because they would always fall short, and thereby fail, to provide a satisfactory
characterization. He writes, “man’s nature cannot be defined in terms of a certain quality such as
love, hate, reason, good or evil” but only in terms of the “fundamental contradictions that
characterize human existence and have their root in [the] biological dichotomy between missing
instincts and self-awareness.”296 This then becomes the objective groundwork on which
biophilic and its necrophilic substitutive counterpart can be viewed as a theoretical basis for
human psycho-existential needs—it is the foundation of one’s character.
To talk about humans as creatures that can love, conceive beauty, think, etc., would
certainly fall shy of a holistic and accurate description—always being in jeopardy of missing
some additional essential quality. Furthermore, these are traits that might also be shared, and
therefore no longer be unique to humans, with other animals. For they too can love, fear, think,
use tools, etc. Thus, qualities make for a sloppy and often ill-ascribed characterization of
mankind. Instead, Fromm limits the complex manifestation of our situatedness to a description of
means used to help us integrate and overcome the problem of the existential dichotomies.
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Section III: Fromm’s Dichotomies: Albuquerque
As briefly mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the importance of using the
dichotomized description in Fromm’s work is key to understanding his philosophy as a whole.
As a quick note to the reader, Fromm uses dichotomies to refer to the existential dichotomies.
Fundamental and foundational components of the psychic architecture that are responsible for
spawning traits and attributes unique to humans. Second, though the term ‘dichotomies’ is often
reserved by Fromm for the specific term “existential dichotomies,” dualistic language appears
throughout his philosophical framework. In fact, dichotomized vernacular is the core
composition of his humanistic philosophy and extends beyond that of the technical use of the
term as will be shown in the following paragraphs. These dichotomies serve not only to describe
the nature of man and his happenstance, but also to ascribe, proscribe, and prescribe behavior—
the topic of the final chapter.
As stated previous paragraph (and loosely mentioned throughout the second part of the
dissertation), the term “existential dichotomies” is a technical term referring to the experience
that appears to be unique to humans on the whole and is a product of having become divorced
from our “prehuman state of harmony with nature.”297 This detachment has thrown us into a
cognitive disequilibrium, which, along with reason, imagination, self-awareness and the
minimization of instincts, created the qualities that make him distinct from the rest of the animal
kingdom. That is, granting man an apperception to differentiate and see himself as distinct from
others, to reminisce, recall, and rewrite the narrative of the past along with the trajectory of his
future, to affix symbolism and meaning to objects and experiences, to conceive and understand
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the nature of his reality along with the world he resides in, all while being “the most helpless of
animals.”298 According to Fromm, it is this very biological weakness that is the basis for man’s
strength, enabled by the existential dichotomies, and prime cause for the development of his
specific human qualities.
Thus, the existential dichotomies are the lifeblood by which the “dynamic energetic
forces” are circumscribed and are forced to express themselves in a more systematic way. Hence,
the foundation of our makeup is one of discomfort, pain, angst, and suffering, since—as
mentioned several times thus far—we are dispossessed among two all too apparent existential
extremes of these inherent psychical contradictions. These contradictions manifesting in us are
turning us into an anomaly which is a part of nature and subject to her laws, while
simultaneously allowing us to lord over it and manipulate it (and himself) along with its
creatures; we are born without one’s consent and at a random place and point in time, making us
feel homeless and alone, yet we are provided with a historical context with its own unique ability
to help us relate to others and be interrelated.
That man is mortal and between life and death—the most profound existential dichotomy
for Fromm299--breeds an awareness that profoundly influences our lives. Yet death remains
extraneous to and incompatible with the experience of living. Thus, we are individually (and
even communally) infinitesimal amidst a backdrop of an infinite creative potential that is bound
by a biological dichotomy between missing instincts and self-awareness—a demand forced to be
expressed and navigated alongside social demands. It is these fundamental contradictions that
most characterizes human existence and produces psychic needs common to all men. The most
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powerful forces motivating man’s behavior stem from these conditions of existence, forcing him
to perpetually seek a new equilibrium.
In the AoHD this broad consideration of existential dichotomies—an endless list to be
sure—ends up being boiled down to three main “horrors” of man: that of separateness,
powerlessness, and lostness—to be elaborated below.300 Juxtaposed with their opposites of unity,
effectiveness, and rootedness, it is from these three main dichotomies that we attempt to
overcome our existential angst. Each of these needs “can be satisfied in different ways, which
vary in different ways according to the social condition” 301 and manifest themselves in different
passions such as love, a striving for truth, a striving for justice, care, liberty, a striving for
happiness, or conversely, more pathological traits such as hate, suppression, order by
subjugation, masochism, narcissism, sadism, etc. For Fromm, these strivings are the passions,
which he aptly refers to as character rooted passions since “they are integrated in man’s
character”302 and ingrained in the existence of man. Given the fundamental nature of these
dichotomies in man’s experience with the internal (and therefore external) realms, they can also
provide the structure for a society that promotes and produces a healthy or unhealthy psyche,
both on a social as well as individual level. The latter of the aforementioned traits being a
consequence of powerlessness, separateness, and lostness, while the former result from
prioritizing unity, effectiveness, and rootedness. The climactic leap here is the underlying
assumption of this dissertation that a healthy society is more likely to be partial toward
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maintaining a biophilic relationship with nature and works to foster a similar mindset within its
populace.
The existential dichotomies, reason, and character rooted passions or, human passions,
are all in a type of everlasting dynamic dance. Having lost paradise, and “having become an
eternal wanderer,” man is forced to cope with the irreconcilable and insoluble problem of his
dichotomies by trying to solve them with reason and interacting with them through his passions.
Thus, character is “the relatively permanent system of all noninstinctual strivings through which
man relates himself to the human and natural world.”303 It is a substitute for missing animal
instincts that may be aptly considered as man’s second nature since it helps to organize the world
and orient him in it. In sum, then,
What all men have in common are their organic drives (even though highly modifiable by
experience) and their existential needs. What they do not have in common are the kinds
of passions that are dominant in their respective characters—character rooted passions.304

To be clear, what is not common to all of man is the attention that is given to particular
existential difficulties by placing communal emphasis on particular passions. Even more
subjective is how the individual decides to conform to or reject the Zeitgeist of his community.
Ergo, another implicit dichotomy is created. Where on the one hand, there is a ‘natural’ category
composed of existential dichotomies and physical instincts, on the other, you have a historical
category of the character-rooted passions.305 Nevertheless, the need to overcome the internal
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contradictions is not to be ignored but is instead compulsory. All passions and their subsequent
manifestations are “attempts to find an answer to his existence or, as we may also say, they are
an attempt to avoid insanity.”306 Both the mentally healthy as well as the neurotic are necessarily
predisposed to search for answers to life’s great mysteries and to cope with problems of
existence. The difference between them is that the former corresponds more with the total needs
of man, the unfolding of his powers, and happiness, than the latter.307
Though it is impossible to ever find a solution to these existential contradictions, to
ignore them would be to risk insanity. 308 The need for a frame of reference or an existential
orientation is paramount to the individual. This makes it impossible to be ‘disoriented’—for lack
of a better word—since to exist is to be forced to engage in one way or another. To exist is to be
condemned to engagement. Whether one is an idealist, in the colloquial use of the word, or a
nihilist, a perception of life, its meaning, and one’s active role within it cannot be escaped. Hence
one’s character informs and dictates one’s orientation. The need for a frame of orientation is so
intense that it often creates bewilderment in many students of man who have observed the ease
with which people can fall under the spell of irrational doctrines, whether they be political,
religious, or any other type. 309 Unconscious psychical directionality attempts to overcome the
internal divide, indicated by an incessant craving for absoluteness. 310 This craving is mitigated
only by achieving a cohesive orientation or ideological map to direct behavior, not unlike a
compass. 311 For Fromm, this is made evident in our inexorable push for progress.
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The needs and passions that give life to this orientation are, in a traditional Frommian
classification, dichotomized. The existential dichotomies, more specifically the “horrors” of
lostness, powerlessness, and separateness, result in a need to be rooted, to be effective, and to
have unity, as discussed above. Each of these further divides into an additional dichotomy.
Fromm, following in Freud’s footsteps,312 explains our need for ‘rootedness’ as a symptom of
severance, saying,
When the infant is born he leaves the security of the womb, the situation in which he was
still part of nature—where he lived through his mother’s body. At the moment of birth he
is still symbiotically attached to mother, and even after birth he remains so longer than
most other animals. But even when the umbilical cord is cut there remains a deep craving
to undo the separation, to return to the womb or to find a new situation of absolute
protection and security. 313

Man, being aware of his separateness, needs to create new bonds to stave off
psychological degeneration. This is the reason why solitary confinement is considered torturous
even though no physical pain is being inflicted upon the individual. Our need to be amongst, to
feel related, is imperative to our psychical and psychological wellbeing. Rootedness is further
subdivided by Fromm. On the one end of the spectrum resides the biophilic manifestation of
brotherliness, while its more inimical counterpoint on the opposite end is incest.
Since the way to paradise—a return to nature along with the cessation of apperception—
is no longer possible due to man’s biological and neurophysiological constitution, man appears
312
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to have two options. The first is to allow the craving of regression to persist and to look for a
mother-like alternative which can offer the semblance of a ‘womb-like’ security. Incestuous
behavior is not only restricted to a fixation for mother, or any other elementary ties of blood,
such as to family and clan, but can later extend to that of the state, nation, church, etc.—all of
which “assume the function which the individual mother had originally for the child.” 314 The
individual now, instead of developing his power of independence, relies on people or institutions
to feel rooted, provide identity (as being a part of them as opposed to being apart from them and
taking part in them), and be sheltered and existentially fed by them. Alternatively, there is
another way to overcome intense feelings of utter isolation and lostness.
The second option is to learn to relate himself to the world in “ascertainable ways.” 315
That is through love, since to effectively do so would require independence and existential
productiveness (to be discussed below), thus approaching the problem of non-belonging in a
biophilic fashion. A society which attempts to move from the incestuous to a loving method of
addressing lostness would concomitantly be inclined towards a more biophilic constellation of
character rooted passions, beginning a psychic reunion between man and nature.
Moreover, the need to feel a unity and to be effective, takes on a similar spectrum of
dichotomized boundaries which in turn develops into a spectrum of dichotomized behaviors
(ranging from healthy to pathological extremes). With respect to the existential problem of
powerlessness, our need to have effect and impact on the world around us is evident from
childhood. Contextual conditioning is responsible for a child’s behavior and can (and often does)
influence behavioral patterns in their adulthood. For example, if every time a child cries, it elicits
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a wanted reaction from adults, this behavior can be used as an ‘effective’ tool in acquiring
something they want or particular attention. This type of behavior can continue into adulthood in
the form of entitled tantrums, aggressions, emotional abuse through guilt, tears, or selfvictimization, etc. Regardless of this example, the point is that the need to interact with the world
whether it be with objects or people is necessary in developing a sense of identity.
The identity idea of “who I am” is partly constructed on the idea of what one is capable
or incapable of doing along with their perception of each of those factors. Nevertheless, Fromm
states that if an individual were to experience themselves as an entirely passive being, as a mere
object, he would “lack a sense of his own will, of his identity.” 316 Thus to help mitigate this and
prevent himself from being “washed over” by the infinite, he must “acquire a sense of being able
to do something, to move somebody, to ‘make a dent,’ or…to be ‘effective.’” 317 Ergo, when
assessing one’s relationship with others, one can generate a feeling of potency, causing particular
effects. Given their character, a person may be inclined to cause either love or fear and suffering.
Similarly, in objects, one can have a predilection to either construct or destroy. Both of the
interactive dichotomies—biophilic activity as well as destructive tendencies—stem from an
inherent need to overcome vital impotence and the vulnerability felt against the backdrop of a
sublime universe.
The unbearable existential split in man’s psyche can be subdued by establishing a sense
of unity within himself, and with the external world comprised of humans and nature. The
conscious can be “anaesthetize[d]” by inducing states of trance and ecstasy mediated by drugs,
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sexual orgies, fasting, dancing, ritual, etc.318 The attempt to reestablish unity can also be
achieved through the process of identification. In more primitive societies, one can observe the
attempt to restore psychic harmony by identifying with certain totem animals, whether through
prayer or mimicry. There are numerous ways that the mind can reinsert itself in a state of holism.
Unity can be established by subordinating all energies to one all-consuming passion. This
can be a passion for destruction, power, wealth, fame, hoarding, dominating, etc. All of these
passions can act as an anesthetic by assisting the individual to “forget oneself.” 319 For Fromm, “it
is the tragic attempt, in the sense that either it succeeds only momentarily (as in a trance or in
drunkenness) or, even if it is permanent (as in the passion for hate or power), it cripples man,
estranges him from others, twists his judgement, and makes him as dependent on this particular
passion as another is on hard drugs.”320 Man is again presented with a bifurcated option: that of
relatedness, on the one, or narcissism, on the other. To achieve a state of psychical health, then,
man can only overcome his fear of aloneness through the development of reason and love.
Unable to achieve a state of cognitive maturity—one which includes the mutual and concomitant
growth of the intellect and emotion—man is condemned to be psychically crippled. The inability
to establish a ‘oneness’ with the self and the world inevitably manifests as psychological trauma
and becomes expressed in varying degrees of pathological behavior(s).
Therefore, man’s character structure is necessarily formed as a product of his
phenomenological situatedness, i.e. his existential dichotomies arising from a decrease in the
instinctive equipment in man. Effective behavior is the ability to act immediately in an integrated
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manner without being hindered or delayed by too much doubt or excess thought. A viable
substitute for instinctive behavior then is a function which would enable man to “act as if he
were motivated by instincts,”321 namely character.
Character then, according to Fromm, is “the specific structure in which human energy is
organized in the pursuit of man’s goals; a person acts ‘instinctively;…in accordance with his
character.”322 The character-conditioned drives are so strong that the person merely feels as
though they are ‘natural’ without having to question their motivation. Fromm gives us the
example of a miser who does not ponder whether he should spend or save, or the exploitativesadistic character that is driven by the ‘instinctive drive’ to dominate and exploit others. The
concept of the character is crucial to understanding psychic health, more especially destructive
tendencies that are malignantly aggressive. The destructive and sadistic passions in a person “are
usually organized in his character system.” 323 Character is the system of psychic expression
attempting to thwart the madness evoked by our existential condition.
To summarize in the spirit of the dichotomy, Fromm’s technical use of existential
dichotomies refers to the objective needs found in every human having evolved in such a way
that has placed us in a psychologically precarious position—always working to stave off insanity
beset by intense existential confusion. The classical journalistic questions of who, what, where,
when, why, and how, all apply to the individual over the course of a lifetime, and are further
hyperbolized by fear of aloneness, displacement, and powerlessness. Regardless, the pacification
of the psyche can be achieved in a variety of ways, all of which are further broken down in an
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either/or categorized fashion. In the case of our need for rootedness, one’s character can tackle
the demand by either achieving a sense of solidarity, brotherly love, and/or mystical experiences
that render a worldview comprised of a totalizing network of interdependent interactions
between individuals and nature, or, contrariwise, through addiction, depersonalization, and
dependency. The need for effectiveness can be answered either by love and productive work or
by sadism and destructiveness. Unity, relatedness, and the need for an object of devotion can be
expressed by an abstract figure like God or concepts such as love, truth, justice, reason, etc., and
by being kind, compassionate, loving, etc. Conversely, the same can be achieved through
idolatry of destructive idols, and through dependency, masochism, sadism, and malignant
aggression. Either method would be sufficient to resolve the tension in an individual’s psyche,
however Fromm clearly places them in a moral hierarchy: the biophilic over the necrophilic and
the maladaptive.
Section IV: Fromm’s Character: There
Though the passions are represented by Fromm as dichotomies, seldom are they
expressed in such a cut-and-dry way since they “do not appear as single units but as
syndromes.”324 Behavior such as constructiveness, love, justice, reason, and interrelatedness are
all various aspects and manifestations of a single “life-furthering” productive orientation.
Expressions of destructiveness, sadomasochism, greed, narcissism, and incestuousness, all
similarly stem from a “life-thwarting” syndrome. Moreover, Fromm notes that where “one
element of the syndrome is to be found, the others also exist in various degree.” 325 Thus, what we
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see are multitudinous forms of expressive behavior that all stem from either a biophilic
orientation or a necrophilic one. But that is not to say that a person is ruled by either one
syndrome or another. Rather, it is almost always a blend of both syndromes. He suggests that
“what matters for the behavior of the person and the possibility of change is precisely the
respective strength of each syndrome.” 326 What matters is the intensity with which the qualities
of either one of the syndrome become manifest. We can now draw a link between mindset and
behavior: namely, that of one’s character rooted passions and the way one engages with the
world.327 Engagement is, more often than not, a mixture of the dichotomies expressed in varying
degrees of intensity along its spectrum.
With respect to varying intensities, first, one might observe the action itself. For example,
to satisfy the inherent craving of belonging, an individual must find alternative means by which
to generate ties. In this particular instance, in an attempt to fend off the feeling of isolation or
lostness, one can relate himself to other people in the world in a variety of ways. One might love
others. To do so adequately, one must achieve a “presence of independence and productiveness.”
Therefore, a level of freedom is necessary in order to acquire a relatedness through love. 328
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Supposing though that one’s sense of freedom is not adequately developed, one can achieve a
state of relatedness through symbiosis. In other words, instead of an interdependence, relatedness
can be had through dependence where a person becomes a part of someone or something, or by
making someone or something part of themselves. For instance, in the symbiotic relationship of
sadism, one strives to direct or control others. Conversely, in masochism, one chooses to relate
themselves by being directed or controlled by another. More drastically, if one cannot find a way
to relate themselves through love or symbiosis, the problem of relatedness can be solved through
narcissism. In such an instance, the individual “becomes the world, and loves the world by
‘loving’ himself.”329 These are all different ways with which relatedness can be achieved,
keeping in mind the potency and blended overlap.
Furthermore, suppose, as is often the case, that narcissism is blended with sadism in a
more extreme version of each of the expressions. This, given the level of intensity, can lead to
unadaptable pathology, e.g. madness. The most extreme behavior results in a malignant form of
attempting to solve the problem through the craving to destroy all others. Fromm suggests that
“if one exists outside of me, I need not fear others, nor need I relate myself to them. By
destroying the world I am saved from being crushed by it.” 330 Alternatively, if an individual is
related to the world, there is no need for the malignant forms of expression; rather than seeking
to destroy the world, one’s feelings of self-preservation are not activated and one becomes able
to love and preserve the environment they find themselves in. This is one of the necessary
concepts missing from the climate ethics discussion that could allow for the conceptualization of
a sustainable solution.
329
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Assuming that Fromm is correct in his various descriptions of man’s inner life, his
project would still be incomplete. A map is not enough as a guide for action, humanity also
needs a goal to aim for and that gives it direction. The animal has no such problems. Its instincts
provide it with a map as well as with goals. But mankind, lacking instinctive determination and
possessing a brain that permits him to think in a multitude of potential directions, needs an object
of total devotion; it needs an object of devotion to be the focal point of all its strivings and the
basis for all its effective –and not only proclaimed—values. Such an object of devotion is
necessary for several reasons. The object integrates one’s energies in singular direction. It helps
to elevate a person beyond his isolated existence with all its doubts and insecurity and gives
meaning to life. In being devoted to a goal beyond one’s isolated ego, one transcends himself and
leaves the prison of absolute egocentricity.
These ‘objects’ of devotion can be expressed in any number of translations from the
mental state of character rooted passion to expressive behavior. To reiterate, our need to
overcome our fear of separateness by being rooted, our powerlessness by being effective, our
lostness by being unified, all manifest themselves as a manifold means of relating ourselves to
the world. Fromm calls these needs character rooted passions. In other words, one’s character
often draws upon such existential motivators as energies from which to disperse and create
oneself. One’s character is “the relatively permanent system of all non-instinctual strivings
through which man relates himself to the human and natural world” and therefore lends us our
framework for ideological mapping. It is through rooted passions, born of man’s dichotomies,
where the potential of man lies dormant and awaits social extraction in order to harden into
activity; the devotion to the chosen object. Regardless, Fromm still sees social extraction as

152

ultimately being subsumed under the rooted passions since he contends that any type of social
influence “can only work through the biologically given conditions of human existence.” 331
Character rooted passions, then, are responsible for the development of character. Man’s
character becomes the “relatively permanent form in which human energy is canalized in the
process of assimilation and socialization.” 332 Character rooted passions are therefore the primary
and fundamental cause of behavior, since they underlie character, and are directly responsible for
a person’s relatedness to the world—energies that are displaced, if one recalls, by the precious
nature of our existential dichotomies. Only upon understanding man’s character can a discussion
be had pertaining to ethical theory since it “is both the subject matter of ethical judgment and the
other object of man’s ethical development.”333 While we often generate ethical theories to
account for man’s behavior, behavior needs to also be understood in terms of ethical production.
In other words, theory and practice cannot be divorced from each other and need to correspond
in such a way that there is sufficient explanation as to why behavior falls short of moral
rectitude.
The study of personality then is essential to understanding behavior since it is the
“totality of inherited and acquired psychic qualities which are characteristic of one individual
and which make the individual unique.” 334 The personality can be further divided into a
dichotomy of inherited qualities versus acquired qualities. While inherited qualities are
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composed of “temperament,335 gifts, and all constitutionally given psychic qualities,” 336 acquired
qualities are generated through their interaction and the way the world is impressed upon the
individual—as a response, it is a conformity and response to dealing with environmental factors,
e.g. one’s family, state, country, personal experiences, etc. The prominence of the role of
character is discussed by Fromm as the factor of human nature, which is expressly responsible
for ethical behavior and its continued development. This is likely due to us having some measure
of control with respect to how we respond to external factors. He writes, “While differences in
temperament have no ethical significance, differences in character constitute the real problem of
ethics; they are expressive of the degree to which an individual has succeeded in the art of
living.”337 The art of living is precisely the existential responsibility each and every being has
toward himself and the other. This will be included in the discussion in the upcoming chapter,
after which the transition from mindset to behavior will have been bridged.
Character then is the unique fashion with which the individual relates himself to the
world, or rather, is the part of the personality that most heavily influences outlook and
comportment.338 This is achieved through the acquisition and assimilation of objects as well as
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his relation to himself and people.339 Finally, we arrive at a point where we can begin to bridge
the gap between what gives way to mindsets and begins to transform into behavior. This, like all
else in Frommian philosophy, is also subject to a dichotomized configuration. Character rooted
passions give way to character orientations. In other words, existential impetus stemming from
our cognitive ambivalence—existential dichotomies—give way to the character rooted passions.
The engagement of the passions with the world340 yield character. Character further lends the
individual his own particular existential axioms i.e. ways with which life is perceived according
to the organized value schema (unconsciously) internalized. This in turn gives way to an
existential orientation: expressed behavior following from the given characterological mindset.
The given existential orientations, to be discussed below, are concepts of ‘ideal’
personality types and not an accurate description of a single individual’s personality. Similar to
the character rooted passions discussed above, they too manifest as a syndrome—a “blend of all
or some of these orientations in which one, however, is dominant.”341 Additionally, they are also
divided into two major groups. The productive orientation and non-productive orientation.
Where the non-productive orientation lacks self-sufficiency and fails to reach an appropriate
level of development, the productive orientation is an achieved state of existential maturity that
allows for the execution of a self-created ethical ethos founded upon a biophilic objectivity.
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Regarding the non-productive orientation, Fromm lists four major character types: The
Receptive, Exploitative, Hoarding, and Marketing characters. Furthermore, these four
orientations, albeit having failed to achieve a state of maturity, are far from being deemed
pathological. Though pathologies develop strictly in non-productive orientations, this only
results in venturing into relationships consisting in either symbiotic severity or, conversely,
extreme withdrawal. In the former, a person cannot achieve a state of independence and remains
reliant on institutions, e.g. religious, occupational, nationalistic, etc., or other people to provide
them with existential structure, motivation, and direction. Extreme withdrawal yields narcissistic
personalities that fail to overcome the ‘self’ and remain emotionally detached and empathetically
crippled. Additionally, the non-productive orientation can also possess passive qualities that
allow for well-adjusted behavior conducive to life-affirming activities. Irrespectively, though
non-productive behavior might reflect healthy behavior, the root of that behavior is subject to
dependency and fear. Hence, it is prevented from achieving a state of autonomy. The most
extreme cases in non-productive orientations result in malignant aggression and necrophilic
pathologies.
These orientations also become subject to further dichotomized division, generating a
spectrum of relatively stable to extremely unhealthy. Each possesses qualities that result in more
biophilic forms of expression as opposed to necrophilic, thus generating a hierarchical criterion
of value. In the case of the receptive and exploitative orientations, both are considered to possess
symbiotic qualities. For example, someone who possesses and expresses aspects of the receptive
orientation as the primary mode of his personality deploys distinct modes of accepting and
receiving, often using others as a means to sustain their sense of self. With respect to the quality
of love, the receptive personality would consider love to be congruent with “being loved.” The
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borrowing of emotional support from others acts as a prop for supporting, sustaining, and
validating their own existence. Fromm elaborates,
[The receptive orientation is] dependent not only on authorities for knowledge and help
but on people in general for any kind of support. They feel lost when alone because they
feel that they cannot do anything without help. This helplessness is especially important
with regard to those acts which by their very nature can only be done alone—making
decisions and taking responsibility. In personal relationships, for instance, they ask
advice from the very person with regard to whom they have to make a decision. 342
Moreover,
By and large, the outlook of people of this receptive orientation is optimistic and friendly;
they have a certain confidence in life and its gifts, but they become anxious and
distraught when their ‘source of supply’ is threatened. They often have a genuine warmth
and a wish to help others, but doing things for others also assumes the function of
securing their favor.343
Behavior from the receptive orientation is based mainly on personal insecurity and fear of
aloneness. But, as shown in the second block quote above, this behavior also possesses ‘positive’
qualities. The positive and negative aspects of any of the non-productive orientations depend on
the degree of productiveness in the total character structure and can be understood as either a
passive or active expression, respectively. 344 In the case of the receptive orientation, a person
with an emphasis on productivity would exhibit traits such as acceptance, responsiveness,
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devotion, modesty, charm, adaptability, idealism, sensitivity, politeness, optimism, trust,
tenderness, etc. Conversely, the more prone they are to relying on others, these traits can
transform into a passivity without initiation: opinionlessness, submissiveness, a lack of pride, a
lack of principle, a lack of realism, cowardice, spinelessness, wishful thinking, gullibility,
sentimentality, etc.345
In a more extreme instance of this particular symbiotic relationship, a person can develop
tendencies that “attempt to get rid of one’s individual self, to escape from freedom, and to look
for security by attaching oneself to another person”346—in other words, masochism. In such
instances, the masochistic individual suffers from the inability to initiate excitation for himself
and of reacting readily to normal stimuli but becoming reactive when overpowered, “as it were,
when they can give themselves up to the excitement forced upon them.” 347 A similar pattern of
behavior can be seen for the remainder of the orientations with each of them, in its extreme form
resulting in pathology and neurosis.
The exploitative orientation—another symbiotic relationship—manifests as sadism since
it too is rooted in a dependency on others. Contrary to the receptive orientation that is contingent
on others ‘feeding’ their existential drive, the exploitative orientation exhibits a characteristic of
taking whether “by force or cunning.” They “grab and steal” what they need, whether in love or
ideas.348 Where masochistic tendencies are an attempt to get rid of one’s self by being
“swallowed”, the sadist strives to “swallow” others.349 Thus, while the receptive personality can
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fall into masochistic tendencies, the exploitative is more often prone to sadistic behavior that can
express itself aggressively, egocentrically, conceitedly, rashly arrogantly, seductively, etc. The
passive aspects of the exploitative personality manifest as someone who exudes activity as
opposed to being genuinely exploitative; able to take initiative, make claims, has pride, is
whimsical, self-confident, and captivating.350 The “active” form of the exploitative orientation,
i.e. the most functional, appears “in all kinds of rationalizations, as love, overprotectiveness,
‘justified’ domination, ‘justified’ vengeance,” 351 etc. In its extreme form it can be expressive of
destructive tendencies, treating others as things to be used, as a means to their end as opposed to
an end in itself. 352
The next two orientations—hoarding and marketing—are distinct from the receptive and
exploitative in that instead of forming symbiotic attachments that form close and intimate bonds
with objects or people at the expense of one’s freedom and integrity, these two orientations
exhibit withdrawal and destructiveness. Describing withdrawn orientations, Fromm writes:

The feeling of individual powerlessness can be overcome by withdrawal from others who
are experienced as threats. To a certain extent withdrawal is part of the normal rhythm in
any person’s relatedness to the world, a necessity for contemplation, for study, for the
reworking of materials, thoughts, attitudes. In the phenomenon here described,
withdrawal becomes the main form of relatedness to others, a negative relatedness as it
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were. Its emotional equivalent is the feeling of indifference toward others, often
accompanied by compensatory feeling of self-inflation. Withdrawal and indifference can,
but need not, be conscious; as a matter of fact, in our culture they are mostly covered up
by a superficial kind of interest and sociability. 353

Hence, the hoarding personality is an orientation that looks inward and is concerned with
preservation. Hoarders protect what they have and seek to bring more in while minimizing what
they give out, often defining themselves by their possessions. They are the miserly ‘savers’ who
tend to savor and idealize the past. Intimacy can be viewed as threatening and they attempt to
achieve a measure of security by possessing their beloved. The hoarding orientation can exhibit
qualities that are either practical or unimaginative, economical or stingy, loyal or possessive,
methodical or obsessional, cautious or anxious, reserved or cold.354
The marketing personality is mainly concerned with exchange, often treating “oneself as
a commodity and of one’s value as exchange value.”355 A market place where one’s labor or skill
is not given a value or payment but one actively commodifies one’s personality in competition
with others—can be purposeful and exchanging or opportunistic, able to shift and change or to
be inconsistent, youthful versus childish, tolerant versus indifferent, adaptable versus
undiscriminating, generous versus wasteful. 356 Fromm explains the (economic) conditions and
the problem generated by a citizenry that has adopted such an orientation. He writes that,

353

Fromm, Man for Himself, 110.
For full detail on the hoarding orientation, cf. Man for Himself, 65-67.
355
Ibid., 68.
356
For more insight on the marketing orientation, cf. Man for Himself, 67-82. Today’s society has taken it a step
further from what Fromm seemed to think was possible. He claimed that one needed skilled labor and a pleasant
354

160

Since modern man experiences himself both as the seller and as the commodity to be sold
on the market, his self-esteem depends on conditions beyond his control. If he is
“successful,” he is valuable; if he is not, he is worthless. The degree of insecurity which
results from this orientation can hardly be overestimated. 357

The real issue with possessing such an orientation is that one ends up experiencing one’s self as
independent of self. The identity one has is moldable and can give way to any and all
circumstance so long as it pays in likeability allowing the individual to experience himself as one
with his action. In the productive personality, Fromm writes, for example, someone’s agency is
in accordance with his abilities, i.e. “I am what I do;”358 in the marketing orientation one’s
powers of creation become estranged, “different from himself”—something for others to judge
and use. 359 Thus there is a loss of authentic identity and a type of inculcated alienation. A person
simply becomes “the sum total of roles one can play: ‘I am as you desire me.’” 360
The pathological extreme of the withdrawn orientations, the hoarder or alienated being, is
destructiveness. This is because the impulse to destroy others stems from the fear of being
destroyed themselves and often results in an inability to trust—either people or a fear of the
chaotic aspect of life. Instead of accepting and learning to embrace the parts of life that makes
them uncomfortable, they actively strive to continuously block and resist it. Fromm notes that
“the passive and active forms of the same kind of relatedness” are often “blended in varying
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proportions,” resulting in a “more intense and more complete blocking of productiveness.”
Destructiveness becomes much more extreme than withdrawal and is the “perversion of the drive
to live.”361 The energy of the unlived life becomes transferred into destructive behavior and the
decimation thereof. 362
Recall that both positive and negative aspects are part of the same syndrome of character
expression. It is best to imagine this on a spectrum in which the productive orientation might
prevail over the non-productive. High productiveness yields passive non-productive traits, while
low productiveness yields active non-productive traits. Furthermore, the more a particular
orientation prevails, in other words, a productive versus a non-productive orientation, the more
the individual is likely to exhibit biophilic as opposed to necrophilic behavior. Of course, as
noted earlier, orientations are almost always blended with one another while moving along
several spectrums in an increasing or degenerative manner. Therefore, in considering these basic
orientations, Fromm concludes that there exists a “staggering amount of variability in each
person.”363 This is brought about by the fact that

1) the nonproductive orientations are blended in different ways regarding the respective
weight of each of them.
2) Each syndrome changes in quality according to the amount of productiveness present.
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3) The different orientations may operate in different strength in the material, emotional,
or intellectual spheres of activity, respectively. 364
Thus, if one adds to these other factors of the personality such as temperament, innate
gifts/natural tendencies, and unique precociousness, Fromm notes that there is an infinite variety
of personalities to be had. Understanding this is crucial if one is to attempt to undertake a social
ordinance and collective effort toward maximizing healthy mindsets and productive orientations
as opposed to generating an endless stream of alienated and sick psychic states. I am of the
opinion that any society that generates and fosters pathological mindsets and orientations could
never have a functional and sustainable relationship with the environment.
Conclusion
A discussion involving the science or philosophy of humanism within the broader
discussions in climate philosophy is essential to the appropriate harnessing, fostering, and
development of long-term sustainability. Character rooted passions with a biophilic comportment
along with the active striving to minimize its necrophilic counterpoint can serve as basis in
providing direction having used ontology to provide foundational first principles. One that
inherently promotes a conjoined dogma that focuses on the psychic health for individuals and
societies alike. In this light, our options appear to be plain as day. Our need for an object of
devotion can be satisfied by having devotion to love, truth, reason, justice, etc., or by idolatry of
destructive idols and malignant principles. Our need for relatedness can be answered by love,
kindness, individual interdependence or instead, by dependence, sadism, masochism, or
destructiveness. Our need for unity and rootedness can be addressed through solidarity,
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brotherliness, mystical experiences that promote wellness and stability of mind or, by
inebriation, addictions, and depersonalization. The need for effectiveness can be answered by
love and productive work or by sadism and destructiveness; stimulation and excitation can be
answered by a productive interest in man, nature, art, ideas, and participation, or by a greedy
pursuit of the fulfillment of pleasures and narcissism.
Given these objective existentially rooted passions, Fromm reasons that a) human beings
are required by the laws of nature to fulfill bodily needs in order to survive, b) these needs are
motivated by instincts c) despite instincts being a major motivating factor, they are not primary
motivators since if they were, man would not have major qualms with life should he be allotted
ample food, rest, etc., ergo, he concludes, that d) the major motivations of man are his
dichotomized (rational and irrational) passions: the strivings for love, tenderness, solidarity,
freedom, and truth but also, conversely, the need to control, submit, and destroy—narcissism,
greed, envy, and ambition are all passions which produce meaning, existential excitation, an
identity, and fulfillment as a byproduct. Such needs make organic drives secondary in that they
alone do not suffice to make man happy, nor do they guarantee his sanity. 365 Additionally,
passions are not some luxury to be pursued only once physical needs are met, as though they
were optional; they are the reasons for living. 366
Society, by and large, provides people with a set of conditions that offer ‘ready-made’ values
directing, promoting, and suppressing particular rooted passions and is composed of pre-set
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criteria that generate communal meaning and extend motivation. Thus, according to normative
humanism, it is possible—when taking physical and psychic qualities and needs into account—to
generate a criteria whereby the state of health of a society can be evaluated, judged, and
ultimately used as a mark for national objectives, international accord, and planetary
homeostasis. This would be the set values used in economic tools such as cost-benefit analysis or
any other evaluative method used for decision making.
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Chapter 5: Humane Humanism
The purpose of the last chapter, though mostly expositional, is to consider tools necessary
to assist the climate conversation by supplementing it in a few ways. First and foremost, it
provides a radical shift in approach. For example, as previously mentioned as it is the general
thesis of this dissertation, climate ethicists tend to limit their analysis to externalities. This, of
course, makes sense. After all, consequences matter. Since the impact on the climate is often
observed in terms of the amount of carbon in the atmosphere, monetary loss due to disasters,
amount of biodiversity loss, hectares of forest burned, etc., the analysis generated and solutions
suggested are mirrored in response as the focus is often on external and empirical
explanations.367 Quite naturally, the most visceral and instinctive response to a fire is to pour
water onto it. This type of problem solving is immediate and serves well for short-term problem
solving.
Should there be a fire that would rage for the next few centuries, pouring water over it,
though perhaps momentarily effective, would surely prove to be insufficient. It is argued that
Fromm’s humanism can beneficially augment the conversation by adding a much-needed
alternative perspective that focuses on the internal life of man. Solutions offered that account for
that inner dimension, along with its intrinsic demands and properties, can more radically procure
and provide long-term planning—one that offers ethicists and policy makers the advantage of
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stereoscopic vision. Such a supplement to current theories can aid in the creation of a culture that
values both internal and external factors, rather than one which promotes the latter at the expense
of the former.
Second, the previous chapter provided a necessary grounding to the conversation in two
specific ways. The first is by introducing an objective standard in the form of existential
dichotomies and character rooted passions. It is believed that without one, no substantial
progress can truly be made since all parties involved can pull in any and every direction, failing
to act simultaneously and with unified purpose like varying archers aiming at random targets.
Second, setting aside the unfocused infighting or the ineffective ‘talking in circles’ that would
inevitably occur, there is also the threat that without a standard, the momentum to push for a
better future can fall to the wayside due to an increase in an ideology of social Darwinism—the
idea is that progress and betterment become eclipsed by the nihilistic despair of opportunism and
short-term gains. Therefore, asking fundamental questions such as “what does it mean to be a
human?” or “what features about our nature are universal?” gives us a starting point that enables
us to create a unifying ethical foundation with which to build up from and produce long-term
actionability alongside short-term action. Asking seemingly banal questions such as “is life
important?” can lend us a point of agreement, despite the question being broad and borderline
platitudinous. Nevertheless, these broad and often quite difficult questions can create a culture of
consensus as opposed to scathing disagreement and a bottomless skepticism.
Third and last, I recommended Fromm’s character rooted passions as the center-stage of
future social engineering since they can be viewed as core criteria for generating a set standard
for existential health. Health means being of sound body and mind. I gave emphasis to the mind
since it tends to lose priority when made to compete against the tactile and tangible. Seeing how
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the passions meld with society to form a major part of the personality, how we decide to
(re)structure social mechanisms becomes an essential task since they work to fashion our
mindset and influence our behavior. If our minds are non-productive or pathological, despite
being well-adjusted to current society, then it would make sense that our daily activities, without
being cognizant of them, are symptomatically harmful and destructive to ourselves and the planet
as a whole. Therefore, considering a humanistic approach as a viable response to climate change
not only provides the climate conversation with solid grounding but also with a tenable
trajectory—a new paradigm of values to aim for. It is the intention of this chapter to discuss this
trajectory—to assist in transitioning to a new culture, one that puts life and health first.
The focus of this chapter will aim to transition from an account of mindset to behavior,
attempting to extrapolate some notion of health in the form of a productive orientation. Having
discussed the unhealthy mindset in the previous chapter and having concluded with the
plausibility of adopting a humanist culture that derives from our inherent needs and attributes,
this chapter will begin the first section, “Humanistic Productiveness,” by briefly discussing the
relevance of man’s social context with respect to his development. This is necessary if we are to
ask Fromm’s famous 1955 question, “Are we sane?” and apply it to our current circumstance.
Furthermore, to adequately flesh out the correlation between sanity and behavior in the second
section, “Diagnostics on the Way to the Productive Orientation,” I aim to cement the connection
between mindset and behavior by concluding with a definition of the productive orientation at
the end of the section. These first section gives us the requisite background necessary to deploy
the discussion in the second i.e. Fromm’s conception of activity as enmeshed qualities of our
current, having, mode of living. Qualities that prevent healthy behavior such as narcissism,
alienation, and abstractification—composites of the having mode of living— when juxtaposed
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with the being mode, lend us a behavioral (and external) assessment of health—yet another
dichotomy, except this time, applied at the macro level.

Section I: Humanistic Productiveness
Recall that according to Fromm, the emergence of reason overruled our instinctive
behavior and put mankind in an existentially awkward position—that of having to produce for
oneself answers to the problem of existence. Given the inextinguishable and ever-looming
torment of the existential dichotomies, man is forced to everlastingly strive for satisfactory
solutions that will help him cope and become better assimilated to living. For Fromm, man’s
development is inextricably tied to the dynamism of history and his situatedness. The context
that he finds himself in causes him to react and create a world in which he can apply his
creativity and “feel at home with himself and his fellow men.” 368
In Man for Himself (1964), Fromm writes, “every stage [man] reaches leaves him
discontented and perplexed, and this very perplexity urges him to move toward new
solutions.”369 So what we see here are two distinct factors that play a role in the development of
mankind. The first is produced by his innate and pre-given existential dichotomies, the second is
the environmental factors. How he chooses to confront the passions, along with the external
conditions he is forced to contend with, gives way to the identity he creates for himself and the
meaning he extracts from the given experience. Though being “discontented” and “perplexed”
seem to be an inalienable part of being human, each new “stage,” according to Fromm, reveals
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new conditions that force man to overcome once more—thereby successfully negating the
issue—or to perish.
To further elaborate this concept of historical procession, Fromm directs us to Hegel
where he attempts to shed light on his famous quote, “what is real is rational.” 370 Fromm’s
reading of Hegel was not as a reactionary. In other words, that this quote is misunderstood,
erroneously depicting Hegel as someone who accepted everything that existed as “rational”
provided that they/it existed.371 “What Hegel meant,” Fromm goes on to clarify, was that
anything which was “real” was “real inasmuch as it was necessary.” 372 What “is necessary in the
evolutionary process is never pathological.” 373 Action only becomes pathological if it exists
beyond its evolutionary necessity. 374 In such a reading of Hegel, what we see is an intersection
where health and evolution either converge biophilically or diverge necrophilically.
Given this interpretation, Fromm’s notion of ethics pertains to the psyche’s adaptation to
social evolution—one that accords with the dichotomy above. Let us take an example given by
Fromm where he discusses Marx’s evolutionary thinking. He writes that

Slavery…is not in itself morally evil as long as the development of society makes slavery
a necessity. Or, that would hold true for property, which would hold true for alienation,
and so on. If, however, slavery exists in a situation in which it is not necessary because
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the general conditions of society would permit the overcoming of slavery, then it
becomes a pathological phenomenon.375
Fromm’s explication of a Marxist ethical theory sheds light on his own notion of psychic
adaptation and evolution, since it stems from the Hegelian tradition of a humanity imbued with
an intrinsic potentiality. For Fromm, what we have is a distinction between socially immanent
versus a universal ethics, each of which is in a state of constant conflict, and that, over time, “has
decreased in the process of human evolution.” 376
From the point of view of a universal ethics—“norms of conduct the aim of which is the
growth and unfolding of man” 377—divesting a human being of free will in order to objectify it
and use it for the bidding of another is an unethical practice. But there is a difference between a
society whose socially immanent ethics or, “the norms in any culture which contain prohibitions
and commands that are necessary only for the functioning and survival of that particular
society,”378 existing due to a culmination of its natural and unaware evolution, and a society that
has long outgrown the need for it but still maintains its perpetuation. In the latter case, the
society has dipped from unethical to pathological. The difference is that in such a scenario,
society doubles down on the authoritarian cultural norms as opposed to attempting to overcome
narcissism and alienation via replacement with love and objectivity. For Fromm, this is mental
illness on a social level. We could similarly discuss the morality of anti-ecological policies in
society, those societies which require it are not sick, those which do not, yet pursue them
anyway, are.
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Thus, the approach of normative humanism is not confined to that of the individual and
his mental and psychic health but extends to the overall welfare of the group, the state, the
national and international communities, etc. Since mental health coincides with the maturation of
a single person, having grown through varying psychological states,379 it just can just as readily
be applied to group dynamics. In the case of the individual, should a person fail to achieve a
level of spontaneity, freedom, and a genuine expression of self—provided that these are
objective goals to be achieved by the individual for the sake of maturation—he will suffer from a
defect of a non-productive orientation. Similarly, should such a goal not be attained by the
majority of members in a community, this in turn becomes a socially patterned defect. Since it is
shared among the majority of the members of the populace, this permits the individual to remain
unconscious of his defect and retain a measure of personal security unthreatened by the
experience of being different.380 Quite accurately, Fromm points out, “the fact that millions of
people share the same vices does not make these vices virtues, the fact that they share so many
errors does not make the errors to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the same
forms of mental pathology does not make these people sane.”381
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Regarding the problem of human existence with respect to the individual, normative
humanism posits a right and wrong/a satisfactory and unsatisfactory solution to such a problem,
and that from this premise “the criterion of mental health is not one of individual adjustment to a
given social order, but a universal one, valid for all men.”382
Regarding the immanent ethics regarding a given society, it often behoove the individual
to submit to the rules essential to its particular mode of production and arrangement of
hierarchical values, if only to avoid neurosis. In any society that harbors such an ethics, the
group is often responsible for tending to the character structure of its members and molding them
in such a way that “they want to do what they have to do”383 under the existing circumstances of
the status quo. Therefore, socially subjective virtues take precedence. For instance, in warrior
societies, the foremost virtues might be strength, bravery, and a love of honor; in a farming
society, those of community, patience, and interdependence; in a capitalistic society, virtues such
as a strong work ethic, buying power, and the freedom to be impulsive may be prioritized, thus
becoming a part of its ethical system.
Furthermore, ethically immanent societies use the “dignity” of universal ethics to inveigle
its members into compliance and agreeable behavior. Fromm writes that “norms which are
necessary only in the interest of the survival of a special kind of society” are invested and
proclaimed to be part of the “universal norms inherent in human existence and therefore
universally applicable.”384 Thus, for example, in a society that values private property, the
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prohibition of theft is made to appear as though it had derived from the same human necessity as
the prohibition of murder.385
Aside from the existential dichotomies then, individuals are also invested with historical
contradictions spawning from the cultural Zeitgeist of their environment. Immanent demands of
social life and universal demands of the individual passions are fueled by a synthetic tension that
is man-made and hence soluble, meaning, capable of being resolved. Fromm writes that the
“contemporary contradiction between an abundance of technical means for material satisfaction
and the incapacity to use them exclusively for peace and welfare of the people is soluble.” 386
Given this example, the failure to achieve world peace or end world hunger is not a problem of
resources but rather that of human behavior and institutional non-compliance. Again, note that a
problem is only soluble if the means to negate the contradiction are readily available, as opposed
to an insoluble historical contradiction like the type of slavery discussed earlier. The slavery of
the ancient world could not be solved until a later point in history once a sufficient material basis
was acquired to allow for the equality of men. Thus, the contradiction generated by the imminent
social ethics was capable of finally collapsing into a universal ethics.
Interestingly, it is at the point where dialectical contradiction is stubbornly upheld
wherever its resolution becomes most pressing, for “it is one of the peculiar qualities of the
human mind that, when confronted with a contradiction, it cannot remain passive.” 387 Progress,
in such an instance, is the ability to overcome this apparent inconsistency through action despite
it being stymied by those most representative of the values produced by the given society. Any

385

Ibid.
Ibid., 43.
387
Ibid., 44.
386

174

individual who refuses to collapse current soluble contradictions often confuses the historical
dichotomy with existential dichotomies. Fromm explains that such an individual is “eager to
prove that they were existential dichotomies and thus unalterable,” 388 attempting to appease the
need to negate the contradiction through rationalizations. This is a peculiarity of man, to accept
the thoughts shared by most of the members of his culture or postulated by people looked to as
powerful authority figures.389
Nevertheless, with the attempt to harmonize the historical paradox by doubling down on
non-productive orientations and outmoded cultural norms, man’s mind may be momentarily
appeased, “although he himself is not totally at rest.”390 So long as a certain type of social
organization is historically indispensable, members of that culture and community will continue
to accept its ethical norms as binding, despite not being ‘at total rest.’
Should a society proceed to uphold customs that no longer benefit the majority of its
members, despite having a basis for change, it is left up to the “awareness of the socially
conditioned character” to mobilize and dispense from themselves tendencies that will bring about
“change to the social order.”391 Such attempts will be castigated as unethical since they would be
attempting to achieve the demise of a social order that is no longer historically necessary, or
paradigmatically sustainable. Conversely, submission to the current social values is heralded as
‘devotion,’ ‘selflessness,’ and ‘patriotic.’ 392
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In the Pathology of Normalcy (2010), Fromm discusses the stagnant values of 1950s
America, many of which we can currently observe have transitioned from a 1953 ‘stagnancy’ to
a 2020 festering, long overdue for a critical re-analysis—in the then contemporary America.
Values that currently still stand, such as “individual freedom, individual enterprise, the scientific
approach, political democracy, [and] the domination of nature.”393 The ideas though have not
been revisited in order to establish a ‘better fit.’ Instead, we are operating on values incurred as a
reaction to and rebuking of an outmoded social and economic system and working instead to
make our own stagnate and slowly putrefy. Normative humanism would require us to
occasionally reassess on a regular basis and adjust as needed. Climate ethicists, many of which
are calling for such a reassessment regarding the environment, fail to understand that the
reassessment needs to be socially ubiquitous.
A quick example of such an outmoded concept is that of equality. Without an appropriate
negation to our negation, if you will, what we see is mass confusion. Equality during the French
Revolution might have meant something along the lines of one human not being existentially
superior to another, i.e. a type of solidarity/brotherly love, injected with an admixture of
skepticism. However, what we see in the current political climate is the prevailing idea that
everyone’s subjective opinion is on par with everyone else’s. Thus, a student is equal to a
professor, a patient equal to a doctor, a politician equal to a scientist, and an intellectual buffoon
equal to an erudite. The virtue of equality has taken on a different meaning, one that ultimately
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led to the demise of authoritative bodies initially put in place as an invaluable guide for the
benefit of humanity. Ruth Nanda Anshen manages to encapsulate the idea quite accurately in the
introduction to Fromm’s To Have or to Be (1976), writing, “For when equality is equated with
interchangeability, individuality is negated and the human person transmuted into a faceless
mask.”394 Hence, a similar revisiting needs to be had with concepts such as freedom, enterprise,
and our relationship with nature.
Fromm writes almost prophetically,
Suppose that in our Western culture movies, radios, television, sports events and
newspapers ceased to function for only four weeks. With these main avenues of escape
closed, what would be the consequences for people thrown back upon their own
resources? I have no doubt that even in this short time thousands of nervous breakdowns
would occur, and many more thousands of people would be thrown into a state of acute
anxiety, no different from the picture which is diagnosed clinically as “neurosis.” If the
opiate against the socially patterned defect were withdrawn, the manifest illness would
make its appearance. 395

Mental health then is a type of interactive result maintained both by the individual and society; a
responsibility that involves the practice of life as it manifests and results from the conditions of
human existence.
As noted earlier, this all depends on an interdependent responsibility to see the fruition of
psychic health by fostering an environment that aids in the overcoming of narcissism and
394
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alienation, 396 since mental sickness is a fixation or regression that belongs to a former
evolutionary state. This, of course, becomes a key responsibility when considered from the point
of view of our cultural, economic, and political trajectory—whether conscious or otherwise. He
notes that evolution, for human beings, “is the result of cultural development, and not of an
organic change.”397 In such an interaction, society can actively assist in generating healthy
mental states or alternatively, work to hinder their development. For Fromm, societies, by and
large, actively do both. The question simply becomes “to what degree and in what directions
their positive and negative influence is exercised.” 398 The idea being, to foster its members to
achieve a sense of identity and independence and to overcome any hostile tendencies, allowing
for a capacity of thriving and a peaceful coexistence individually, communally, and
environmentally.
Such a situation may be dismissed as too idealistic, for it does not adequately factor in the
‘true’ nature of humanity. A survey of human aggression, whether it be of the benign or
malignant sort, is out of the range of this dissertation. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that Fromm
attributes malignant aggression—aggressive action taken that is not defensive, accidental,
playful, or self-assertive but that is peculiar to human beings in that it does not serve the survival
of man but is instead an unhealthy substitute for the continuation of mental functioning 399—to a
more severe manifestation of the non-productive character. Neuroses and pathological psyches
are expressions of hopelessness (or the loss thereof) and is met with man’s need for
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stimulation.400 Wherein destructiveness is the alternative to hope, just as attraction to death is the
alternative to the love of life, and just as joy is the alternative to boredom. 401 Fromm further
illustrates the point saying,

Not only does the individual live by hope. Nations and social classes live through hope,
faith, and fortitude, and if they lose this potential they disappear—either by their lack of
vitality or by the irrational destructiveness which they develop. 402

So long as a society supplies an outlet for the character rooted passions of its members that is
conducive to and aids in the fostering of narcissism, alienation and abstractification, a society is
unlikely to achieve individuals who encompass a productive orientation and willfully participate
as a unified collective; this will be the subject of the next section.
Section II: Diagnostics on the Way to the Productive Orientation
While it is possible to stabilize a society that exhibits traits of a socially patterned defect,
introducing new dilemmas external to it will invariably shake its foundations and potentially
yield system collapse. The issue of sustainability is not only limited to hard planetary and
ecological boundaries but more importantly pertains to a mental state capable of maximal
resilience; this involves and depends on a dynamic flexibility contingent upon interdependent
cooperation. Such fluidity can be achieved only if the comportment of individuals within
differing societies is expressive and reflective of a mindset that is rooted in broad values such as
400
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objectivity and solidarity. Objective reasoning and solidarity of which need to be governed by a
patience based on achieving an ‘optimal’ truth instead of an authoritarian absolute truth; such a
disposition is aligned with the productive orientation. However, before this orientation can be
positively realized, there are many (likely) obstacles for a society to overcome during its
evolution.
Values give way to, though no less significant, specific traits, such as solidarity and
brotherly love, which are brought about by an education and political system that actively fosters
care, compassion, emotional awareness of the self, and patience. Thus, environmental factors
such as practical behavior influences and gives rise to a mindset that in turn manifests itself in
reflective behavior. Speaking to ancient consanguinity between man’s inherent traits, a system
onto itself, and its interconnectedness to external systems—society and its relationship to
nature—Fromm writes,

While it is true that man can adapt himself to almost any conditions, he is not a blank
sheet of paper on which culture writes its text. Needs like the striving for happiness,
harmony, love and freedom are inherent in his nature. They are also dynamic factors in
the historical process which, if frustrated, tend to arouse psychic reactions, ultimately
creating the very conditions suited to the original strivings [i.e. regressed stages]. As long
as the objective conditions of the society and the culture remain stable, the social
character has a predominantly stabilizing function. If the external conditions change in
such a way that they do not fit any more with the traditional social character, a lag arises
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which often changes the function of character into an element of disintegration instead of
stabilization, into dynamite instead of social mortar, as it were.403

Let us quickly examine and example to better illustrate the point—solely focusing on the
negative attributes of a capitalistic society for the sake of argument—the example being the
radical shift that eighteenth century capitalism had to undergo in order to facilitate fluid
participation and fully transition from the feudal enclosures. Economic behavior had to become
“separate from ethics and human values.” 404 The appropriate axiomatic assumptions had to be
put in place that what was good for growth of the system was also good for the people. Hence, an
auxiliary construction was also necessary to enable this mindset that in turn enabled the qualities
required for the smooth function of the system—those being, egotism, selfishness, and greed,
which were to be understood as innate in human nature, hence “not only the system but human
nature itself fostered”405 such qualities and behavior.406 Not only had these traits come to be
considered as the cornerstone of human essence, but by 1964 they were heralded as a form of
righteousness in Ayn Rand’s The Virtue of Selfishness.407
Traits such as those just mentioned are, according to Fromm’s humanism, symptomatic
of regressed non-productive personalities that should be actively engaged and transitioned into
productive qualities. He warns that, with respect to narcissism, there “is probably no entity that is
more significant and more basic in the production of mental illness.” 408 Narcissism is a type of
403
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solipsistic attitude where one’s subjective understanding i.e. one’s personal feelings, physical
needs, psychical needs, etc., are interpreted as though they are objective and are, in addition,
given greater consideration and prioritization than the needs of others. Narcissism precludes the
individual from conceiving of and emotionally extending toward anything external to himself;
one’s conception of what is external to him is solely perceived via intellectual affectation and
devoid of a genuine emotional connection. This especially becomes problematic when it changes
from individual narcissism to group narcissism. Such a transfer in mindset is conducive and
directly responsible for “religious hatred and nationalism,” akin to tribal identity. This invites
individuals devoid of income, education, security, etc., to attach themselves to a group since
maintaining their own individual narcissism would be particularly difficult. Maintaining one’s
individual narcissism in such instances would more likely reveal a defect but attaching oneself to
a group where one can maintain his narcissism while having it normalized by group leaders,
group members, or any other contributing factors to the ideological echo chamber, would prevent
him from showing any immediate psychological defect and assume a life of relative normalcy—
so long as the system is not disturbed.
When we speak of overcoming such a tendency, it is important, once again, to recall the
spectrum from which it operates. Thus, narcissism can be expressed in a malignant fashion such
as the traits described above. In other words, the person whose narcissism is directed toward
himself, one’s body, one’s mind, one’s attitude, feelings, interests, etc. The immediate attributes
of the individual are what matter most and are the only “real” or genuine factors when assessing
how the world works and functions. Such a person is separated from reason, love, and his fellow
man, and hence, as a consequence of not being able to function with a measure of objectivity and
consideration of others, is considered to be severely sick according to the clinical
182

psychologist.409 Conversely, benign narcissism is “not directed toward a particular area”410 but is
rather focused an accomplishment or achievement. Hence, it takes on secondary characteristics
where, though a person must point to something in order to sustain his identity, he nevertheless
must create a part of himself first. Though not ideal, this form of narcissism is a step removed
from malignancy and a step toward overcoming the pathology.
A further (and greater) impediment to the productive orientation is alienation.411 In a
nutshell, Fromm describes alienation as a “central problem” of mental health and defines it as an
“alienation from ourselves, from our feelings, from people and from nature; or…the alienation
between ourselves and the world inside and outside ourselves.”412 Keep in mind that, similar to
narcissism, alienation also leads to a processing problem; one that prevents the individual from
adequately forming healthy ties with others and strips him of the ability to take into
consideration people he does not know or that relate to him directly. Thus, what we consistently
see in Fromm’s humanism is a philosophy that it is centered on bonding and interaction.
People who bond because of insecurity tend to form a dependency that can become
unhealthy, others, due to fear, withdraw and can only connect with those they feel they have a
measure of situational control over. Narcissism is a great example of a defect that can convert
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from an individualistic solipsism to group think thereby shedding light on socially patterned
defects.
Alienation is quite different. Though it too affects the individual and garners similar
outcomes with respect to psychologically patterned ailments, the process of alienation appears to
be more insidious in that it seems to only be possible should a person be bereft of self-awareness.
Not that a narcissist does possess awareness, but a narcissist in many ways can manage to stave
off the loss of identity due to social pressures. While the problem of the narcissist is perhaps too
much identity, one that prevents him from factoring in others accordingly, the alienated being not
only suffers from a loss of genuine freedom and identity, but is additionally removed from his
motives and how they became his to begin with. The danger of the past was that man would
become a slave; the danger of the future is that he will become a robot.
The problem of social relatedness becomes compounded when you take a group of
people comprised of non-productive orientations, who all think the same; they can easily become
conformed to totalitarian social structures while believing themselves to be independent thinkers,
free, and happy. An ignorance can become so deeply rooted that “even the threat to the future of
their grandchildren does not genuinely affect them…The fate of humanity is…little their
concern.”413 You end up with a major conundrum: man does not need to be free; he need only
believe that he is. What you get in turn is a slave who will kill in order to remain on the
plantation in what he believes to be a willful state of happiness. 414 With alienation, the death of
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an authentic identity, the very kernel of human potentiality and self-empowerment, are
increasingly snuffed out.415
Furthermore, the worry discussed above is brought about by in an increase of thinking in
terms of abstractification, or, to think of something in an abstract way as opposed to
concretely—in economic terms, one sees objects or experiences in terms of their worth in
exchange value as opposed to experiential or use value. One’s identity, at its worst, instead of
being easily indoctrinated, can instead become the amorphous personality of the marketing
character orientation where people do not only sell their physical power, their skillset, their
intellect but often sell their personalities based on the reaction of others. One’s sense of personal
value is relegated to the consumer, the employer, the authoritarian figure that dispenses with
approval or disapproval.

The whole sense of value of an individual—if one will call it an individual—depends on
whether he is salable or not, whether there is a demand for him or not. For this reason this
sense of self, his sense of inner confidence never depends on the appreciation of his real

There is a distinction in Fromm’s conception of freedom between the ‘freedom from’ and the ‘freedom to.’ The
former encompasses a more traditional understanding such as the emancipation from social restrictions e.g.
authoritarian governments. Often though, when man is free, he becomes hopeless and despondent. A ‘freedom to,’
man’s qualities that allows lends him authenticity and the ability to overcome authoritative oversight, is required if
man is going to truly inherit independence. According to Fromm, this latter step is very difficult for man, often
forcing him to unite with other ideologies and groups that will eliminate the demand for critical thinking and will
simply give him such a way to be. Pertaining to the individual, Fromm writes: We can use the concept ‘freedom’ in
two different senses: In one, freedom [to] is an attitude, an orientation, part of the character structure of the mature,
fully developed, productive person. … Freedom in this sense has a reference to…to the character structure of the
person involved; and in this sense the person who ‘is not free to choose evil’ is the completely free person. ― The
second meaning of freedom [from] (has to do with) the capacity to make a choice between opposite alternatives;
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choose, while it is precisely the average man with contradictory inclinations, for whom the problem of freedom of
choice exists.” (Fromm, The Heart of Man. Its Genius for Good and Evil (New York, Harper and Row, 1964) 132.
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concrete qualities, intelligence, honesty, integrity, his humor, anything he is, but on
whether or not he succeeds in selling himself. Therefore, of course he is always insecure,
always dependent on success, and gets frantically insecure if this success is not
forthcoming. 416

Given such severance between one’s intellect and emotive capacities, the psychic ‘health’ of the
individual remains tethered to the confines of the ‘flavor of the day’ and his creative power is
actively exercised in such a way so as to generate approval; a further symptom of alienated
feelings and sentiments. The alienated being yields a lack of introspective capabilities, which
further yields three primary problems that prevent the attainment of a socially productive
orientation: the problems of vitalism, boredom, and relatedness.
With respect to vitalism, Fromm asks, “what is the source of energy from which we
live?”417 Though a bit of an awkward and irregular question, it is nevertheless poignant and quite
apropos to living a fruitful life. Rewording for clarity, we might ask where do humans draw
energy from? The immediate and instinctive response defaults to physical means. For example,
we retrieve our energy from food, from sleep, from exercise, etc. Fromm notes that, regardless of
our dependency on the physical to physiological transmutation as a necessary source of energy,
our energy levels begin to drop after the age of twenty-five or so. We must therefore find an
alternative source from which to draw our energy from and that source is often found in our
interactions. Joy, energy, and happiness, all depend on the degree with which we are related to
others.
416
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Our ability to be concerned, involved, and actively engaged, often produces a surge of
energy and excitement. To do so also requires that we be in touch with “our feelings, with the
reality of other people” and “not experience them as abstractions which we can look at as
commodities at the market.” In this case people would serve no purpose other than to be
objectified, whether it would be for our own gratuitous amusement, the vapid and vacuous
hoarding of ‘experiences,’ the ascension of a social hierarchy of one type or another, etc.
Genuine interactions that manage to replenish the spirit and fill us with motivation and
excitement can only be fostered in unalienated relatedness. Where “I am I and I am the other
person.” And where “I become one with the object of my concern, but in this process, I
experience myself also as a subject.”418 Existential vitality therefore requires a type of invested
playfulness.
Moreover, the members of alienated societies where people experience all things in life
as an abstraction instead of something concrete, often find themselves at the mercy of boredom.
Boredom, according to Fromm, is “one of the great evils that can befall man” since there are
only a “few things which are as terrifying and unbearable as being bored,” 419 adding that, “the
disease from which modern man suffers is alienation.”420 In fact, this pervades society so deeply
that it pathologically adheres to the verisimilar maxim, one of the many axioms considered
indispensable to the functioning of contemporary socioeconomic culture, that man is lazy by
nature. To combat his innate boredom, the commonly accepted maxim gives way to concepts
such as the need for hedonistically positive incentives like money, status, fame, etc. Equally
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important, if not more-so, are disincentives such as hunger, homelessness, and a loss of options,
each of which plays the part of the silent threat on the reverse side of the incentivization coin.
With this view, work is not something one naturally does but is instead something one is socially
compelled or coerced into doing.421
This assumes that without incentives or disincentives, society’s incessant march toward
greater heights and more ‘progress’ would grind to a halt from an innate predilection to lie on a
couch, sleep all day, and forever take the path of least resistance. From this axiom, the
subsequent ontological inference is made that man as a being is intrinsically indolent and passive
and hence, his motivations derive primarily from extrinsic stimuli. 422 The contemporary
description of man’s unwillingness or inability to generate action motivated from an internal
energetic force—a force of self and from self—unless obligated to, bound by, or forced by
external factors and the fulfillment of basic biological needs, is juxtaposed with society’s
conception of work. That work is ipso facto disagreeable and unpleasant, and consequently leads
to boredom. Thus, the feedback loop of incentives and disincentives comes full circle. Fromm
succinctly illustrates the point writing,

Whether it is physical discomfort or the psychical discomfort of boredom, both sides,
workers and employers, agreed that work was by necessity unpleasant, and that in order
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to motivate the worker to function at all he needed to be threatened with starvation; and
in order to make him work better and more productively one needed to reward him by
higher wages and A? shorter working day. 423

Boredom,424 a sure sign of inadequate or unfitting stimulation, frequently presents a
person with a potentially insidious set of options—having the need to occupy that existential
lacunae by filling it with deleterious substitutes in order to achieve a state of fulfillment. This
need for appropriate stimulation can be analyzed as a matter of a healthy oriented motivator. For
example, boredom can be divided into three categories: (1) people who are capable of
responding productively to activating stimuli, or the non-bored person; (2) people who are in
constant need of a shift and change in stimuli—what Fromm calls “flat” stimuli—but manage to
compensate for the boredom in such a way that they are unaware of it, otherwise understood as
those who are chronically bored; and (3) people who fail in any attempt to obtain excitation via
normal means of stimulation, or are sick or pathologically disturbed.
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The last type is described by Fromm as being in a state of chronic depression, whether
conscious or unconscious. This pathology can ultimately become a catalyst for malignant, cruel,
and destructive action. Accordingly, the second type of boredom can be compensated by
sufficient external stimulation; the last is incapable of being compensated at all. While we can
ascribe three types of (in)activity to some measure of spectral health, whereby the first would be
healthiest and the third pathological, the vast majority of people often fall into the second
category. Fromm notes that the “majority [of persons], while not suffering from a grave illness,
can be nevertheless considered suffering from a milder form of pathology: insufficient inner
productivity.”425 Boredom is often prevented by substituting an unearthed “activating” stimulus
from one’s inner and natural creative nature, in exchange for more ephemeral short burst
excitation or “simple stimulus,” with potentially detrimental, long lasting consequences. 426
The alienated being, then, ceases to see himself as the center of his activity and the
creative source of his existential impetus. Where narcissism is the opposite of relatedness such
that an inability to consider the ‘other,’ alienation begins with the inability to relate to oneself.
This has larger consequences, as one’s relationship with just about anything can become skewed
and a certain ‘numbness’ can set in it. Fromm discusses an extreme instance of alienation using
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A. Eichmann as a prime example in order to show how boredom can escalate to indifference by
becoming melancholic—a pathological state of boredom. 427 He writes that Eichmann

did not give the impression of being particularly evil; rather, he is entirely alienated. He
is a bureaucrat to whom it makes no particular difference whether he kills, or whether he
takes care of, small children. For him, life has completely stopped being something alive.
He “organizes.” Organization becomes an end in itself, whether it has to do with the gold
teeth or the hair of murdered humans or whether it is railroad trains or tons of coal. When
Eichmann defends himself and states that he is only a bureaucrat and has, in reality, only
regulated trains and worked out schedules, then he is not altogether off the mark. I
believe that there is a bit of Eichmann in us all today. 428

As with Eichmann, alienation is modernity’s great salubrious obstacle requiring urgent
attention. What makes alienation such a social detriment is that it actively constricts and
obstructs access to the universal and emotional objectivity. For instance, just as a lack of
information impedes one’s procurement of knowledge—since half the battle is awareness and
insight into critical thinking—alienation behaves in a similar fashion, preventing emotional
awareness and the ability to empathize. While reason is bound by objective laws, humanism
holds the same for emotion, and what expressly allows for the grounding of emotion objectively
is love. Without loving productively, a person fails to be objective and remains emotionally
cloistered and socially beholden to culturally subjective authoritarian values. Hence, to overcome
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the social problem of alienation is to be able to engage the world in an impartial fashion by
achieving a productive orientation, for “in the experience of love lies sanity” 429 and “the
overcoming of human separateness.” 430
The productive orientation is a particular outlook that gives way to the being mode of
living; a biophilic mindset that yields biophilic behavior. In short though, they are one and the
same. Essentially, all human needs listed by Fromm—the need to be rooted and related, the need
for creativity, an identity and a frame of orientation—are addressed with a specific mindset that
‘produces’ specific activity (to be discussed in detail in the following section). There is a
difficulty in its description. Fromm himself often discussed this orientation by pointing to other
philosophical texts to make his point;431 his language, additionally, was vague and generalized,
allowing Noam Chomsky to critique his work as ”superficial.” 432 Regardless, Fromm was in fact
attempting to describe something missing in the 20 th century. While previous centuries had
always placed a great deal of effort at describing a utopian vision, or what precisely a good
society should be, the 20th (and even current) century was and “is conspicuous for the absence of
such visions.”433 There is, for Fromm, an emphasis, if not a down right fixation, on critical
analysis of concepts, man, society—all of which are necessary—but are similarly devoid of an
explicit account of mankind’s transformative and evolutionary aspirations. 434 As a result, Fromm
attempts to lend the reader this necessary description of a productive character to assist by filling
in the hyper-analytic blind-spot with a humanistic account.
429
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The most salient feature about the productive orientation can be best described as a
realization of an individual, i.e. a fully mature being. This means a few things: Maturity, first, is
the manner with which a person is related to the world; second, the manner with which a person
is related to themselves; and third, the synchronization of the two that results in the being mode
of living. The difficulty here is the separation of each of these three motions. While we can
discuss them separately for the purpose of a more practical consideration, Fromm would likely
concede that this would be quite an impossible feat to accomplish in actuality, where there is
likely to be cognitive dissonance in a non-productive personality since often what they think,
feel, understand, and are aware of, are different from what they outwardly express; the
productive orientation is best described as an honest orientation. One cannot treat the internal
and external in such a being as though they are separate. Colloquially speaking, ‘what you see is
what you get.’ While other orientations can often “mask” themselves, a person who is of a
productive character becomes “unmasked.” 435
Fromm, at the start of the chapter “What is the Being Mode?” in To Have or to Be?,
describes the concept of persona like a mask we wear—our ego. A persona, therefore, is
describable where, in contrast, an actual living being is not describable. It is not a “thing” as the
persona is. Each living person is as unique as “fingerprints,” since the ability to produce—and
simultaneously reveal—an identity stems from one’s ability to be creative and freely express
oneself. 436 The being mode is one where the persona is stripped and is replaced by a being that
simultaneously encompasses unique traits while being fluid in his honest expression, hence lithe
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in character. The synchronicity between mindset and an activity as a univocal expression is what
makes this orientation difficult to ‘pin down.’
Regardless of such difficulties, what is more easily explained is its quality of relatedness.
As discussed throughout the course of this dissertation—along with why humanism is an
essential addition to climate philosophy—is the importance of how humanity manages to relate
to itself and the natural world around it. The ancient Hermetic principle of correspondence, “As
above, so below; as below, so above. As within, so without; as without, so within,” is a concise
and accurate way of understanding the importance of relatedness and its impact. If the internal
life is neglected, external life will suffer for it. If external life is suffrage, then internal life will
be neglected.437 At least, that is the humanistic premise. The productive orientation then
possesses biophilic attributes that allow for biophilic behavior since they are correspondingly
relational. This is why Fromm talks about love as “the only path to sanity.” 438
Using love to better illustrate the relationship between mindset and activity, and to further
explicate the synchronous yet creatively manifold relationship between the two, one would make
a mistake in thinking that it is separate from an activity or that it is a ‘feeling.’ That by attaining
love, you can therefore acquire whatever it is that love promises through some type of
instantaneous magic. This would be akin to a person willing to learn how to play music if they
first come to possess an amazing instrument that will indefinitely imbue them with the
inspiration to do so. Furthermore, the attainment of love is spontaneous in nature. For Fromm,
love is “not natural” but rather a culmination of “discipline, concentration, patience, faith, and
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the overcoming of narcissism.” 439 To be able to love means that one must already possess
particular prerequisite characteristics that would enable a person to perform the act. Hence, love
is something that requires both mindset and activity in order to be able to adequately bridge the
gap between I and thou.
Moreover, love is paradoxical in nature. In order to graduate to a productive orientation
one must overcome the problems of existence by solving the problem of his separateness,
lostness, and powerlessness. It is by understanding and living this concept that we can begin to
overcome the problem of existence. In non-productive orientations one attempts to shed his fear
of these horrors of man by becoming one with the world and by submitting to a person, an
institution, a nation, an idol, etc., essentially, by becoming part of something that is bigger than
himself and potentially ‘losing’ himself in the process. Conversely, a person can also attempt to
unite himself with the world by having power over it and making others a part of himself,
thereby transcending his individual existence by lording it over others.440 Attempting to solve the
problem of the passions in the symbiotic sadomasochistic fashion will ultimately fail the test of
long-term sustainability since it is at the expense of the integrity and independence of all parties
involved in the dynamic.
The non-productive persons involved “live on each other and from each other, satisfying
their craving for closeness, yet suffering from the lack of inner strength and self-reliance.”441 A
genuine mastery over the character rooted passions can only be achieved through love and the
recognition of its universal and objective qualities. That if “I truly love one person I love all
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persons, I love the world, I love life” and if a person believes that they love someone, then they
“must be able to say, ‘I love in you everybody, I love through you the world, I love in you also
myself.”442 The paradox is that the condition for the ability to love is the ability to be alone. 443
One can only truly love if he has managed to overcome and transcend the problem of his
existence. In such an instance, love itself is not a relationship one person has with a specific
other person but it “is an attitude, an orientation of character.”444 In other words, it is the
productive orientation. It is precisely this type of paradoxical Gordian knot that makes this
orientation hard to describe. If I were to say that in order for me to relate to others, I must first be
able to relate to myself, and in order for me to love others, I must first love myself, there appears
to be some (specious) order or precise account for attaining productive virtue. Likewise, the
conditional statements can be compounded in complexity by further adding to it the problem of
sequential definitions in that I can further suggest that in order to relate to myself and love
myself, I would first need to know what it means to relate, to love, and, more problematically, to
know what I am—as a being, as an individual, as a member of a group. This quickly becomes an
epistemological nightmare since in such an example, knowledge, outlook, and practice all go
hand-in-hand. They cannot be separated. If one shifts, they all shift. This is both a bug and a
feature of humanism, making it simultaneously necessary and yet difficult to attain.
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Moreover, to say that there is a specific sequence regarding what knowledge an
individual must first possess in order to execute virtuous action is also impossible since mindset
behaves as a syndrome. Thus, in order for me to relate, I must be able to relate to others as well
as myself, simultaneously. Through this dualistic interaction, what is being learned is
relatedness; one does not come ‘before’ any other; all components come together in flux. As the
previous chapter discussed, non-productive orientations blend together to form a syndrome
comprised of varying orientations (including the productive) intertwined together; the
manifestation of the productive orientation is similar in nature. In love for example, “beyond the
element of giving,”445 the active character in the being mode of living, “implies certain basic
elements, common to all forms of love.” 446 The implicit elements one must possess are care,
responsibility, respect, and knowledge. While they are the fundamental building blocks to being
able to love, they are also some of the key ways by which love can come to be expressed. The
productive orientation then is expressly different from the non-productive orientations, as it is a
syndrome of biophilic activity—a concept that, if extrapolated, applies to all of nature.
Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to transition the discussion of Fromm’s Humanism from a
healthy mindset to healthy behavior. In the fourth chapter, there was an exposition of Fromm’s
philosophy, a description of his ontology of man—necessary for an ethical foundation and
direction—and a detailed account of varying non-productive orientations. The aim of this chapter
was to finally arrive at a description of the more elusive productive orientation. Additionally,
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while attempting to finally flesh out a definition of a healthy mindset, the first section,
“Humanistic Productiveness,” examined ethics through a historical significance in an
overarching endeavor to ground the behavior and activity of contemporary society; a society
rooted in the having mode of living. Thus, there was also a shift in focus that transitioned from
the individual mindset of the fourth chapter to a more collective mindset. The second section,
“Diagnostics on the Way to the Productive Orientation,” in an attempt to answer the question
posed in the preliminary section to this chapter i.e. Are we sane?, discussed the collective
psychic pitfalls of contemporary society in the form of narcissism, alienation, and
abstractification along with their derivational issues of vitalism, boredom, and relatedness. The
result was that any society that fosters this sort of emotional shunting readily qualifies as insane
since it bars itself from being able to adequately relate to others or to effectively motivate one’s
self. Finally, productive and non-productive orientations were discussed side by side in order to
make each of their distinct qualities more salient, therefore shedding more light on the mindset of
healthy behavior.
The next chapter will begin where this one leaves off, dealing with a continued transition from
mindset to behavior and working its way toward Fromm’s opposing dichotomies from the having
mode to the being mode of existence. This mode of living will be described and expressed
through the presentation of several practical examples. These examples will not only illustrate
the being mode but also serve as examples of how humanistic values can serve to solve the
fundamental issues of our relationships as individuals nestled within the context of society and
societies nestled within the context of a planet. In other words, humanism implores us to observe
and readjust our grasp of relational dynamics.
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Chapter 6: A Giant Leaf for Mankind
This chapter aims to discuss Fromm’s dichotomized modes of living: the having versus
the being modes. I will begin this section with a brief account of excitation and stimulation—
having already touched upon the concept of our need to perpetually feed off of and draw energy
from external circumstances and conditions—in the second section of the last chapter. The
intention is to segue into how such energy is used, dispersed, and expended in thought and action
of both the having and being mode of life. After a detailed exposition of the having mode of
experience, there will be a brief consideration of solutions indicative of an alternative mindset
from the one exemplified by the analytic climate ethicists surveyed in part I of the dissertation
e.g. a sketch of where Broome and his methodology best fit into the application of the given
moral schemas. The goal is to show how the climate philosophers previously discussed fail to
live up to the Herculean task of the type of revolution required to achieve genuine sustainability
despite what they say being of genuine benefit. Finally, I will conclude by presenting Fromm’s
being mode of experience, advocating for a cultural and socioeconomic aim guided by health and
normative humanism.
Section I: (Anti)Humanistic Behavior
The last chapter transitioned from the four specific (necrophilic) non-productive
orientations of the fourth chapter by weaving individual personae with aggregate dynamics and
outcomes; calling for an overcoming of narcissism and alienation and the adoption of more
biophilic qualities. The idea was to delineate and further establish the relevance, effect, and
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relation between our internal life to the external world. The last section ended with an account of
the last orientation: the (biophilic) productive orientation. The intention was to begin the
transition from individual to group dynamics and from mindset to behavior.
The need for stimulation was briefly touched upon in the last chapter in the form of
“simple” versus “active” stimulation and its relationship to boredom. The idea is that if an
individual is not appropriately stimulated, his expulsion of energy will espouse unhealthy
tendencies—boredom being a leading factor in depression and psychic pathology. Apposite
energy retrieval and expulsion is paramount to the well-functioning of the individual and society
alike. Where and how we give our due attention becomes responsible for where we draw our
existential vitality since, as previously mentioned, it cannot be solely sustained through physical
means, especially with the increase of age. Therefore, it is important to delve a little deeper into
the distinction between the simple and active forms of stimulation and to discuss their impact on
and implementation of character orientations, world views, and cultural outlook in order to
complete our transition from (internal) mental states to (external) behavioral patterns. Continuing
our discussion between the having and being modes of living, while chapter 4 discussed these in
terms of an individual’s mental state and activity, 447 this final chapter will focus more on these
behaviors on a societal level. The idea is to conclude with some concrete examples of the
efficacy of productive models in the following last section.
Plainly put, just as Fromm deals with all matters of his ideas as a spectrum bound
between and regulated by dichotomized extremes, the basic outline remains the same for
excitation/stimulation. Frommian humanism maintains that life and stimulation go hand-in-hand.
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He cites examples of research conducted by a neurologist Ivan Sechenov, a Russian scientist
whose Reflexes of the Brain (1863) was one of the first to document sources suggesting that the
“brain is not merely reactive to outside stimuli” but “is itself spontaneously active.”448 He goes
on to further cite that “the brain consumes oxygen at a rate comparable to that of active muscle,”
essentially saying that a high rate of oxygen consumption is short lived in active muscles while
the nervous system has a high demand for it, whether physically active or asleep. 449 Moreover,
he shows that certain metrics such as dreaming, brain size and weight, an infant’s need for
stimulation, and simple “observations of daily life,” are evident in organisms, both human as
well as animal, that “are in need of a certain minimum of excitation and stimulation, as they are
of a certain minimum of rest.”450 Given the evidence Fromm presents, the axiom that ‘man is in
need of stimulation’ seems fairly well-secured, which, if true, permits one to ask: what type of
stimulation?
Considering the stimulative spectrum, stimulation in general is required for man to a)
function while or a particular type of excitation is necessary for man to b) flourish before ‘opting
out.’ Thus, we have simple stimulation on one end and active stimulation on the other. There is
the additional type of ‘stimulation’ that is achieved by the productive personality but one might
hesitate to call it stimulation since “the person who is fully alive does not necessarily need any
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particular outside stimulus to be activated; in fact, he creates his own stimuli.” 451 The “alive
person” is a type of self-propelling wheel who can take interest in all manner of things and is not
dependent on external stimulus to achieve satisfaction.
Keep in mind that both types are extrinsic in nature and apply to the non-productive
individual that has yet to achieve self-dependency, always in need of others to provide it for
them. This is important because, as previously mentioned, being able to be actively engaged
instead of passively dependent is an autonomy achieved in maturation and the final stage in
biophilic development. Self-endowed curiosity is something that needs to be re-learned, as it is
observed in children but “after the age of six…become[s] docile, unspontaneous, and passive”
where they prefer to be “stimulated in such a way that they can remain passive and only ’react’.”452
The relevance of appropriate excitation follows the same pattern: Internal life affects the
individual; the individual affects his surroundings and, reciprocally, surroundings affect the
individual, in turn affecting his inner life. What makes this excitation particularly significant is
that it is responsible for generating drives:453 the motivating forces that provoke, inspire, call to
act, etc. How an individual becomes accustomed to being stimulated can in time condition him to
seek particular pleasures and abstain from particular perceived pains. On a macro level, how a
society stimulates its members will affect their overall development, the habits they develop, and
the ends they seek.
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Simple excitation is solely based on a basic and immediate stimulus rooted in
neurophysiological organization. Excitation is therefore “reflex-like” and short-lived. 454
Simple/flat stimuli are responsible for the classic ‘fight or flight’ response (stemming from an
immediate threat or danger), but are also produced by other biological needs such as hunger or
even sex. In such instances, the person is said to be reactive in that he is responding to a bodily
stimulus but he is not acting—by which is meant that “he does not actively integrate any
response beyond the minimum activity necessary to run away, attack, or become sexually
excited.”455 Thus, the brain and the physiological apparatus acts for man.
Conversely, an active stimulus causes a person to be active as opposed to being acted
upon. This involves a measure of creativity and self-control. Supposing, for example, that a
person might be faced with a situation that involves an immediate threat or danger, one can forgo
the biologically inclined, fight, flight, or freeze reaction, substituting it instead with other types
of defense mechanisms such as a joke to diffuse a given situation. Laughter, embarrassment,
shame, active-passivity, a menacing calm, or a reaction that involves an amalgam of multiple
reactions that may assist in not only diffusing a situation but perhaps even gaining one the upper
hand, are all examples of alternative and creative reactions. Danger aside, active stimuli can be
anything that inspires personal engagement—it “invites you to respond by actively and
sympathetically relating yourself.” It inspires an interest and a type of spontaneity that is seen in
play.
Active stimulation is responsible for creating a relationship between you and the object or
person you are engaging with. This does a couple of things: first, the object or person is no
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longer merely something external to you that is ‘flat’ or ‘mute’ but rather is something that has a
direct access to your inner self. There is a relationship of mutual affectedness often producing a
heightened level of enthusiasm, awareness, and awakeness. 456 As a result, the barrier between
subject and object is a bit more diaphanous and therefore permeable. Second, such interactions
often involve a greater degree of vulnerability—this means that as one impacts a someone or
something, they are mutually allowing for them to be impacted upon. This allows for further
insight into oneself since in such a behavioral freestyle you might creatively speak or behave in
ways one might not have not previously orchestrated; importantly, in doing so, one is partaking
in momentary self-creation. As I act, so I become. As the internal is the creative force, the
external is the representing manifestation. The essential difference is that while simple stimulus
produces a biological drive, an active stimulus results in a striving where a goal can be
considered and incorporated into an authentic development of one’s character.
Broadly speaking, assuming that excitement and stimulation matters, then we can more
aptly take note of the type of stimulation society we are confronted with in contemporary society.
Speaking of life in industrial societies in 1973, Fromm writes that they “operate almost entirely
on simple stimuli.”457 Given a society that promotes and fosters an environment based on simple
stimuli, the motivating drives produced are mainly “sexual desire, greed, sadism, destructiveness,
[and] narcissism,” which are mediated through “movies, television, radio, newspapers,
magazines and the commodity market.”458 With the propagation of maladaptive behaviors, short
term gains are idolized and the power to procure instantaneous passive satisfaction of one’s
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impulsive wants and cravings is glorified as an end in itself. Such matters of short lived
excitement actively prevent long-term existential satisfaction since simple stimuli, when repeated
beyond a certain threshold, “lose their stimulating effect…due to a neurophysiological principle
of economy that eliminates the awareness of stimuli that indicate by their repetitiveness that they
are not important.”459 This leaves the individual to either increase the stimulus in order to
achieve the original level of excitation or to change the source (and type) of stimulus. A certain
level of “novelty” is required. 460
Ultimately, this can create a populace that is alienated—who cannot know themselves
since they are perpetually acted upon and are always in search of new sources of stimulation as
though they are mere objects whose sole purpose is to provide optimal stimulation in a socially
idolized form. Furthermore, people who are dependent on simple stimuli can also become
stunted in ways of learning and receiving new forms of information, in what they find to be
useful, advantageous, and worthwhile. In addition, they would also suffer from a lack of follow
through, patience, perseverance, often demanding quick results along with a quick release of
emotions. Such a society as chronically bored yet inured and unaware of their pathology of
normalcy—not being experienced as a pathology since it is shared as a socially patterned
defect.461 Stimulation and excitation therefore become two of the essential factors for generating
conditions that are conducive to mental states prone to destructiveness and cruelty since “it is
much easier to get excited by anger, rage, cruelty, or the passion to destroy than by love and
productive and active interest.”462 The former does not require the individual to make any kind of
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effort of excitation while the latter requires one to have a certain level of “patience and
discipline, a willingness to learn, the ability to concentrate, to endure frustration, to practice
critical thinking, as well as to overcome one’s narcissism and greed. 463 People dependent on
simple stimuli are even likely to remain in ‘worst case scenario’ situations simply because these
provide a constant flow of novelty and further simple stimulation, despite being antithetical to
personal growth and flourishing.
Industrial societies today seem to have two distinct value systems designated as
conscious and ineffective versus unconscious and effective. The conscious values are those of a
humanistic and religious tradition such as individuality, love, care, faith, etc. These values,
Fromm contends, “have become ideologies for most people and are not effective in motivating
human behavior.”464 It is, instead, the unconscious values that have become responsible for
directing and motivating the social system of “the bureaucratic, industrial, property,
consumption, social position, fun, excitement, and so on.”465 Fromm categorizes this set of
values, and their adherents, in what he calls the having mode of living, or the having orientation.
This mode of existing is an outlook—a characterological comportment that serves to generate a
unconscious understanding of the world. This understanding, generated from the value schemas
of one’s psychic orientation, functions as a practical guide to daily life and helps to aid in the
construction and reinforcement of personal identity along with an explanation of the world they
reside in. Specific to the having mode, the orientation is often used as a retrograde phenomenon
where behavior reinforces existential theory and is often found to be divorced from conscious
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values. Action in this case is used as evidence to support axioms that aren’t necessarily true but
that can justify one’s emotions, behavior, and situatedness: face-value axioms such as man is
lazy by nature; a good relationship is akin to good teamwork; technological advancement equals
social progress; everyone is entitled to their own opinion because everyone’s truth is different,
are some examples of underlying social principles dispersed and parroted through the
individual. 466 Thus, in the having mode of living, the self is created and sustained through a
materialistically tethered feedback loop where meaning is placed in objects and objects in turn
lend meaning and purpose to the individual. Meaning and purpose that serves to construct being,
in other words, it becomes integrated in a person’s personality and character serving as means for
identity creation.
The key distinction between the having versus the being mode of existence is the manner
with which a person relates to and experiences the world. While having, possessing, and
attaining things is not in direct conflict with an individual of a productive orientation, Fromm
indicates that the characterological having mode necessarily is.467 In other words, “Even the
‘just’ and the ‘saintly,’ inasmuch as they are human, must want to have in the existential sense—
while the average person wants to have in the existential and the characterological sense.”468
Existential having, i.e. things we need to live, is a necessity. Having a body means humans have
minimum requirements in order to maintain life. This requires that we have, keep, take care of,
and use certain things for survival.

466

For further information on axioms influencing behavior, cf. Fromm, Man for Himself, sec. “The Science of
Man,” 20-25.
467
Fromm, To Have or to Be?, 85.
468
Ibid., 85-86.

207

In contrast, having in a characterological sense is a drive to “retain and keep that [which]
is not innate [to man]”469 but rather is a result of human conditions and environmental factors
that work to shape and reinforce one’s outlook. The ownership of property or possessions is not
problematic in and of itself but becomes “characterologically” problematic once man depends on
it to provide him with (a non-productive) identity and existential significance. The existential
dichotomies are problematized against a backdrop of meaninglessness and our need to derive
meaning for direction: criteria for how one ought existentially and ethically to navigate
themselves. Uncertainty “is the very condition to impel man to unfold his powers. If he faces the
truth without panic he will recognize that there is no meaning to life except the meaning man
gives his life by the unfolding of his powers, by living productively.” 470 In the having mode of
living, a person does not create his own identity but rather conforms his identity to cultural
demands and restrictions mediated by internal fears, insecurities, or whatever are the reasons that
preclude one from standing up and peering over the wall for oneself, so to speak. Over time, a
person can become potentially engulfed by the external entity leading one to become
pathologically consumed, and in direct risk of losing their own self. On a social level, this can
lead an individual to authoritarianism, destructiveness, or automaton-like conformity.
The nature of the having orientation runs parallel to the nature of private property471 since
it is a mentality primarily concerned with acquisition and definition. Consider the statement ‘I
have something.’ Where the ‘I’ is the subject and the ‘something’ is the object, the ‘have’
expresses the relation between the two where the meaning of the object, whether it’s a house, a
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car, an accomplishment, an interaction, a relationship, etc., lends definition to the subject. Ergo,
“the subject is not myself but I am what I have.”472 Moreover, the construction of the self
revolves around power as this mindset fixates on the level of control one has over objects and
one’s ability to attain, maintain, contain, and manipulate them according to one’s will. The
ability to impart force, measured by external development, becomes the primary mode of
acquiring existential validation. The predictability of causality and its rendered effects are a
necessary component of sanity—hence our inexorable search for objective grounding.
Maintaining and controlling a state of causal permanence—one that perhaps alters and shifts
according to one’s volition—is what imparts an individual living in a having mode with a
meaning laden pattern. That meaning, of course, depends solely on social recognition and
perception of that causal pattern.
To aid in the understanding of this involved theoretical concept, consider the following
example. Let us imagine a person who has a need (for whatever reason) to be acknowledged by
being the center of attention. Now, in time, this individual chooses show business as a
profession; more specifically, let us say that he becomes a comedian. A comedian, after all, is not
only center stage, night after night, but is also the only person on the stage. Additionally, making
the crowd laugh assists in any feelings of powerlessness he may harbor and helps to feed his
sense of self-worth—not only because he has the ability to make someone laugh, but also
because he can now compete against others with the same talent, placing him in a particular
hierarchy where he can further acquire higher status. By forging a stable environment for
himself, he can say he does the same comedy club circuits as his peers and is well respected by
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them, consistently kills, can draw in money for club owners, etc., feedback drawn from the
external environment becomes cause for ushering in an identity: He is a man that is funny, can
generate draw-power with his particularly refined personality, is a good friend—since he
socializes consistently with the same people—, earns a good income and therefore is a
contributing member of society, allows himself to be ‘open’ and ‘vulnerable’ by subjecting
himself to the crowd and is therefore fearless, etc. In sum, this man has come to ‘know’ himself.
To drive the point home a little further, let us also assume that the comedian was born
with the talent of making others laugh. This was not something he truly had to work for in order
to establish. Even in situations where the crowd might not have been particularly responsive, the
comedian always managed to somehow turn it around and have it work in his favor. One may
conclude, based on extrinsic factors, that the comedian is successful because he is funny, and
funny because he is successful. Given the hypothetical situation, one can produce a panoply of
meaning with which to derive a measure of existential significance, having achieved a
framework for his identity.
In continuing to describe the having mode and its relationship to itself, there are two
major takeaways here: First, the laughing crowd (and all that comes with it), acts as a measure of
permanence used to construct a meaningful worldview. Second, whatever meaning is derived
from that worldview is based solely on extrinsic factors. The having mode behaves as a type of
possessive fixation where the possession (and its perceived properties) provides the possessor
with meaning-laden use-value, only to be discarded should it cease to fulfill its existential
function of supplying and supporting an identity. This argument coincides with and mitigates the
unique difficulties that manifest from the comedian’s character rooted passions. Instead of
dealing with the problems head on e.g. his particular fear of separateness, powerlessness, and
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lostness, this particular hypothetical comedian masks them by creating a cocoon of personal
ignorance entrenched by empirical evidence; the sustenance of one’s ego. In terms of his mode
of relatedness, Fromm explains that,

In the having mode, there is no alive relationship between me and what I have. It and I
have become things, and I have it, because I have the force to make it mine. But there is
also a reverse relationship: it has me, because my sense of identity, i.e., of sanity, rests
upon my having it (and as many things as possible). The having mode of existence is not
established by an alive, productive process between subject and object; it makes things of
both object and subject. The relationship of deadness, not aliveness.
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Interestingly, Fromm uses the term “deadness” as the choice word to describe the psyche of
having. While at first this may seem to be a gross exaggeration, recognizing that relationships
procured with a having orientation are, at the core, symptomatic of emotional withholding and
stuntedness; splinter sized emotional defects that proceed to deprive the individual of the healthy
existential foundation needed for creative beings, and which can further evolve and develop into
full blown pathologies given the right circumstance. One where the ability to remain objective is
sacrificed for the retention of subjective safety.
In the case of the non-productive comedian that has assumed a having mode of living, the
way the crowd shows up is as an “object.” The crowd is an object that earns his affection
because it actively supports, promotes, and perpetuates his psychological dependencies and
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psychic needs—whether they be for simple stimulation, narcissism, finding acceptance given a
low self-esteem, helping him cope with depression or anxiety by providing a momentary
distraction, the need to control things (sadism), gaining him a particular reputation, or
conversely, the need to feel the loss of control (masochism) by allowing the crowd to control him
by ‘washing over him’ and affecting the comedy he creates, etc. Realistically, because the
reasons often come in syndromes, it is probably the case that given the lot just described, the
genuine underlying reason for doing comedy is a complex combination of the non-productive
traits described above intermixed with productive traits as well. In the case of thee nonproductively prone hypothetical comedian, should the crowd cease to be sufficient in providing
him with what he needs to sustain him, he would cease to feel fulfilled and no longer have a use
for them since they no longer are effective at keeping the “mask” on and insanity at bay.
Finally, let us raise the stakes by imagining that the causal link between his brand of
humor and what the crowd finds funny was abruptly broken. Suppose he was teleported to an
alternate universe where everything was the same except for what people found funny. He was a
man who always managed to make people laugh. Suddenly, nobody seems to get his jokes
anymore or simply finds no humor in them. Nobody even so much as cracks a smile in his
direction—the causal chain is abruptly and permanently severed. The termination of a perceived
external permanence is likely to send the person of the having orientation (in this case, the
comedian) into an existential crisis, looking instead to quickly patch things up with a sufficient
replacement capable of reflecting back to him the perceptive qualities he structured his identity
around. If no suitable replacement can be found or brought about, he runs the risk of
psychological implosion, given that his sense of self is not derived or generated from a being
mode of experience—an orientation whose behavior derives from intrinsic qualities unique to
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him. Hence, relationships and experiences are not alive and active but are instead muted and onesided; put in a Frommian description, it resembles a static “deadness,” instead of a dynamic
aliveness where identity is not built on an unconscious need to suppress phobias and ‘secure’
one’s well-being.
In sum, the relatedness of the having mode of experience pertains to the maintenance of
the identity forged by the accumulation and interaction with property and the on-going objectoriented/objectified relationship one has to the world and all life contained within it. His
relatedness is subject to character passions rooted in psychological self-preservation, victimhood,
fear, and the inability to be rid of or let go of emotional pain or trauma. Therefore, “the particular
form of relatedness is expressive of his character,”474 which (once again) generates and reveals
meaning in a dichotomous way: behavior born of love or fear, competition or cooperation,
equality or authority, liberty or oppression, trust or mistrust, hope or depression, compassion or
apathy, care or neglect, etc. Of course, when considering this at scale, the tribalistic-generating
nature of these dichotomies (or the actions they precipitate) would result, at a sufficient
threshold, in these same having mode features being reflected back from the collective society of
a having mode populace. Case in point, the failure of the “Great Promise” of unlimited progress,
and the ensuing arrival of climate change.
For Fromm, the Great Promise of unlimited progress was a Zeitgeist that promoted “the
domination of nature, of material abundance, of the greatest happiness for the greatest number,
and of unimpeded personal freedom.” 475 This promise, which sustained us since the industrial
age, is currently in its twilight, if not already completely shattered. It was built around two
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psychological premises: first, that the aim of life is happiness, i.e. maximum pleasure defined as
the satisfaction of any desire or subjective need a person may feel, which Fromm calls radical
hedonism; and second, that egotism, selfishness, and greed, insofar as the system needs to
generate them in order to function lead to harmony and peace. The failure of this promise,
according to Fromm, stems from “the distinction between purely subjectively felt needs and
objectively valid needs.”476 The former is being detrimental to human growth while the latter is
in accordance with human nature.
According to Fromm, economic behavior was separated from ethics in the eighteenth
century. The development of an autonomous economic system was supposed to be divorced from
human needs and human will and no longer determined by the question “What is good for Man?”
but by “What is good for the growth of the system?” 477 Putting our creation out of our hands and
having to adapt to it, he notes that the two premises of the Great Promise proved to be incorrect,
time and time again.
For the first premise, radical hedonism cannot lead to happiness since it is often
antagonistic to human nature in that. “the ‘pursuit of happiness’ does not produce well-being.”478
A major reason is that we live in a state of perpetual contradiction with respect to the theory
versus the actual practice of radical hedonism. When juxtaposed with the ideal of disciplined
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work, the contradiction results in the acceptance of an obsessional work ethic and an ideal of
complete laziness during vacations and times of rest.479 “We,” he writes, “are a society of
unhappy people: lonely, anxious, depressed, destructive, dependent—people who are glad when
we have killed the time we are trying so hard to save.” 480
For the second premise, egoism as described above is not solely a type of behavior but
takes root in one’s personality. Egotistic behavior, Fromm explains, is self-serving in a way that
one wants to possess all things for oneself and stand tall above the rest. Qualities such as
possessiveness become primary instead of sharing; what generates a feeling of pleasure is
possessions, one’s control over them, and the status that they bring. Since the aim of egotism is
rooted in the having mode of experience, naturally one becomes greedy and protective of what
one has since “I am more the more I have.”481
The underlying governing attitude in a society composed is of members predominantly in
a having mode of existence is that of antagonism and antipathy containing superficial
characteristics that take on the attributes of a relatively innocuous and affable persona.
Repressing true motivations, such members have to ‘cordially’ deceive and take advantage of
their customers, actively compete with their competitors in such a way that might bring them
complete ruin, actively exploit their workers, all while never being truly satisfied since there is
no end in sight to one’s wishes. Profits, for example, should always grow, no matter the
repercussions—at the expense of life itself. If this is the law of the land, how can its members

479

Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 6.
481
Ibid.
480

215

truly ever come to live in a state of honesty, solidarity, care, etc., especially when they are in a
perpetual state of struggle and warfare amongst themselves?
Speaking of consumer culture, we can more fully articulate how one’s mind and actions
or, total comportment, proceed in a having mode of being, and point to the contradiction between
someone’s property and one’s ephemeral interest in it. The having mode results in the process of
depersonalization, acquisition, experience, exchange, and character development. In the first, the
relationship between the owner and his property is an element of depersonalization. The object is
not concrete; it is first and foremost a status symbol and extension of power—what Fromm calls,
“an ego builder.”482 In acquiring a particular object, whether it be a house, a car, or a new
kitchen, the owner has actually “acquired a new piece of ego” 483—a new piece of himself. Next
comes acquisition, experience and exchange. Often, when acquiring a new object, the thrill is
short-lived.
Thus, in a consumer society, one does not purchase things for long-term functional use,
which also limits the amount one needs to buy (as one would given a productively oriented
mindset) but instead, the ‘throw-away culture’ allows one to gain momentary pleasure in the new
acquisition and to repeat the number of ‘endorphin bumps’ by increasing the number of microdoses, i.e. reasons for why one ‘needs’ a new thingamabob. Again, this works to increase one’s
sense of control while increasing the need to experience new simple stimuli. One has the power
to ‘find a good deal’, ‘make a deal’ with someone, add a missing piece to a collection, all
concluding with the feeling of possession and a false sense of empowerment. The object itself is
of no genuine relation but again, it is the process, along with what the object represents, that
482
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behaves in a symbolic fashion. Such activity and the acquisition of new materials objects act as
an additional piece of evidence, adding another line to the caricature of one’s ‘identity,’ and
making it the last and most important factor in the process: the development of a hoarding and
marketing non-productive orientation.484
Section II: Being Mode
The previous section gave an exposition the relationship between (biophilic) activity and
the having mode of living with the greater emphasis on the latter of the two. As just mentioned,
the idea is to show how a mindset plays out in behavior and partakes in society. Now, while the
last section gave specific examples of certain instances, this section will not attempt to mirror the
last. So, while I decided to give emphasis to the having mode of living by talking about energetic
forces and via analogies to a hypothetical comedian, this section will attempt to make spaces for
being mode/productive orientation in a different way. For one, I do not believe to be out of
bounds when I say that we are living in a non-productive society that fosters a having mode of
existence for its citizenry. This, after all, is the crux of the thesis of this dissertation: that society,
by and large, finds itself amidst catastrophe with no readily available solutions as a result of our
lifestyles, way of thinking, and general attitude toward each other and the planet we reside on. It
would not be out of line to say that we are society is out of harmony with the environment, its
institutions out of harmony with its members, individuals out of harmony with each other, and
the individual out of harmony with himself. Causal order follows suit from macro to micro and
vice versa. Thus, I felt as though the examples used to elucidate and clarify non-productive
mindsets/necrophilically disposed behavior was sufficient. The reader could readily extrapolate
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and apply the outcome on a social level; specifics were not necessary as they would simply be
obvious.
This section will attempt to give further inside into the being mode of living but in a
different format from the last. The examples provided below will be more suggestive in nature,
meaning that, given the description of the productive orientation in §4.4 and §5.2, this section
hopes to provide examples that more readily encompass the spirit of forward thinking biophilic
activity. Instead of a description, I will offer three particular instances that possessed the values
of Fromm’s humanism and managed to successfully realize the necessary changes for the better.
Each of the three examples—a behavioral study on narcotics involving rats, the opioid crisis in
Portugal, and the newly adopted economic ‘donut model’ embraced by Amsterdam—will be
presented in the same light and consistency as per the theme of this work: With a call for a) the
adoption of a systems approach to existential problems, b) the importance of considering the
internal factors influenced by and affecting the external factors, and finally c) application—the
final jump from the individual to the social, and theory to biophilic practice.
Essential to the being mode of existence is its consideration of systems dynamics in its
effort to integrate all parts into the whole. 485 Coming full circle and continuing the discussion on
systems theory, the subject of the first chapter, the nature of systems and the interaction of its
parts can be understood as a dynamic and interactive dance since “the proper function of each
part is necessary for the proper functioning of all other parts.”486 Therefore, there are six
essential features of system dynamics and their fluid function to take into consideration should
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there by a need of systemic and totalized change. This is necessary since systems are not merely
a static summation of all their components but rather dynamically influenced by its sub-systems.
First, regardless of whether it is an organism or an inorganic system, a system has a life
of its own. The system always comes to dominate its parts, forcing the parts to operate within the
given system and its motivating forces. It has an ‘inner coherence’ that makes it naturally
resilient to change. In other words, systemic change is very difficult to achieve and thus
infrequent. Second, this being the case, attempting to change an isolated part of the system “will
not lead to a change of the system as a whole.” 487 In such an instance, the system will proceed as
usual only to return the attempt at change back into the fold of the system norms. A genuine shift
in the dynamics of the system can only be changed if, instead of attempting to reform only a part,
the entire system undergoes a reintegration of all parts. Third, to understand which changes are
necessary to a system, a proper analysis of the functioning of the system juxtaposed with a study
of the direct and indirect causes of the dysfunction—along with resource availability to bring
about such changes—is required. Fourth, the optimal functioning as well as the dissolution of the
system are both contingent upon its overall efficient function and integration of all the parts. An
efficient system functions with minimal energy or consumptive friction between themselves, the
system as a whole, as well as neighboring systems. System disintegration therefore is a
consequence of when its parts are no longer able to adapt themselves in a regenerative fashion to
the demands of new conditions. Having lost its capacity to adapt itself, the parts become
“ossified” so that the friction within the system and the contradictions between the system and
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neighboring systems becomes so intense that eventually the system falls apart and
disintegrates.488 Fromm acutely describes these dynamic saying,

Between the two extremes, the optimal functioning of the system and its disintegration,
are many shades of partial dysfunction. Whether a system can recover its balance or will
disintegrate depends on the ability to introduce adequate changes based on the analysis of
the system. ...there are systems like that of the human organism or of a society which can
be changed by human interference, provided this interference is based on the proper
knowledge of the functioning of the system and the availability and of measures that
permit systemic changes and have the willingness to do so.489

Fifth, until now, systemic change was limited. Socially speaking, this is was due to
lacking material resources capable for such changes. Thus, ‘social ossification’ was due to a
pragmatic stilting. And lastly, sixth, system changes often fail to occur “not because they are
objectively impossible but for a number subjective reasons.”490 Reasons being, a lack of
comprehension of the function of the system—along with the reasons of its dysfunction—,
special interest groups that actively fight against any change that would be disadvantages to
them, and most importantly, the mindset to be found within the system that refuses to make
adequate concessions that will ensure necessary adaptation. Most people, including scientists,
tend to think linearly and in terms of momentary and obvious cause and effect, finding it difficult
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to think in terms of processes within the greater context of the system as a whole. When
attempting to subdue any inflammatory ills that present themselves, whether it’d be
homelessness, suicide, drug-abuse, or whatever else, it is done with a frontal assault to the
problem-at-hand, as opposed to the less obvious but more pervasive underlying social dynamic.
Taking seriously Fromm’s connection between the individual and society, this societal
process can be understood as the analogue to the individual’s productive orientation. Though the
expression of the being mode, along with its biophilic mindset, is hard-pressed to fully realize in
the form of a concrete expression and explanation; a fully mature person is impossible to fully
describe.491 It is, as Fromm might say, “indescribable in words” and is instead expressed by
sharing experience. Rather than describing what the being mode is, Fromm discusses the
prerequisites for it: “independence, freedom, and the presence of critical reason.” 492 Similarly,
one must have unity, rootedness, and effectiveness, as discussed in chapter 4. He also states that
“Its fundamental characteristic is that of being active, not in the sense of outward activity, of
busyness, but of inner activity, the productive use of our human powers,” 493 so it is the opposite
of the passive activity that defines the having mode. Productive activity is activity that engages,
interests, and creates: “Man—man and woman—can create by planting seeds, by producing
material objects, by creating art, by creating ideas, by loving one another. In the act of creation
man transcends himself as a creature, raises himself beyond the passivity and accidentalness of
existence into the realm of purposefulness and freedom.”494 There is a common theme in
Fromm’s work that suggests how one ought to become of the being mode by overcoming
491
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syndromes of the having mode. In fact, one can simply look at much of Fromm’s description of
the having mode to illustrate what the being mode is not and thus develop an understanding of it
in contrast to the having mode. Being is not clinging to what one has or using it as a crutch, as
one would with a having mode. Being is the opposite of appearing. One does not appear as kind,
one simply is. It lacks the persona of the having mode.495
At this point in this dissertation, I have fully addressed Fromm’s having mode. The being
mode is, at its core, the active expressions of the productive orientation, as discussed previously.
This can best be explained by way of examples of behaviors resulting from this mode of living.
Understanding the being mode is essential for understanding the illustrative examples and ideas
of solutions indicative of an alternative mindset from the one exemplified by the analytic climate
ethicists surveyed in part I of this dissertation. Having more thoroughly discusses systems
theory, we can now return to our initial example of the Cape Town water crisis since we are now
in a better position to appreciate the internal psychological side of the external behaviors
observed in the systemic solution that ultimately saw them through their crisis.
The example of Cape Town shows the power of shifting to a unifying mindset. As
discussed in chapter 1, such all-encompassing change must include events, patterns, structures,
and mental models, in order to invoke and establish the breadth of any new vision. Despite all
the necessary changes adopted by Cape Town’s government, overcoming such a doomsday
scenario would have floundered should there have been a lack of mutual cooperation among
“residents, businesses, and stakeholders.” Hence, having seen an acknowledgement of events and
patterns, namely the lack of fresh water and its causes, in conjunction with a structural change
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enforced by governmental institutions, would not have been enough without a shift in the
mindset of the citizenry and its culture. Ameliorative action must be introduced and injected into
society so that any changes undertaken are made simultaneously from the top-down and the
bottom-up. In discussing a humanized bureaucracy, Fromm explains:

While in alienated bureaucracy all power flows from above downward, in humanistic
management there is a two-way street; “the subjects” of the decision made above respond
to their own will and concerns; their response not only reaches the top decision makers
but forces them to respond in turn. The “subjects” of decision making have a right to
challenge the decision makers. Such a challenge would first of all require a rule that if a
sufficient number of “subjects” demanded that the corresponding bureaucracy (on
whatever level) answer questions, explain its procedures, the decision makers would
respond to the demand.496

Adaptation must be systemic and totalizing in nature. It is an entire way of non-productive
existence that instigates such existential crises as the Cape Town water shortage and only a
productive one that fix it. An example of what the effects of such a Copernican turn might look
like are encompassed in “Rat Park” and the shift away from previous methods of rat
experimentation related to addiction. An experiment that shifted our understanding of
dependency by observing the behavior of rodents when offered the option between narcotics and
flourishing.
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The salient feature of this experiment was its radical shift from the gauging the rodents
from conditions unnatural to its nature, and instead providing them an environment ideal to their
needs. One which allows them to a state of ‘internal’ mousey ‘fulfillment.’ Prior to Bruce K.
Alexander’s Rat Park—the acclaimed experiment published in Psychopharmacology in the late
1970s and early 1980s—, addiction psychology research focused exclusively on the external
factor of the drug. Experiments where a lone rat in an isolated box drugged itself to death were
the foundation of addiction theory. Mainly, that drugs like opioids were so irresistible that
anyone or anything who took them would succumb. Alexander looked at these experiments and
noted that the rat was not really living a full life i.e. a life most natural to its nature. Given what
the rats were subjected to there was nothing else for it to do but take drugs which ultimately
skewed data. Alexander and his team decided instead to build a Rat Park—as close as he could
get it to a rodent utopia that included alternative forms of entertainment and interactions within a
rodent community.
The result was an almost complete abandonment of drug use by the rats.497 In an article
titled “What Does ‘Rat Park’ Teach Us About Addiction,” Lloyd Sederer considers the results of
Rat Park and proclaims that “a social community beat the power of drugs.”498 To make an
analogy to human psychology, the environment these rats were put into inclined them to
eventually fall into necrophilic behavior. As noted by Alexander, “the drug only becomes
irresistible when the opportunity for normal social existence is destroyed.”499 It was only when
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connected with a community, given alternatives for expressions of activity, and a chance at ‘rat
productiveness,’ that the rats could exhibit a biophilic mode. Very much in line with Frommian
humanism, Sederer says, “Humans, not just rats, need to be part of a community, encouraged to
relate and experience the support of others. This is about as basic a psychological truth as
exists”500
Commenting on the results of his experiment, Alexander explained, “Our rats consumed
much more morphine when they were isolated. This fact definitely undermined the supposed
proof that certain drugs irresistibly cause addiction.”501 He then extrapolated into speculation
about potential application to humanity saying, “People do not have to be put into cages to
become addicted—but is there a sense in which people who become addicted actually feel
“caged”? … Maybe our fragmented, mobile, ever-changing modern society has produced social
and cultural isolation in very large numbers of people, even though their cages are invisible!” 502
This analysis parallels some of Fromm’s realizations that gave way to recommending the
adoption of a humanistic philosophy into the fabric of our social system. Alexander continued,
“This means that the knowledge of man, his nature, and the real possibilities of its manifestations
must become one of the basic data for any social planning.” 503 The implementation of such data
was critical to the approach to addiction pursued by Portugal.
In an article titled “How Portugal is Solving its Opioid Problem,” Rebecca Clay begins
by noting that “Portugal now has the lowest drug-related death rate in Western Europe, with a
mortality rate a tenth of Britain's and a fiftieth of the United States'. The number of HIV
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diagnoses caused by injection drug use has plummeted by more than 90 percent.”504 Prior to this,
in the 1990s, Portugal was in the grip of an opioid crisis that was so well established that 1% of
its population—across all classes—were addicts and had “the highest rate of HIV infection” in
the EU.505 This radical improvement in the health of the society was brought about by an equally
radically different approach to drug addiction by the society than previous attempts to solve the
issue. Specifically, Clay notes that the vital difference was that “The Portuguese model is based
in humanism—seeing people with drug problems as people with an illness.”506 Instead of
attempting to address the externalities of drug use, infection rates, overdoses, etc., the Portuguese
government began with the assumption that these individuals were motivated to behave in this
way for specific reasons, not simply out of capricious passions.
The solution to this miserable psychological state by the addicted population was
understandable, given Fromm’s connection between the need for activity and expression,
recalling the discussion from chapter 4,

To create presupposes activity and care. It presupposes love for that which one creates.
How then does man solve the problem of transcending himself, if he is not capable of
creating, if he cannot love? There is another answer to this need for transcendence: if I
cannot create life, I can destroy it. To destroy life makes me also transcend it.507
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Effective solutions addressing the external factors alone would not be enough. The new approach
recognizes this. According to Clay,

The goal is to empower individuals and help them attain autonomy, whether that means
helping someone get an identification card to help reintegrate them into society or getting
them to the hospital for treatment of HIV. The organization also offers participants access
to regular medical and psychosocial assessment, greater awareness of their health status
and access to community health and social services. 508

The lessons of Rat Park, being applied to humans in psychologically similar situations,
yield the same result: a healthier people and society. However, to consider this approach truly
effective as a potential solution to the issues presented by climate change, a further shift, from an
individual focus to a societal focus is needed. Such an instance can be found in Amsterdam
having become an exemplar for all future economic strategies.
As a city, Amsterdam has adopted a new economic model. The so-called ‘doughnut
model’ represents a significant shift in economics similar to the shift in addiction research of Rat
Park and the Portuguese solutions to the opioid crisis. As explained by Daniel Boffey in an
article in The Guardian, “The central premise is simple: the goal of economic activity should be
about meeting the core needs of all but within the means of the planet. The ‘doughnut’ is a
device to show what this means in practice.”509 Spoken in the language of broad-brush-strokes,
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the essential focus of the internal as related to the external (and vice versa) is apparent. It should
be noted that such a concept is scalable—equally applicable to the planet as it is to a city, if not
as equally easy to implement. Boffey explains that the creator, “Raworth scaled down the model
to provide Amsterdam with a ‘city portrait’ showing where basic needs are not being met and
‘planetary boundaries’ overshot. It displays how the issues are interlinked.” 510 The donut model
then is an economic model that does not gauge itself solely on GDP but tethers a social
foundation comprised of twelve social aims—health, food, water, energy, networks, housing,
gender equality, social equity, political voice, peace & justice, income & work, education—of
the Sustainable Development Goals of the UN to an ecological ceiling that considers nine key
planetary boundaries—ocean acidification, climate change, ozone layer depletion, air pollution,
biodiversity loss, land conversion, freshwater withdrawals, nitrogen & phosphorus loading, and
chemical pollution. The idea is to balance the two against each other in order to minimize the
risk of social shortfalls versus a ecological overshoot. In an article for the World Economic
Forum, the creator of the doughnut model, Kate Raworth, explains her motivations as attempting
a shift in economic focus,

In the 20th century, policies promoting redistribution were largely focused on
redistributing income—by raising taxes, increasing transfers, and implementing
minimum wages—along with investing in key public services such as health and
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education. All are essential, but they still don’t get to the root of economic inequalities
because they focus on income, not the sources of wealth that generate it. 511

This conception of the underlying issue associating the various, apparently disconnected,
problems Amsterdam was facing, harkens back to the systems theory and the mode of living shift
that Fromm advocates for saying “that the full humanization of man requires the breakthrough,
from the possession-centered to the activity-centered orientation, from selfishness and egotism to
solidarity and altruism.” 512 To that end, Raworth, in the humanistic spirit, notes that,

Instead of focusing foremost on income, 21st-century economists will seek to redistribute
the sources of wealth too—especially the wealth that lies in controlling land and
resources, in controlling money creation, and in owning enterprise, technology and
knowledge. And instead of turning solely to the market and state for solutions, they will
harness the power of the commons to make it happen. 513

With such an outlook from those designers and implementors at the top, members affected
within such a system will, due to its inclusive nature, partake in a relatedness that disperses
energies toward necessary objectives: the welfare of humanity and the health of the planet.
Pointing out the heretofore unique opportunity, Boffey notes that, “the world is experiencing a
series of shocks and surprise impacts which are enabling us to shift away from the idea of growth
to ‘thriving’ … Thriving means our wellbeing lies in balance. We know it so well in the level of
511
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our body. This is the moment we are going to connect bodily health to planetary health.” 514
Addressing the current bottleneck moment, Raworth expounds on the necessary measures saying
that, “By taking on such questions of distributive design, we’ll give ourselves a far greater
chance of tackling inequality and of thriving in the Doughnut’s safe and just space this century.
And that is nothing less than our generational challenge.” 515 With the previous successful
demonstration of the power of a more humanistic approach, the success of this social creation
experiment may seem a forgone conclusion. Whether or not it does, this represents an attempt at
the restructuring of the elements of society that Fromm makes use of to explain that maladies in
societies that need to be addressed on an equal level, i.e. at the societal level.

In The Revolution of Hope, Fromm makes note of the problems trickling down from
social maladies to individual maladaptive behavior. He explains that, in an ill society, “Our
Bureaucratic method is irresponsible, in the sense that it does not “respond” to the needs, views,
requirements of an individual. This responsibility is closely related to the case character of the
person who becomes ‘an object’ of the bureaucracy.” 516 In such a circumstance, the connection
between the individual members of society and the direction of the society itself is broken. The
result is a negative feedback loop replacing the positive one; what was once a society of healthy
and productive individuals, becomes a sick society, comprised of individuals exemplifying and
even defending the having mode of life they have adopted in response to their external situation.
To avoid this, a society on the edge needs a clear understanding of the undergirding properties
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affecting it. This is where a practical tool like the doughnut model might come into play.
Parallelling Fromm’s theoretical approach, Boffey quotes Raworth stating that “The doughnut
does not bring us the answers but a way of looking at it, so that we don’t keep on going on in the
same structures as we used to.”517 The potential outcome looks impossibly different from the
non-productive society Fromm describes above. By way of positive description, Fromm clarifies:

Whatever the merits of the source of the validity of humanist norms, the general aim of a
humanized industrial society can be thus defined: the change of the social, economic, and
cultural life of our society in such a way that it stimulates and furthers the growth and
aliveness of man rather than cripples it; that it activates the individual rather than making
him passive and receptive; that our technological capacities serve man’s growth. If this is
to be, we must regain control over the economic and social system; man’s will, guided by
his reason, and by his wish for optimal aliveness, must make the decisions. 518

It is hoped that, through the above analysis, the connection to helping our current climate
relationship and avoiding environmental catastrophe is clearer. Fromm’s Humanism does not
provide a step by step set of instructions for climate change specifically but instead points
society in a direction of societal and individual health that would improve our relationship with
the world around us. It is the unifying ethical foundation pointing us inward to the psychic health
and betterment of ourselves and, through a more productive human orientation, of our planet.
Humanism functions much like Raworth’s donut model: It is not a solution but a new way of
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looking at our situation to help change society on a fundamental level and avoid the status quo
that has enabled and allowed for our current dilemma.
Conclusion: Summing up Biophilic Activity
Section I, “(Anti)Humanistic Behavior,” and Section II, “Being Mode,” of chapter 6 were
discussions that, in exploring the distinct nature of a societal having mode of existence, in the
first section, and the being mode of existence, in the second, were done in the hope and
advocation for such a transition. As mentioned at the beginning of §6.2, societal change geared
toward productivity was best illustrated in the form of three prodigious examples: a study that
served to question our understanding of narcotics addiction, the handling and success of
Portugal’s opioid crisis, and the introduction of a new economic model in Amsterdam. The hope
is to take such ideas and scale them to the international and planetary level. The reason examples
were given in lieu of concrete categorization and classification—as was done for the nonproductive orientation in §4.4—was because the having mode “refers to things and things are
fixed and describable,” while being “refers to experience, and human experience is in principle
not describable,”519 albeit doing my best to do in §4.4, 5.2, and 6.1. Summing up “The Greatness
and Limitations of Psychology” (1959), As previously mentioned toward the end §4.4, Fromm
writes about the difficulty that arises when attempting to articulate and describe the full range of
a productive human, saying,

What is fully describable is our persona—the mask we each wear, the ego we present—
for this persona is in itself a thing. In contrast, the living human being is not a dead image
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and cannot be described like a thing. In fact, the living human being cannot be described
at all. Indeed, much can be said about me, about my character, about my total orientation
to life. This insightful knowledge can go very far in understanding and describing my
own or another’s psychical structure. But the total me, my whole individuality, my
suchness that is as unique as my fingerprints are, can never be fully understood, not even
by empathy, for no two human beings are entirely alike. 520

For Fromm, the way to bridge the gap between individuals and overcome the barrier of the
separateness is only through the process of “mutual alive relatedness.” 521 Thus, our relatability to
each other stems from our mutual experiences and is what ultimately lends us meaning in the
form of a greater ‘describability of context.’ A productive orientation therefore becomes through
context; through a consistent interpretation, revisiting, reinterpretation, and perpetual
clarification of perspectives and experiences. Its primary means of expression is the (inner)
activity which is upheld and conditioned by qualities such as autonomy, critical thought, and the
ability to empathize and consider the world around him. 522
Revisiting the conversation on active stimulation (versus simple/flat) in §6.1, the activity
of a person in the mode of being is produced by him and can only be a direct expression and
manifestation of the unalienated self. The activity in the having mode is mainly alienated
behavior generated and directed by an influence that is separate from the being; it is often
extrinsic, parasitic, and manipulative in nature; forces which drive means-to-end behavior
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instead of end-in-itself behavior. Therefore, in non-alienated or productive activity, the “I”
experiences “myself” as the subject of my activity. 523
To further elucidate this thought, the concept of activity is something that in the modern
vernacular is congruent with the expenditure of energy in the form of physical activity. Often,
contemporary definitions of activity include labor or a body in motion. It is socially recognized
purposeful behavior that results in corresponding socially useful changes. Furthermore, it fails at
nuance in the same way that the specialized field of behavioral psychology does, i.e. it refers
merely to the external behavior but precludes any description or reasoning for the impetus or
motivation of the action. Simply doing the thing, whether it is having sex, doing homework,
drinking alcohol, petting kittens, etc., is viewed (in a positive light) as a form of engaging
activity despite having been potentially carried out due to internal compulsion, anxiety, external
coercion, etc. Activity in this case is synonymous with and can quite easily be replaced with
passivity and busyness. Conversely, productive activity is unalienated in essence and not an
outcome of something that acts upon me in a pseudo-incentivized or coercive manner. It is
invoked and perpetuated of one’s own will and personal volition.
Furthermore, the being mode is in direct contrast to having mode and is an expression of
aliveness and authenticity in its interactions. Complications arise with the having mode since in
lieu of genuine expression there is mere appearance or likeness. One’s actions are motivated by
underlying forces such as fear, anger, insecurity, that are not organic drives natural to the person
but are instead interferences that alter the course of honest behavior, deceptive and artificial in
rendering. For example, if a society is prone toward aggression as a show of strength, substitutes
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licensure in lieu of freedom, promotes politeness without the underlying substantive care and
compassion, produces a populace that is well-behaved but lacking in moral fiber, or has a habit
of acting in a foolhardy fashion in order to elicit the word bravery, such a society, is prone to
masking its discrepancy between its behavior and its motivations. 524 Thus, behavior is not a clear
indication of accurate reflection.
Because of this, Fromm continuously stressed the importance of a humanistic science of
man to better understand mental health and evolutionary thinking. Mental health being
understood as a negative notion i.e. devoid of. He discusses mental health as being something
that is often considered as lacking ailment since it is understood or defined as someone who has
no neurosis, no psychosis, no alcoholism, no depression, etc. 525 Ergo, mental health is defined
negatively by the absence of illness, instead of “by the presence of well-being.”526 Part of the
pathway to such a definition of mental health tries to invoke the spirit of architecture and the
planning of future models. It suggests new ways to learn, to express anger, to form bonds and
relationships, amidst a new hierarchy of value judgements, away from a having mode of
thinking.
The inextricable interaction between individual and society is such that neither can be
isolated from its interrelated context and justly assessed and understood as though it were an
independent and isolated source. For Fromm, a healthy mind—of course with exceptions—are
more likely to be developed in healthy societies; the problems of individual mental health and
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social mental health simply cannot be separated.527 The productive orientation is therefore a
symptom of mental health, free of particular conditions, constraints, and hindrances. As Fromm
explains,

Mental health would be a syndrome of unalienated, relatively not narcissistic, not
anxious, and not destructive, but productive individuals. …people who are interested in
life…The capacity to be interested in life depends not only on individual factors, but on
very significant social factors. The main form of coping with mental illness and trying to
achieve mental health, is not primarily individual therapy, but is primarily the change of
those social conditions that produce mental illness or lack mental health.528

Social health, by measure of a humanistic standard, is the result of possessing an identity
and achieving independence by the overcoming of isolation, alienation and a narcissistic
worldview. Such a society is built upon a culture of interrelatedness possessing a cooperative
ethos as a result of a productive and existentially healthy psychology. The first step to the
overcoming of a necrophilic culture with destructive predispositions and predilections, as
discussed in §4.1, begins with hope; hope in transcendence and in the unlikely possibility that
progress is possible. That same hope behaves as a social guardrail that structures life conditions,
enabling man to unfold individually with faith in himself and a reasonable dependence on
another person(s) “but without feeding from him, not eating him up.” 529 Thus, humanism lends
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us a productive orientation whose core values—objectivity, solidarity, love—generate a
psychological predilection for the flourishing of all of mankind.
A society that fosters a productive orientation among its members and adopts a being
mode of living as part of its structural framework would more likely be able to achieve planetary
sustainability since its definition of what is useful and what constitutes activity would differ,
putting in place a system that would allow us to overcome ourselves in order to be what we are.
Fromm describes such activity within such society, saying that

Its fundamental characteristic is that of being active, not in the sense of outward activity,
of busyness, but of inner activity, the productive use of our human powers. To be active
means to give expression to one’s faculties, talents, to the wealth of human gifts with
which—though in varying degrees—every human being is endowed. It means to renew
oneself, to grow, to flow out, to love, to transcend the prison of one’s isolated ego, to be
interested, to ‘list,’ to give.530

Biophilic activity then is based on an individual’s psychic health, beginning with the
capacity to generate stimulation without the need of a constant external stimulus; a person’s
existential vitality is derived from their own sense of being, their sense of self, along with a
familiarity and comfort with one’s internal life. In effect, the opposite of an alienated existence
where such things seep and facet themselves from the outside in. This further means that an
individual is exactly that; he is given everything necessary to mold and set himself into an
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individual, one that is not dependent on external entities to define him but instead defines himself
according to his own peculiarities. Social engagement among productive personalities is the
participation of independent individuals that establish voluntary inter-dependence within a
community. A community comprised of such members further produces individuals that engage
in like activity creating a virtuous feedback loop at its biophilic core.
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Conclusion

Speaking at the international level, any political and economic systems centered around,
motivated by, and propagating a having culture will forever remain at odds. At odds within their
own nation states, at odds with each other, and at odds with environmental boundaries and
forces. Fromm warns that so “long as everybody wants to have more, there must be formations
of classes, there must be class war, and in global terms, there must be international war.” 531
Greed and peace, like oil and water, preclude each other. Therefore, I find it fitting that a
comparison between Fromm’s philosophy and the ideas explored in earlier parts of this
dissertation i.e. chapters 1-3, is offered as a neatly tied concluding bow to this work.
It is not that I believe that the analyses or arguments offered by externalist ethicists such
Broome, Gardiner, Garvey, Singer, Shue, etc. are incorrect or that they, in any way, are actively
advocating for a having mode of life. On the contrary, I believe that most of their arguments and
recommendations ring true when read from their given context. But, I also believe that any
argument made that actively calls for the preservation of the current mode of life or recommends
that by focusing only on small scale institutional changes as a course of action for entering into
an ecological relationship with our planet is inevitably going to fall short of what the data
suggests is required.
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My aim for this project was to add to the philosophical conversation by making two
sweeping claims in solidarity with the rest of my revolutionary brothers and sisters. The first of
the main arguments made throughout the course of this dissertation, ad nauseum, is that for any
change to be effective, given the current circumstances, it must be total in scope. 532 We cannot
merely install a carbon tax and hope that the problem resolves itself. This crisis requires the
effort of every nation and every individual to aid however possible, however small. Small shifts
in habits and the proper education of our youth will yield greater results in the long run. Those
who can do more, should do more. This means that richer nations in the West, as well nations
with new-found international wealth in the East, should work together to assist smaller and more
impoverished nations that are less abled. Any nation that attempts to “pass-the-buck” in order to
escape responsibility is sure to be condemned by future generations as those nations, and
individuals alike, failed to be on the right side of history in a time when it was most pressing.
Speaking as an American, the bulk of that responsibility unfortunately falls to us. Not only
because of our over consumptive habits over the course of decades (if not centuries) but because
we are also responsible (whether intended or otherwise, whether it yielded a net positive for
humanity or otherwise) for the spread of consumer culture and necessitating an international
market based on our ‘first world’ habits. Regardless of responsibility, all institutions are in need
of a radical reshaping since they all are part of an interactive whole. We should all do our part to
see that we reshape it for the better.
The second major argument is that greater attention, and even a prioritization, needs to be
given to mankind’s inner life in order to produce a healthier populace with sustainable lifestyles.
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The reengineering of the future should be centered around our psychological needs, not only
economic gains and technological advancements. I believe that Erich Fromm is one of many
examples that gives us a comprehensive way of organizing the slippery qualities of our inner
world in an objective way. His humanism focuses on the individual’s inner health and connects it
with values that promote health on a societal scale. This is what I believe to be the missing piece
of the climate puzzle. That perhaps instead of working with the ‘objectively’ external first and
leaving it to the random individual and general populace to subjectively ‘figure-it-out’ for
themselves. We can instead apply a Copernican turn and base the empirical, the material, and the
physical needs as requisites to our existential health and special nature.
The problem of existence seemed like a good place to start. It affords us the opportunity
to think in terms of circles. Where the point begins in the center of one’s psyche, and like a vine,
creeps and grows into activity, which then overlaps and affects other circles in a harmonious
entanglement unlike the phagocytic collision of worlds the having mode of living compels. A
conjoining of worlds forming a web-like ‘warp and ‘woof’ of enmeshed realities that are
interlinked by the common humanistic thread. This is not a new concept but has now become a
necessary one. That said, to reiterate, my two major overarching arguments are that systemic
change is necessary in order to achieve sustainability and that you cannot accomplish this task
unless you consider and change the root of the problem: the ideology born of mindset and
culture.
From these two arguments, four minor arguments splintered off to present more robust
explanations of the two. Again, keep in mind that the idea was not to act as an antagonist. All
scholars assisting in the fight for survival, the maintenance of our planet, and the opportunity to
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give future generations a good life, are superlative in kind and intent. Thus, my arguments are
more in line with observations than they are with actual disagreement.

(a) The arguments provided by climate ethicists focus purely to the external. Since the impact on
climate change is often observed in terms of the amount of carbon in the atmosphere, monetary
loss due to disasters, the amount of biodiversity loss, hectares of forest burned, loss of revenue,
etc., the analysis generated and solutions suggested by any thinker who solely considers
empirical data as the only useable data available, mirror these external statistics in their response;
as the focus is often on external and empirical explanations or, at best, virtues that inculcates
particular action. While this type of evaluation is absolutely necessary since the problem at hand
needs to be combatted externally, what becomes noticeable is the lack of consensus. What
exactly becomes the rallying point for recommended activity? Yes, the planetary landscape is
radically changing, but this is not sufficient to deploy concentrated counter measures with
concerted pressure. If survival is the main focus of research, this becomes too broad, since it can
mean different things to different people. If it becomes the preservation of life as we know it,
whose life are we talking about? The lives in affluent nations, poor nations, nations currently
amidst industrial revolutions? The argument was made that there is the need for a unified
prescriptive climate ethic and it was suggested that normative humanism can serve as that
univocal voice that ties all prescriptive/Step Two suggestions together by providing an ontology
to ground the ethics. Thus, the argument was to reorient our external focus to internal one
believing that this will create a longer lasting effect and more sustainable society.
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(b) Suggesting that we need not ‘throw the baby out with the bath water’ and that we should
work within the framework that we currently have, much like Garvey and Gardiner suggest in
the onset of the first chapter, leads to contradictory behavior. Conservatism is the root of the
problem in its unwillingness to shift to a more effective system. Given current climate
projections, by supporting the system or even parts of it, without advocating for a complete
overhaul in every institution, one is essentially advocating for a complete collapse of humanity
and all planetary species alike. This seems like an extreme notion prima facie, but it is this very
system, the one advocates wish to maintain, that, in its ingrained spirit of having, is
unsustainable on every level. 533
At the risk of being overly repetitive,
The revolutionary changes necessary to humanize technological society—and this means
no less than to save it from physical destruction, de-humanization and madness—must
occur in all spheres of life: the economic, social, political and cultural. They must occur
simultaneously, since a change in only one part of the system will not lead to the change
of the system as such, but will only reproduce its pathological symptoms in other forms.
These changes are: (a) A change of the pattern of production and consumption in such a
way that economic activity will become a means for the unfolding and growth of
man…(b) The transformation of man, the citizen and participant in the social process,
from a passive, bureaucratically manipulated object, into an active, responsible and
critical person…(c) A cultural revolution that attempts to transform the spirit of
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alienation and passivity…the aim of this transformation is a new man whose goal in life
is being, not having and using.534

(c) and (d) As mentioned just now the analysis of external consequences is vital to combatting
the climate crisis, but there is a difference between them e.g. in the case of Broome or other
kinds of externalists. There is a significant difference between the ethicists of chapters 1 and 2
and the economic-philosopher John Broome in chapter 3. I initially chose Broome to be the
poster child for the current climate ethics field. Many of which are of a utilitarian ilk, often
utilizing a type of hyper cost-benefit analysis of just about everything. Many of the papers used
earlier in this dissertation were rife with pie charts, line graphs, and mathematical equations, all
used to unearth and better explain their conclusions. Ethics papers often sounded like scientific
ones, except that, in addition to presenting a collection of data, they included an argument. Thus,
if one [myself] was going to make an argument against these ‘externalists,’ Broome would be the
person one should ‘lean in’ on given his economic background. After all, economists are analytic
exemplars and the debate over climate ethics has been dominated by analytic climate ethicists as
discussed in part I.
The climate ethicist is responsible for extrapolating and articulating ethical conundrums.
Gardiner, Garvey, Jamieson, Parfit, Caney, Shue, Singer, et al., all do a phenomenal job at this.
After all, they are professional ethicists. They are great at finding highly specific places where
the mind becomes ‘stuck’ and precludes action. In my opinion, the major debates in climate
ethics are all anthropocentric and are roughly four in number. They are: 1) the intergenerational
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problem, i.e. what do generations owe to each other?, 2) climate justice i.e. allocation of
emissions and national and international responsibilities, including economics, migration, etc. 3)
population, and 4) poverty.
Broome is not like the rest. He is different. He is necessary, much like the other ethicists,
but in a much different way. While these are all topics that Broome discusses, his way of dealing
with the issue was not primarily through argumentation—not genuinely—but through economic
resolution. His kind of cost-benefit 535 analysis attempts to take into consideration all known
variables, as many known-unknowns as possible, factor in probabilities, and weigh consequences
against each other—this includes the value of life. Once this has been sufficiently understood, in
order to set some boundary conditions of our own, economic tools can help to articulate a
narrower course of action or help to weigh the best possible choice should difficulty arise
between several tough choices. More importantly, Broome’s current actionable plan gives a strict
criterion for specific guidelines to be followed. Any preferable course of action recommended
should be heeded because it is more beneficial than any of the alternative options. Whatever the
benefit is, it is explicit. Thus, given the particulars of the political world we currently inhabit, in
the case of political gridlock, for Broome, the best thing one can do is come up with a plan where
nobody has to sacrifice thereby building some political momentum.
By crunching numbers to generate a very accurate and effective cost-benefit analysis,
Broome is offering the closest thing to a solution among the externalists despite how incredulous
it may sound at first glance. Many ethicists attempt to balance values of the world we currently
find ourselves in against each other and apply it to a theory of justice. Broome, conversely,
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simply applies a calculative justice to the world as he finds it. The result is, in theory, an
actionable plan.
Ethical economists occupy a position necessary for the enactment of humanistic ethics by
way of an ethical induction. We need people like Broome, people who can understand ethical
language, and translate it into solid economic policy that is more likely to result in the world that
embodies humanistic values. But we must first begin with understanding what these values are
before implementing them. While all ethicists are taking part in both descriptive and prescriptive
analysis, Broome’s use comes later, after the embedding of appropriate value schemas—and not
a moment before.
This is where the other externalists come in to play, as necessary investigators into the
actual application of the values discovered and espoused by humanist ideals. This is a difference
in kind from what Broome is undertaking. Nonetheless, their qualifications, assessment of
qualities and values—including the creation of new ethical criteria—are a necessary part of the
conversation. In essence, they are currently engaged in precisely what they are doing, but they
lack a uniformity of unanimous objectives. They are like detectives fishing for information,
without having a case at hand to distinguish evidence from irrelevance when time is in short
supply and Hannibal Lecter is on the loose.
In sum, there are four critiques I have with the climate ethicists discussed:

a) The arguments provided by climate ethicists pertain solely to the external, ignoring the
internal.
b) Arguing for solutions within our current framework falls prey to contradictory
behavior.
246

c) Externalists are working without an ontological framework and thus minimizing
actionable traction.
d) Broome is missing necessary boundary conditions for an ontologically harmonious
state, hence his economic cost-benefit methodologies have no True North.

The aspiring ideal is to assist humanity to begin transitioning into the next epoch of its
evolution and to design a sustainable future that considers all avenues of psychic health. This is
not an area that is explored or fully understood. May researchers of every field leave no stone
unturned and let us work together for a better tomorrow. I submit to you that the top most
hierarchy of values is not life itself, nor its length, as most would have you believe, but the
experiential quality thereof.
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